THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 138, 11 June 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

It ifi too early to make more- than, general comment upon the New German attack, which is aimed 1 at the MontdidierKoyon front, a stretch of approximately twenty-five miles (the distance between the two towns ie twenty miles). For once since the Amiens offensive, the course of the enemy's operations has followed the chief probability. Whether the German High Command wishes to pursue hie success southward by crossing the Marne, or to march upon Paris, or to extend the flank of his great salient pointing at Amiens, the French hold upon the heights around Soissons, at once an obstacle and a menace to the enemy, must be loosened. These positions and Reims, to use again a simple metaphor, are the straining posts upon which the strain on the Allies' front between them is held. The Germans can move the front either by stretching it further between the straining posts, or by levering it off one of these points of support. The former course is forbidden them because the "bulge" ' already made down to tho Marne is at ite limit of depth for safety, and, 1 to go any further would invite a. disastrous counter-offen-sive against the sides of the bulge.

Ths new drive is fw removed from Sakduuo &i wsen.l-~a.bout twenty fisiks.

Xone the less, one of its objects is to get rid of the awkward grip maintained at that position, and at the same time to widen the apt>x of the wedge south of Amiens. The whole front between Arras and Reims now forms two sharp comers, one just embracing Montdidier and Moreuil, tho other enclosing Keuilly and Chateau Thierry; and between these points it curves in an irregular arc through Lassigny, then between Nbyon and Eibecourt, then about four miles west of Soissons, then south to the Ourcq at Neuilly, and southward to the Marne, five miles south, below Chateau Thierry. The plain object of the new attack, as expressed on the map, is to begin the straightening out of this curve. Complex results would follow success in this object. It would, to begin with, reduce the number of those strong points of support mentioned by M. Henri Bidou as specially valuable ,to the Allies, and would throw the defenders back on to a line traversing the forest of Compiegne. In all probability, if the enemy attack progresses well, the Soissons positions will be so' much outflanked that they will have to be abandoned ; indeed, this must take place before the line as a whole straightens, and this particular sector may be regarded as a barometer of the enemy's prospects in the offensive.

The desire to straighten the front; between Montdidier and the Marne. merely aims at gaining means to other ends. The chief object of the straightening is to open, out, as already stated, the two sharp projections of the enemy's front. When this is done, either or both can more easily be developed into further advances, and at the same time neither will be so 'dangerous to the Germans if the occasion forces General Foch to make a counter-offensive. From a straightened front, moreover, it is remotely possible that the Germans may advance a new wedge directly towards Paris, which is already taking precautions against attack, by establishing local defences in the shape of an "entrenched camp," as it did in the early.days of the war, when the Germans were in much, the sain© region as they are to-day.

The primary object of the Germans in this year's earlier fighting was to drive a wedge between the French and British armies. They failed in their first effort on the great front astride the Somme. The same scheme underlay the attack in Flanders in April, and the surprisie blow on the Aisne in May, for the basic idea was to compel Foch to withdraw reserves from the Amiens region, and thus expose his weakest sector to renewed attack. The measure of success attained 1 by both these distant efforts is also the measure of their failure to secure the particular result aimed at; and the enemy proceeded, quite naturally and soundly, to make the best possible use of the opportunities he had created. The Flanders attack ended in practically nothing; it has pointed a pistol at the Channel ports, but. it is doubtful now whether the pistol is, for the time being, loaded. The AisneMarne speculation, however^ has pros-' pered better, and it is quite possible that it may prove so big a thing as to take control of the enemy's strategy and put the prospect of taking Amiens for the meantime into a secondary position. The official review of the week published to-day states that the present (or last week's) disposition !of the German reserves is against the idea that the plan has yet been changed; that is to say, the enemy still maintained the bulk of his full forces before Amiens and had not diverted them across the 'A-isne. The present offensive, however, suggests already a. modification of the plan, for these Amiens-facing reserves, or some of them, have turned south. "The of the Germans is the same—to compel the Allies to fight a decisive battle this summer," cays the report.

The German throughout the long and dreary war of the trenches has still pinned his real faith to the war of movement, though the fact has not always, been apparent in the West. He believes thnt his generalship guarantees him success, providing his- numbers are sufficient. It is very notable, however, that two opportunities to initiate manoeuvre battles on a great scale have already passed this year. In the March offensive, the Allied line pivoting upon Arras and swinging west from St. Quentin right back to within - a few miles of Amiens, traversed a vast triangle of country.' Some thirty miles oJ the southern side of that triangle, across country from the Oise to Montdidier, must have presented just the chance which a brilliant strategist with plenty of reserves in hand would have delighted in. The fact is, however, thjit the enormous cost of the advance ate up the German forces so fast that no use could be made of this comparatively clear opening before it was closed. It is precisely this front against which the German effort is now being made. The other chance which was not made use of was the breach due to the attack across the Aisne, but the reason for its non-development into a battle of manoeuvre of large ■dimensions is that the break, or rather its approaches between Soissons and Reims, were too narrow.

The desire of the German High Command to force a ibattl-e of decisive character is obvious; and General Foch is engaged in a tattle of wits to prevent it. As the Colonial Secretary's review indicates, it will take place if the situation really requires it. Otherwise it will he avoided. And the reason for this Allied refusal of battle is as plain as the reason for the enemy's challenge—it is the same. Germany is now, as she has ever been, laced with the certainty of defeat as long as the war remains one of ultimate forces, for the world is against her and her allies. She must win by battle; her opponents can,win by waiting, if they can find ways of waiting. To concede the German demand for a decisive battle now, General Foch would also accept the risk of defeat; and; because his line .-has some eminently tender spots, and the German line hcs none that are ontwardly visible; the chances, other things being equal, are rather in fayonr of the enemy_. That is why the difference of opinion between the two commands is at the moment so acute. In the meantime, it is appropriate to study an interesting dictum laid down by a very eminent German strategist of last century, the famous yon Moltke, and qnoted by a very eminent authority of to-day, yon Freytag LoringhoTen: .". the tactical defence has acquired a great advantage (from a local and tactical point of view)'over the offensive. It is true that in the campaign of 1870 we always took the offensive and that' we attacked and captured the strongest positions of the enemy, but with what a sacrifice? It seems to me, to he more advantageous only to proceed to •an offensive after having repelled several attacks by the enemy." And i'Veytag himself, after the experiences of this war, says: "A powerful offensive, aiming afe the overthrow of the enemy, has almost ■• always led up to a situation in which it was proved to lack the necessary troops in order to pursue its purpose to the end with complete security. Clausewitz expresses this when he says 'every attack must lead to defence/ 7

Yon Moltke, in the quotation above, speaks quite definitely of the "tactical" defence, but it is just the tactical defence which he extols that has prevented the enemy from converting his Western offensive into a- strategical success. The power of the defence, recognised by tlio great German soldier as long ago as the Franco-Prussian W^r, and due, a? he esplaincd* V» the WBtd UaveloiMnmti ot file-

arms, has led to'the position deduced by yon Freytag, that in nearly all cases the offensive has failed for want of men. To-day Foch is applying the advice of Moltke, to delay attacking till the enemy has spent himself—and, furthermore, till he has acquired a good deal more strength with which to take the offensive. The "blocking" process involves risks, and it is undeniably trying to the nerves; but it is better to take the risks and the strain than to lose the war, as .at this stage a rash general might easily do; and Foch always has a coun-ter-offensive up_ his sleeve if the risks incidental to his present plans become too great. .