THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 17, 19 July 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

General Foch has begun a counteroffensive, which, on the brief accounts so far received, has already had important resulte. The map publishedl on another page iv this iseue ahows tha locality affected. „ The object of the attack is clear ; it is to threaten the whole of the German armies south of the Aisne. As can be seen, the German push to the south has made a deep bulge, which, considering its depth, ie not very wide. II; will be seen from the map, lacking in detail though it is, that there is only one railway by which the Germans can send material into this salient. That is the short line which runs from near Coucy to Soissons, and joins up the east-aud-weet lines north of the salient area to .those within it. That railway, it is now reported, has been, brought under fire by the French. It is not only unlikely, it is practically impossible, for tho enemy to have built another railway to double their transport. The country is opposed to it. Right across the salient run tho valleys of the Aisno and Vesle, separating steep ridges and hills; and the fewness of direct roads ia not only a serious matter now, but must have been badly felt by the Germans throughout their operations in this area. The CoucySoissons railway, made available .is soon as the enemy had gained clear possession of Soissons, must, have been a Godsend to the German Staff, and if it is effectively shelled by the French the effect on _ the whole enemy plans in tho salient will undoubtedly be serious. This incident alone iB almost enough to justify the expectation of an. early retreat from the Marne.

The Foch offensive is not to be confounded with a general attempt to reverse the whole position on the West. As far as can be judged at present, it j/a a. calculated local effort to restore ii local position, and the time and place have been chosen probably not so much because of the danger of the German advance as because the opportunity was too sood. to ba a.Uowcd to pas* by. The taUat Gorman offsnsivs-doos not esera ta

have offered any really perilous threat, except to the French tenure of Reims, mid it is doubtful whether that city would be allowed to stand in the way of a strategic advantage to be gained by retreat. Merely to save Reims, Foch would probably not have attacked as he has done unless something more was to be gained tban a mere check. The position which has arisen, however, is that the enemy has sent very large forces forward into a deep salient which is very poorly provided with communications, the principal channel of which has proved to be vulnerable. Such a front is essentially dangerous; and General Foch has decided that the weakness of the German situation, combined with the desirability of saving Reims and thus preventing not only the straightening of the front but the acquisition of another railway channel, have made the attack desirable. ■ . ■

A notable feature of the French attack is that it was a complete surprise to the enemy. He was, according to the latest reports available, still fully occupied with vain efforts to renew his forward march east and south-west of Reims, and no doubt considered that the French and Americans hSd as much as they cared to do at once to hold up his efforts. He possessed ono railway into his big wedge, and in the height of his effort to secure another seems to have neglected to defend the first properly. There is' a distinct similarity between present events and the German surprise attack which recovered the greater part of Byng's gains at Cambrai last year. Apart from the Foch offensive, which after all has only begun, the situation on the big battle-front is entirely satisfactory. The Americana on the Marne. the Italians between the Marne and Reims, and the French (with some Americans) east of Reims, have been able to hold their main positions successfully and in places to drive the enemy back, inflicting all the time very severe losses. A new attack across the Marne reported yesterday afternoon has been completely reversed -by the Americans, who have returned to the river. Had no counteroffensive been begun the situation would be no worse than it was on yesterday's news; perhaps a little better.

The question of a general offensive, aiming at converting the whole Western situation so as to put the Germans on the defensive,' is a most interesting one, which cannot at the moment be discussed at length. All that can be said just now is that it is not likely to be attempted in the present condition of the armies. We have seen how General Foch has attacked v/hen, in addition to his being threatened by German pressure with losses which, if not serious in the strategic sense, would none the less be regrettable, the local conditions imply very serious results for the Germans if he succeeds. The same conditions do not apply on the front as a whole. The Allies are. menaced far more seriously elsewhere" than they are at Reims. But the menace cannot be abolished or even seriously Teduced by any offensh'e which can be undertaken by such forces as are at present understood to be at the disposal of the Allied command. An offensive generally implies that the attackers'have taken the initiative, that is, that they choose the time and place for themselves, and have it in their option to withhold the attack. But occasionally it happens that an offen- : sive is compelled by the enemy. It cannot be declined. It is possible that, for instance/as the result of a renewed attack upon the Allies' communications at and in the rear of Amiens, the Allies might be forced, to save themselves from disaster, to undertake a great offensive. But we may believe, on such data as are available, that such an operation is not desired by the Allied command. It implies risks which are not lightly to be undertaken, and if they are able to do so the Allies will probably spend this year in operations which in essence are really defensive throughout, unless by some miforeseen 'circumstances the Germans prove to be unexpectedly weaker than they now appear.