THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 16, 18 July 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

The theory that the present offensive represents the enemy's great effort has already been severely discounted by the nature and results of the attack. It is unfortunate that the idea was advanced at all in the face of so much improbability, because it implies that failure in this effort meane defeat of the major operation, whereas it really means only failure in one of the subsidiary attempts designed to prepare the way for the enemy's effort to gain a favourable decision. Militarily this battle, however complete a failure it may prove to be, will not decide the war against the enemy ;. though, by operating as a discouragement to the enemy and a confirmation of Yon Kuhlmann's theory that no victory can be won by arms, it may weaken the military party in the enemy group in the same way as did the Ausl--trian failure on the l'iave.

The real objects of the offensive wore probably much more complex than those of the great attack of March, which was a positive and single-minded effort to win a decision. At this early stage they may be sot out as : 1. To straighten out the front between the Marne (which formed the battle line from near Chateau Thierrj»to Dormahs)/ and the Argonne Forest, west of Verdun. By this means the Germans would have gained Reims, with whatever laurels such a conquest implies; would have secured valuable positions in the "Mountains of Reims," the mags of wooded hills between the city and the Marne; and would have secured for several more miles the strong defensive advantage of holding the heights on the north side of the Marne, with the river vnlley between themselves and their opponents, v 2. To induce General Foch to bring reserves to the rescue and weaken his real defence, which, as has been stated repeatedly, is centred about Amiens. ■3. Possibly, and by exceeding good fortune, to execute a genuine "dislocation" of the Allied front, which might be followed up by a battle of manoeuvre of which the shape and results cannot be foreseen. Of these objects, the importance of the first is least; but its chance of success is greatest, and it would probably satisfy the Gorman command pretty well. Incidentally, it is hardly likely that it would cause the Allies nny serious distress, providing the enemy .had to pay a proper price for his achievement.

The battle seems to have been practically over'ill ife first phase ir> one day. Nowhero»did the Germans advance more than six miles, but they seem to have pushed'forward to various distances over the greater part of the front attacked. Only in the immediate neighbourhood of Reims is any striking 'Change in the situation apparent, but there the front has closed- round tho city on the west and east, till it is in a close-fitting pocket of enemy positions, which has a. 1 very ugly appearance. If the enemy cannot soon be driven back from the flanks of this pocket it is not easy to See how the town can be retained ; and any effort to Jetain it, dominated as it its by an exferie.ive mugs of powerful t?un-poßiticMs, .jffiuld^ha jcawui*. -uutU. el. .man . U tJ».

enemy is determined to capture it. For the most part the German advance, as the French reports state, and the Germans virtually admit, has not reached beyond the lighter forward positions, and has not affected the main lines, which, in the present state of tactice, are miles behind "no man's land."