THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 40, 15 August 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

The enemy's • positions on the new battlefront have moved still more slowly since yesterday, and the only appreciable change is on the extreme left of the German line, south and west of Lassigny. A series of townsl now stands just w front of the Allies. From north to south these are : Bray, on the Somme; Chaulnes, on the Amiens-La_ Fere railway; Koye, on the Avre; Lassigny, eight miles west of Noyon; and Ribecourt, on the Oise, five miles south-west of Noyon. Each of these places is now so' completely within range of the Allies' weapons that any special value it may have had as a depot for enemy supply in the past has completely disappeared. Their sole merit at the moment, as towns, is that they form convenient landmarks. The points of importance have moved back automatically to Bapaume, Peronne, Nesle, Ham, and Chauny. Noyon is a doubtful case, 'because the success of the French on the' hills about Lassigny brings it under fire, or at all events so much endangers it that it cannot be made a depot on a big scale. The actual capture of tho towns which now outline the enemy's front is therefore of minor importance. Heavy fighting has occurred at Lihons, which is just'west of Chaulnes; but it is not for the sake of Chaulnes, but to secure possession of the system of hills about it. From these hills the Allies, if successful, can improve their outlook to the East, especially over, the roads which radiate from Peronne southward through the six-mile strip of country west of the Somme.

The fightingabout Lassigny is the most important now in progress. An unconfirmed report states that the town has beon taken, by the- French ,\and if true this signifies that the Germans have at that point boon driven completely over the "massif" to the far side of the Bivefcto stream. The French, as one of to-day's cables points out, have had an exceedingly difficult task in subjugating the hill-mass, as each feature has had to. be taken by envolopment; and the steady progress that has been made is admirable. Complete possession of the hills, and the subsequent bringing- of ample artillery upon them, will double the effect of the success on th* Chaulnes sector.

range can be directed along and across the enemy's roads leading to Roye and Noyon; the Germans will be again in a pocket under fire from both flanks as well as the front, and they will probably have to retire again to a -line behind Roye, and perhaps behind Noyon as well. To be safe, then, against an offensive intended to drive them back upon the Somme between Peronne and the Oise, the enemy will be compelled to maintain great strength in this part of his front.

It was reported yesterday that the organisation of the first American field army, of 30OjO0O men in several army corps, has been officially announced. No hint is given as to how this army is to be used; but it may be supposed that it is a body independent of the. units which have been co-operating with the other Allied armies in the recent battles. If that is so, the new army becomes a big and welcome addition to the general reserve in the hands of General Foch. The appearance of this formidable force, roughly equivalent to eight or ten German army corps, is another instalment in the painful revelation to Germany of the submarine fallacy. It is to the rapid arrival and eager spirit of the Americans that the Allied successes of the past few weeks have been due. The cold months, when fighting has to slacken, are creeping nearer; and with a readjKand great supply of men, who can_ be trained to any required pitch during the winter, assured to him, General Foch has been in a position to draw far more heavily upon^his fully-trained divisions this year than he could have dared otherwise. The victory whigh. we ail anticipate next year depends upon the help of the Americans, but in consequence of their having speeded up their arrival to a quite unexpected extent, the first stages of the victory campaign have been advanced by more than half a year.

In our review of the four years of war concluded on 4th August, it was pointed out that, from the outset, Germany had no. chance of securing a decisive victory unless she secured it in the West, which she m^de a special effort to do in 1914, in 1916, and again in 1918; which final effort must now be adjudged a failure. But our review also regarded it as an open question whether an Allied victory in the West would, of itself, lever Germany out of Russia and the Russian borderland. The answer to this question depends on the nature of the victory to be, and on unguessed developments in the Eastern theatre, to which Germany seen® once more inclined to pay some attention.

There are a number of inducements for Germany to allow herself to be dis. tracted a little by the East. In tho first pla.ee, she.has lost her winning chance in the West, and, must find somewhere else a consolation stake, or what may pass for such; in the second place, she may sco military advantage in once more diverting Eastward an increasing proportion of the Allies' reinforcements; in the third place, she may favourably entertain the possibility of a short defensive line upon the Rhine, releasing sufficient troops to assure an effective German occupation of Russia. If Foeh were to find the Rhine front unbreakable, could Germany—with or without Aus-tria-Hungary—still defy the naval blockade, and, despite attrition, continue to hold Russia? This is the question which Germany has been forced, to face, by two successive Western defeats. It is the question which has caused the Allies to secure a foothold in North Russia, to diplomatically sound Turkey, and to finally launph tho Siberian expedition.

Allied policy ;s fairly clear. Allied policy is—and always has been—to seize every chance of exerting direct pressure in the Eastern theatre, consistent with not compromising the chance to secure the. decisive Western victory. Two things are basic to Allied success. Tho first is sea-power, which includes the holding of the submarine peril; the second is military victory in the West. If possible, military supremacy in the East must be added to these twain, but without compromising them. Not.an ounce of strength necessary to the West should be sent East. But neither should the exercise of power in the East be neglected when it is exercisable without prejudice to the basic plan.

The foregoing carries with it the conclusion that the fall objectives of the North Russian and Siberian operations are not yet definite. The Allies had to go to the Murman coast, just as they had to go to Salonika—-to forestall the enemy .armies in Finland and Servia. But, as events march on, the Salonika and North Russian organisations may yet become offensive in the larger sense. Germany would rejoice to see an excessive Allied diversion 'to North Russia, and she would be glad to see no Allied occupation at all. She must be disappointed both ways. Now that the sea terminal of the Murman railway is closed to him, the enemy is said to contemplate breaking through Finland on to the Norwegian coast. This new movement to the sea, if persisted in, must be countered in turn. Part of the price to Germany would be the belligerency of Norway. But if Berlin will risk a breach even with Madrid, why should it hesitate to dragoon Christiania?

The Siberian expedition, led by Japan, is said to be limited in purpose. There is, it is stated, no plan to create a new liussian front against Germany. There is, however, a distinct intention to support the Czecho-Slovaks; and in this connection the official recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied nation is of immense importance. It means that their forces, fighting in liussian territory, are now our forces; and there is therefore an Allied (Czecho-Sloyak) front in Eastern Siberia and also in Eastern Russia. And if this is not a big step towards creating a new Russian front against Germany, what is it? If the Czechoslovaks can hold their ground, the Allies are once more a big military force in Russia; and in support of the Czechoslovaks the Allies have now gone to an extreme length, both militarily and politically. Which is another proof that the Versailles Council and the several Governments are increasingly recognising the importance of direct action in the Eastern theatre.