THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 79, 30 September 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

If, as the BulgaTian- Minister" in Washington is reported to have stated, his country is out of' the war,, a peculiarly interesting campaign ;will end just as its real complications are beginning. It has already been pointed out that Bulgaria's chance of avoiding a great military disaster in Serbia; slender, depending rnainly^ upon :the result of the race for Uskub, which is the sole practicable link between the western Bulgarian and-eastern forces. But even ■if the Allies won that race—which would mean at least the prolonged loss, if not the destruction, of the army which used to stand on the bendi-'of the Cerna and west of itj Bulgaria, if she chooses to fight it out, can give the Allies a trying task. -.' The conoenti-ationiof the'main routes in southern Serbia at\ Uskiib, the extremely mountainous nature of Mace-' donia as a whole, and the consequent restriction of army movements to a few well-defined channels, results Una very definite" strategical situation in the area where the Bulgarian defeat has just been sustained. But if the Bulgars, whether retaining or losing Uskub; isurvive this first phase of the campaign, that comparatively simple. scheme will end sud-' denly,' and a new and much more complicated one ; will begin. .'• '„...

1 One of. Saturday's messages declared that the British occupation of Strunmitza had: opened the way for an extensive invasion of Bulgaria. But that, airy way of dismissing difficulties will not do, for the way into ■ Bulgaria by the Struina and Strumnitza valleys is far from easy when it is attacked at the outer ena. So far the Macedonian campaign, though, it has been fought against the Bulgarians, has not, been directed so much against Bulgaria as towards the release of Serbia from the invaders; an sinvasion of Bulgaria, which is wonderfully protected naturally by its mountain ranges, is an entirely ,different and most formidable; problem. The best way to conquer territory in which the routes are few and; embedded in masses of difficult country is the system which has proved successful in the past few ■ weeks—-shrewdly ' executed, attaclcs upon sections of the communications in rear of the enemy's front. .It was only that form of attack which perv mitted the British to reach Strumnitza, for the inability of the Bulgars to hold the range-in-front of the Strumnitza vaUey ( was due to.the' Serbians^ having cut the Vardar communications and dis-

integrated [. nearly the whole of. the enemy's front. And it is this'form of attack which is being f persevered with, and which now threatens Bulgarian territory. While troops are pressing northwest from Veles towards Uskub to try to complete the wrecking of the western army, another branch o£ the' attackers has swung off to the east from the Var-' dar, along the valley of the Bregalnitza, past Ishtip, aiid: its cavalry has already passed!beyond. Kotchana, which is 35 miles'in a direct line, and much further by road, eastward of Veles. .This is a very daring move, and the taking of its great, risks is dictated by the important results which will follow its' success.

Its apparent object is to cross the Bulgarian frontier, \v'"ch is marked by a forbidding and sharply marked range of mountains, and reach the Sta-uma River. It appears from one of to : day's; messages that the enemy has during the war built a railway running south from Sofia (beginning with the. old section from Sofia to Kustendil) and skirting the western end of" that extremely massive barrier, the Bhodope Mountains/ south of Sofia. This railway is the Serbians' target;, and the "cutting of it Would have' a smashing effect upon the Bulgars' eastern front on the Struma.

The evidence of Bulgaria's collapse is not good enough to rob these strategical details of their importance, for it is not yet known whether the collapse is real. The war has not yet touched more than the fringe of "Bulgaria. The army,, battered though it has. been in Serbia, is only maimed, not defeated;'and the problem of defeating it if the prospective negotiations do not end in peace will be a difficult one. None the.lesis, an appreciation of the methods, already rtdopUd, iiiul lh» axtsiwion of tb«m

pete Bulgaria's defeat, points to some of the influences that will tend to persuade Sofia to give up the struggle. It has been shown that Bulgaria can bs defeated by manoeuvring against vital spots. She has-already, lost .practically the whole of Serbian Macedonia. The eastward development of the offensive threatens her positions in Greek Macedonia—the country of Seres, .. Drama, and Kavalla, and-when that is'won, all that Bulgaria has coveted and seized of Serbian and Greek territory will have been recovered from. her. The next phase ,will almost, certainly 'edge -over into Bulgaria, in the neighbourhood of Sofia—a point, to which the nation will naturally be highly,' sensitive. The seizure and retention of Macedonia has been one of Bulgaria's chief war aims; and, defeated in that, she will have only the unhappy prospect of inevitable defeat, with nothing left to bargain with. • ■ . '

Readers of the war news have been accustomed during the past few days to read of rapid movements and sweeping successes, and it is rather a mental trial to turn back to the West front .and resume the study of far vaster' operations giving comparatively trifling results so far as forward movements are concerned. Unless one's maps are lar^e, it is almost impossible,to follow the- changes that lta,ve been made by the latest, Allied attacks. But far-more important results than shifting of'fronts have been gained. At this late season—corresponding to the period ;n 1916 when the Somme offensive was about to enter its phase of struggling against rain and mud, as well as Germans—Marshal Foch has chosen to openj a new and vast operation. In 1916, October was expected to be fine; as a fact, it' was the reverse. .-. Last year the month was finer, and there was. much fighting t including the later .phase 1 of the French offensive which had begun under Nivelle, and continued in the autumn:oh almost ejcactly-the same ground, of the Aisne, where a .long-drawn: battle is now in progress. The present operations are on two main sections—one on a front which is at present a; little over, fifteen miles, long, with its centre exactly opposite Cambrai; the.jother On a total front of forty miles, extending west from the Meuse north of: Verdun: But the'differ'ence in the extent of the fronts does not indicate a corresponding difference\in importance. Boih operations have already secured notable results.

ffhe British .attack against Cambrai covers, in. its southern half, portion of the ground upon which General Byng made his famous attack last November, and his army, is again fighting on that ground, assisted on the north by Gbn- 1 era]/Home's army, and by American.detacfiments on Tiis right..Taking the offensive as a'whole, nogreat depth has boen reached, but a clean breach has been made through the German line of defence on the Canal dv Nord, the Bourlon hill: which dominates Cambrai has been, won/, and Cambrai, hitherto almost important enemy centre, has b^eri' reduced enormously in .value, if not already, in British hiands. The Douai-Cambrai railway, which has ; been one of the chief German lateral lines of communication, 'is under fire. Quite apart from the break in the "Hindenburg line' 1 (which name is more or less imaginatively given to the enemy's positions here, »nee the Teal Hindenburg: trenches are now many miles behind the British front)/ the German organisation has been very severely hit. No comfort can be derived- by the enemy;, from" the fact that his canal line, which was such a formidable obstacle, was swiftly surmounted by troops who on land undertook V.task not unlike the naval, attacks at Zeebrugge and Ostend.', An additional complication, the extent of which is not .yet?; apparent, V given by the BritishBelgian offensive, in which Poelcapelle, six miles north-east of Ypres, has been.' captui led in an advance of-. two miles, and a large entry, has been made into the Houthoulst Forest defences., :

The southern offensive by the" French and Americans has also given important results. At last, after jmany battles on the same 'ground extending from 1915,, the French Jiave reached and breached the 1 railway west of.Challerange—aline which to the enemy in the Champagne is comparable to the Douai-Cambrai line in the north. For three years it 1 has been "so near-and yet. so far," and 'all the heavy and numerous fights that have made the names ;of the ■ " buttes "of Souain, Tahure, and Mesnil -familiar names, were fought for the purpose of reaching, or at least securing, .gunnery ■ command of this important railway^ Its present interruption forces the enemy to make use of a far less convenient and longer route roughly parallel to it, and from six to eight miles in rear, so far as lateral movements are concerned. The railway is not a direct line of supply from a base; it' h unly a distributing channel serving' tao actual 'front/ but none the less important and a serious loss to the enemy. The American advance west of the Meuse has not reached positions which ,vitally ; affect the German positions, though; an early development may l>e expected on the east of the Meuse, where the German positionsare now outflanked. „ Between-.the sectors of the American and the French advances,.the I front crosses the wooded hills of Argonne. Here no change; is. reported,: but the. battle is no doubt continuous through the. forest. ■■■' ■ ■;.'. '.'. ,••■' ■: '■■-■..:...;■. ■ -. ■:'