Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1918. GERMAN, JAP, AND SLAV

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 21, 24 July 1918, Page 6

Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1918. GERMAN, JAP, AND SLAV

The question of Japanese military action in Siberia involves a number of sub-questions, such as, for instance: (1) Should the expedition be joint or purely Japanese? (2) How far should impenetrate, and what should be its military objectives? (3) What guarantee should there be of ultimate evacuation ? (4) Is it possible that Japan will become the ally of Germany, on the basis of an annexed Russia, or of a reduced Russia? On the first and the third questions, some small light is thrown by yesterday's Tokio message, which reported "that the "Japanese Diplomatic Council has approved America's proposal for joint intervention, in Siberia," and that " a proclamation is being issued assuring Russia that the Entente has no aggressive designs." "Joint intervention," so far as it goes, reads well, hut there is no indication whether the American armed force participating in the expedition will be merely nominal—like that of France in Palestine—or militarily substantial. Also, a disclaimer of "aggressive designs" is not necessarily a guarantee of evacuation. These observations are made in no critical spirit, but only to set forth exactly what the Tokio message 'conveys. Even if it had stated merely that America had made a proposal acceptable to Japan, it would still have been of high importance,, since the main difficulty is understood to lie between Tokio and Washington.

In the matter of joint action, it is interesting to read recent remarks by the ruling Japanese statesmen. Baron Goto, Foreign Minister, told a Daily Mail interviewer that "if the Allied Powers desire that Japan shall do her best, it would be well to leave her alone to compose tho expedition." In more guarded terms the Premier, Count Terauchi, told an American pressman much the same thing. While welcoming " co-operative action," he declared that what Japan needed was "material and financial help," and he feared that participation of the Allies in the pxtual expeditionwould bs "impossible." In support of this contention, Count Terauchi estimated that the man-power of the Entente Allies and America would be needed in France; that even in European Russia these Powers Would find it impossible to place "half a million or one million troops"; and that therefore they would not find it easy "to send very many troops to Siberia." Clearly, then, the Japanese Government at that time visualised an expedition entirely or esseatially Japanese. Concerning military objectives, Count Terauchi made the following important statement:

As wo know it ,to be impossible to get reinforcements of Half a million or one myltea tewms hsm Ammb&, Great a*iiai», and fciremce to-tight, in. Rossia, t*

could not hope to advance so far as European Russia. The best policy in war is to fight nearer home, dealing- with an enemy who has come a long way into unfamiliar places. It would ba difficult to predetermine how far wo should go.

This means that the Japanese expedition does not propose to fight the Germans unless the Germans come a very long way to meet it. Japan does not intend to emulate Russia's sorry performance in the Russo-Japanese war.

Perhaps the most interesting portion of the interview bears on the question whether Japan will evacuate Russian territory, or whether both, Japan and Germany will come to stay. Count Terauchi was sounded by the interviewer on the possibility of "a new and smaller Russia. " being created between Gerraanoccupied B.altic provinces and Japaneseoccupied Eastern Siberia. An evasive reply contained one pointed sentence, to the effect that " we strongly desire that Russia should continue her national life for ever, even though she were to become in territory a smaller country." Being thereupon asked his opinion on the possibility of a German-Japanese alliance, Count Terauchi said:

That will depend entirely on how the present war may end. It is 1 impossible to predict the changes which the conclusion of this war may bring. If the exigencies of international relationships demand _ it, Japan, being unable to maintain a position of total isolation, may be induced to seek an ally in Germany; but, as far as I can judge, I see no such danger. In other words, I believe that Japan's relations with the Entente Allies will continue unaltered after tho present war.,

It is hardly necessary to enlarge upon tho importance of a public statement such as this, coming from the Premier of Japan. If it has been officially endorsed—as tho American paper publishing it avers—it is a proof that the Japanese' Government is not afraid to present the Allies with the alternative —even though a remote one— of a German-Japanese alliance. A Jap: anese Premier who speaks of a reduced Russia, on the one hand, and a German alliance on the other, cannot be accused of an incapacity to call a spade a spade.

This glance into the Japanese official mind is interesting, if not in all respects reassuring. At the same time it should ba pointed out .that even an endorsed interview is no index to a diplomatic agreement, though it may have been intended to influence one. The exact terms of the "joint intervention" remain undisclosed, and cannot be pre-judged.