Evening Post. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1918. THE "INDISPENSABLE" POLICY

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 45, 21 February 1918, Page 6

Evening Post. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1918. THE "INDISPENSABLE" POLICY

Now that 'Oie, 'Government's Versailles policy ia beffiore the Empire in considerable detail,, it is well to cast the eye over the recent rapid development of this issue. Ljvjrt Friday the following summary of tiie facts, and .of the outlook at that tima, appeared in these columns :—

The tsimple facts of the situation are that the War Cabinet, on the ground of military necessity, has done what Mr. ldoycl George said in November had not been done, and probably would not be clone.- it has enlarged the scope of the I bupreime War Council, and a lessening- of tho Robertson-Haig authority follows almost automatically. If the RobertsonHaig authority accents the situation and fiUty co-operates, tho outlook is tompotarily cleared. In tho alternative, a dangerous deadlock ia at once reached, and. either Robertson and Haif must go or the Lloyd George War Cabinet must fall. Though Mr. Lloyd George has not revealed the exact nature of the new order of things,»he has at any rate made it plain that the November compromise with regard to the Supreme War Council no longer exists. It has been swallowed up in ' the course of events, and the unity party has crossed the stream and has burned its boats. If there must be a parting of the ways, the sooner it comes the better. If not, an end should be made to the prevalent talk about resignations and comonlsory retirements." To this it may be added that the Prime Minister, while asserting the acquiescence of Sir Douglas Haig, has now proclaimed in the clearest possible manner that the parting of the ways between the War Cabinet and Sir William Robertson was inevitable. Though he did no*, use that phrase in the House of Commons, he declared that the measure of military unity required by all the other Allies, and supported by the War Cabinet itself, was "incompatible" with Sir William Robertson's attitude; and he gave the House its choice between the Government and the dissentient General. In short,, he based his defence .not on an-indispensable Prime Minister but on an indispensable policy. As the Manchester Guardian and other observers had anticipated, there was no responsible man or section in the House of Commons whey felt capable of challenging the Government on this predominant issue. In the face of the united Allied demand for military unity and the impending German offensive in the West, the co-ordination policy dwarfed all other considerations, and' pushed the Government's minor sins into the background. The new Prime Minister, to justify himself, would have had to reverse the Lloyd George policy and at the' same time retain the confidence of the Allies; and it is not surprising that no one felt equal to the contract. If the Supreme War Council were to lead to trouble, critics and reformers'would be plentiful enough, but in the meantime no one is prepared to slay the Council until it is dead, and the accepted policy is "wait and see." Symptoms of a Parliamentary crisis, according to the usually authoritative Daily Telegraph, have vanished. At tiie same time, if the Prime Minister is let off, it is not without a caution. He has been warned, even by the most loyal j Unionists, against bad newspaper comI pany, and Mr. Asquith has found time to direct; a dart at the peculiar genius whose activities are now supposed to be diverted Into propagandist work for "enemy countries." The greater unity plan is now an accomplished fact, and cannot be destroyed save-by the ordeal of battle. The steps and stages by which Mr.' jLloyd George has climbed to a realisation of its need— or, at any rate, the steps- and stages by which h^ has shown his hand in Parliament—may . resemble statesmanship less than political strategy, but if he has lost something of his usual directness it is hard to say what other leader of the House of Commons,. outside the Government, could afford to throw a stone at hini. Political equivocation and circumlocution were known at Westminster before the Lloyd George Government took office. We dealt last week with the point about swapping horses, now stressed by the Morning Post. The crux of the situation is not the well-known danger of a swap but the still "greater peril of a divided team pulling at tho ford in opposite directions. Mr. Lloyd George would have shown inexcusable weakness had he attempted to reconcile incompatibles. Having made his choice in favour of the greater unity, the rest seems to follow automatically; and there is no appeal save on the main issue, which no "responsible person is at present prepared to take up. There is not space to-day to deal fully with the details of the new arrangement, particularly on its military side, but attention should be directed to Lord Ourzon's brief statement concerning Sir Douglas Haig's authority. We take it to mean that the British Com-mander-in-Chic. 4: will have full control of ihis. own armies and reserves, but that other British reserves: that would other-' wise be under his command will form >parfc of a Council-controlled strategic reserve of which Sir Douglas Haig may ihave the benefit if the Council so decides.