Evening Post. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1918. FISSURES IN THE FOURPOWER PACT

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 79, 30 September 1918, Page 6

Evening Post. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1918. FISSURES IN THE FOURPOWER PACT

i Though the ..possibility of. deception aid camouflage cannot, yet be eliminated from, the situation, we are inclined to believe that Bulgaria's reversal of her diagnosis of the war is; sincere^ and that she really, desires peace. '•• Her original forecast and. estimate of (German victory was arrived at in other; and- very different times. It was based on the Russian and Gallipoli i-everses, and on the Austrophile, taint, which JFerdinand had introduced i into the secret diplomacy of his adopted kingdom. But, since: then, much water has flowed under the bridge. The bull-dog tenacity .of France and ■Britain has counterbalanced the RussoRumanian collapse; the , advent of America has definitely, tipped the beam against the Central Powers; and it only needed a shock, such as the heavy defeat in Macedonia, to bring Bulgaria definitely into the "separate peace" market. Sofia has clearly ■. sensed the coining defeat of Germany; and again, as in 1915, is endeavouring to diplomatically anticipate^ events, though the anticipation is this time the converse of the calculation on which Ferdinand, builded when he attacked iSerbia. The Bulgarian Premier Malinoff is generally conceded to be a higher.type of man than his predecessor, the ex-criminal Radoslavoff; arid Malinolf is probably sincerely desirous of saving his country from the evil effects of a war the wisdom.of which he seems to have always doubted. So far, however, jthere is 1 no certainty that ■ Maliiioff's Ministerial bloc. is': powerful enough to withstand ., the, German•; .influences (that controlled, Bulgarian policy,- joinder Fer-., dinand. Perhaps the: best evidence ,of the political stability of. Malihoff's Government would be the deposition of Ferdinand, and the ejection of the German units from Bulgaria. , If Malinoff is both sincere and capable/it is hard to see how he can be acceptable to the German military forces in Bulgaria, or they to him. "I do not believe," says Lord Robert Cecil, "that the \ Bulgarian offer ia a trick: If it is, we\will not be caught.'.'

Nor is there any reason why the Allies should allow themselves to be deceived to their own detriment.: So long as the immediate military situation is to their advantage; they would be unwise to accept an armistice, for though such a concession might strengthen the hand of Malinoff in his. own country, it might also give the Bulgarians such a respite as would harden their hearts. Almost certainly the Allies will continue operations so far as to reap all the advantages offering in the Bulgarian-occupied territory of Serbian Macedonia. and Greek Macedonia. If this country—the stolen goods—is won back, the hand of a pacifist like Malinoff will be strengthened in another way, since the Bulgarian War Party will be weakened in its determination when it sees".the chief'bone of contention wrested from it.- Suppose, then, that, as a result of General d'Esperey's present offensive, the Bulgarian-occupied territory is Meased up to and including Uskub (Serbian) and Kavala (Greek); that the Bulgarian western army is iso : lated and driven into Albania; and that the Bulgarians and Austrians, confronted by the Italians, have to extricate themselves from the. Albanian mountains with heavy losses. These things would constitute a great military victory; they, appear to be the most 1 that can be Tea-, sonably expected. But, after-all this, the problem of conquering Bulgaria would remain, and that of freeing middle and northern Serbia (Serbia Proper) would also remain. .The practical question, then, is: When the military situation has stabilised itself, will it be better to eject the Bulgarians from Serbia and other hon-Bulgar territory by force of arms or by agreement?- The weakening ■of the Central Empires through ■ Bui- ; garia's withdrawal, or perhaps through her belligerency against them, would, of course, be a tremendous factor, the consequences of which would be-almost too many to enumerate. Some of them are to be found in a, London cablegram published in this issue, and offer much food for thought. Until every factor in the" equation is known, no judgment on the Bulgarian " separate peace " offer is possible; but the armistice is, at the present stage, not worth considering.

In any negotiations, .the Allies must use care not to, endanger the interests of their' smaller partners, Serbia a-nd Greece. In such. a. situation,' the part played by the United States Government, which is on the side of the Serbs, Greeks, and Rumanians, and yet not at war, with Bulgaria, must be very important. Therefore tho occasion is opportune for President Wilson's great speech, to which we will refer again. For Germany and Austria-Hungary, and also for Turkey, the. events in Sofia represent the writing-on the wall, the fore-warning of judgment .which 'cannot-be averted uor