ALLIES' COMPLETE AGREEMENT

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 45, 21 February 1918, Page 7

ALLIES' COMPLETE AGREEMENT

IME MUST BE NO OBSTACLE _____— | LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS THE ROBERTSON AFFAIR PREMIER'S CHALLENGE TO THE HOUSE (BX TEIiEQB-PH.—TOITED PBESS ASSOCIATION. —COPIBIQHT.) -' - fBEUTEB'S TEKEQBAM.) (Received February 21, 8.30 a.m.) - LONDON, 19th February. In his speech in the House of Commons on the recent Army changes, the Prime Mifaister (Mr. Lloyd George) said : Eetention of Sir William Robertson as Chief of Staff was latterly incompatible with the Allies' common policy, which was based on the assumption that the Allies'had suffered in the past through lack of concerted and co-ordinated efforts. The Government deeply regretted that Sir William Robertson's position was no longer' compatible with the policy decided on at Versailles j but, if that policy was right, no personalities, however valuable, important, or distinguished, should stand in the way ' of its execution. (Cheers.) If the policy was wrong, no personalities, no Governments, ought to stand in the way of its being instantly defeated. POLICY OF CONCENTRATION AND UNITY The Premier emphasised that there was/absolutely no difference between onr policy and the policy of France, Italy, and the United States in -this respect. The policy was based on the assumption that the Allies had hitherto suffered through lack of concerted and co-ordinated effort, and our purpose and policy had been to get concentration and 'unity of effort. It was only necessary to look at 1917 to find exactly the same set of circumstances, inevitably diminishing our power and the concentration which would otherwise have been possible in order to counteract the efforts of the Germans. and the Russian collapse. A CENTRAL AUTHORITY WITH EXECUTIVE POWER ■ It was agreed at Versailles that there must be a central authority, to exercise direction over the war policy; that that authority must be Inter-Allied and must have executive power. The only difference of opinionwas over how that authority should be constituted, but agreement on this point was also reached. , ' v The Premier proceeded to mention several proposals which were considered ■and rejected. One was that the central authority should be composed of Chiefs of Staffs, but this idea was unworkable. It -was felt thai the new body must not only know the conditions of their own armies on their own fronts, but all conditions on all fronts and of all armies. Versailles was now the repository of such information, which was coordinated by very able staffs. No single War Office possessed such information. The Premier proceeded to give cogent reasons why the Chiefs of Staffs in the various capitals could not properly exercise the functions aimed at. REMARKABLE UNANIMITY The Supreme Council unanimously rejected this proposal.' The delegations then separated and considered the matter independently, with the most remarkable result, that next morning each delegation submitted exactly the same proposed, namely, the proposal which now held the field. He would like to have read to the House the document in which the American delegation cogently put the case for tho proposal, which was finally carried, but he could not, because it was mixed up with the plan of operations. The American delegate presented the case with irresistible power and logic. The proposal was altered here and there during several hours' discussion, in which there was not, a single_ dissentient as far as the plan was concerned. Sir Douglas Haig drew attention to a weak point or two, and we undertook to remedy them, -but these were not points affecting the root of the proposal. . ' Upon returning here he reported to Cabinet that 1 he thought the plan unworkable and dangerous. Subsequently the Army Council made certain criticisms from a constitutional viewpoint. He considered these carefully with Lord Derby, who throughout put Sir William Robertson's case before Cabinet. SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S APPROVAL Mr. Lloyd George emphasised his anxiety that these arrangements should bo worked wholeheartedly by all the Anglo-French military authorities, and especially that Sir Douglas Haig should be satisfied. Therefore, before the agreements were made, he talked with Sir Douglas Haig, who said he would work under the new arrangement, which was that the British Permanent Military Ad- .. viser on the Council at Versailles should become a member of the Army Council, and should constantly communicate with the Chief of Staff, and should be absolutely free in the advice he gave; The Chief of Staff would have fhe same powers as his .predecessor (Sir William Robertson), and would remain the Supreme Military Adviser to tho British Government. He would accompany Ministers to the meetings of the Supreme War Council as Adviser, and have the right to visit France and consult the military representatives. Our representative at Versailles must have the most perfect freedom to discuss and recommend plans. If the Commander-in-Chief did not,approve, or if there was a difference of opinion among the various representatives, then the Government would decide. There was no derogation of authority by the Government. The Chief of Staff would be the Chief Adviser to the Government in the event of any such difference of opinion. It was only after the Government had decided to offer Sir William Robertson the position oC representative at Versailles that .the Premier realised that Sir William Robertson objected on military grounds to the system which tho Versailles meeting, had decided unanimously to adopt. Sir William Robertson suggested that the representative at Versailles should be made Deputy of Chief •of' Staff, but the Government rejected the suggestion because the suggested posi- ■ , tion would be impossible for any man, and would make the British representative inferior to other members of the Council. GOVERNMENT BOUND TO STAND BY THE ARRANGEMENT A voice : What about Foch? The Premier pointed out that General Foch was within twenty-five minutes of Versailles, and could be consulted in the event of an emergency. The Premier reiterated that the Government deeply regretted that it was obliged to proceed .without Sir William Robertson. The choile between carrying out unanimously the policy of the military advisers of the Allies and retaining tho services of the most distinguished and very valuable public servant was paid the fullest consideration, but, in view of the magnitude of the policy, the Government was boundvto stand by its arrangement with tho Allies. A PLEA' FOR MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE The Premier dwelt on the natural difficulties in securing the military unity of the 'Allies. Some thought the new arrangement would secure political unity, but it was merely the unity of armies the' Government proposed. He would invite suggestions from the highest military authorities as regards the best means of removing the anxiety that the new scheme might impair the efficiency of our Army. The Government would adopt any such suggestion to improve the new scheme. National feeling, historical Erudition, and suspicion militated against every alliance, while there were also other difficulties, due to professional conservatism. He pleaded for mutual trust and confidence, which was the very soul of victory. "We discussed and rediscussed this plan, in order that our whole concentrated strength should be mobilised to resist and break the most terrible foe civilisation has ever confronted. We faced the terrible realities.' The enemy had rejected most moderato terms, which the whole of civilisation had accepted as reasonable. Why had the enemy rejected them '! Because he was very clearly convinced that the Russian collapse would give him the power to achieve a military victory and impose Prussianism forcibly on Europe." "CLOSE UP THE RANKS" Mr. Lloyd George begged the House to turn down all controversy and close up its ranks. ' (Loud cheers.) If the House disapproved the Versailles policy, let it put in a Government which would refuse to accept that policy, but it nrost be another Government. (Cheers.) The Government was entitled to know, and know to-night, whether the House and the nation wished to proceed with a policy which had been deliberately settled with a view to organising our forces. "THE GRAVEST HOUR IN HISTORY" The Premier concluded : "I have endeavoured to discharge the terrible functions of my position to my utmost capacity and strength.' (Cheers.) If j the House to-night repudiates that policy, for which I am responsible, and, I believe, on which the safety of the country depends, I shall quit office with but one regret : that I have not had greater strength and greater ability to place at. the disposal of my native land ill the gravest hour in. its history,"(Loud, and prolonged cheers,)