Evening Post. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1918. THE KAISER'S MEDIATION

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 42, 18 February 1918, Page 6

Evening Post. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1918. THE KAISER'S MEDIATION

The telegram sent by the Kaiser to President Wilson on' 10th August, 1914, and published to the world at large only last year, continues to be a rich subject of historical analysis and criticism. The discussion is voluminous, but one phase of it perhaps may, in the space at command, be profitably touched on. On 30th July, 1914, while the Kaiser was still carrying on his professed "mediation" between Austria-Hungary and Russia, there came a moment when, he declares, he felt sure of a happy issue. "I felt," he tells the President, "that I was able to tide, the question over, and was happy at the peacefuj outlook." That moment followed on receipt of the following telegram, dated: 30th July, from King George V. to Prince Henry of Prussia, the Kaiser's brother :— " His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia, ■ dated 30th July, 1914,. • " Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to apt with Nicholas for tho maintenance of 'peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a European war—the evil of which could not be remedied —may be prevented- My Government is doing; the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and Franco to postpono further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation _of Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time, the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induoe Austria to accept ttis proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to _ prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that lam doing all''l can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe. ■ ' '< (Signed) GEORGE." The willingness of tha British Government to strain every point to satisfy Austria-Hungary—even to the extent of occupation of Servian territory—was favourably viewed by Austria-Hungary herself. In fact, according to the Kaiser, Vienna emitted the same idea .as London, and at about 'the same time. "This proposal," the Kaiser tells President Wilson, '' was in the same moment telegraphed to me from Vienna for Lon* don, quite in conjunction with the British proposal; besides, I had telegraphed to H.M. the Tsar the same as an idea of mine, before (I received the two communications from Vienna and London, as both were of the same opinion." With all this unanimity, the path of the " mediator" might well appear to be easy, and he might reasonably feel ''happy at the peaceful outlook." But Mr. David Jayne Hill, who was himself United States Ambassador to Berlin from 1908 till 1911, in the course of a detailed analysis declares that the Tsar was never advised by the 'Kaiser in the sense in which the latter i suggests. Mr. Hill writes:— "It is a singular fact that the German White Book, in explaining the origin of the war, makes no mention of any such message to the Tsar. The whole incident is passed over without a reference; and is thus treated, like the Russian proposal that the Austro-Sorvian question be referred to Tho Hague Tribunal, as a -matter of no importance. The German White Book purports to give the entire telegraphic correspondence between the Kaiser and the Tsar, but there is no allusion to a suggestion by the Kaiser similar to the British proposal, or of that proposal itself in any form.. No (proposal was made by tho Kaiser to the? Tsar except unconditional abstention from any intervention.on behalf of Servia under penalty of a European war. The British proposal reforred to by the Kaiser as opening the door of peace was never at any time or in any form communicated by tho German Government to tho Tsar or the Russian Government !" Surely this was an extraordinary line of conduct for a "mediator" to adopt. By withholding information from Petrograd on 30th July, the Kaiser did " tide the question" till 31st July, onVhich morning he was told by the German Chancellor that the Tsar had ordered general mobilisation. Herein was at once- found a pretext- for war, which Germany declared on Russia at 5 p.m. on Ist August. The Kaiser has thus to answer tho charge that he betrayed his trust as a mediator between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Thnre is, moreover, more to answer than that. In the last resort, the cause of tho war, according to the Prussian view, was Russia's mobilisation; in other words, tho Kaiser, after juggling with mediation, seized upon mobilisation as the password to Armageddon.. But even when judged on this narrowed basis, the precipitation of the war still remains a German crime. M. Reinach has pointed out that the signing of a mobilisation order is one thing, the promulgation of it is another. The Aiistro-Hniigarian order was signed on 28th July, the Russian order (a reply to the Austro-Hun-garian) on 29th July, and the German order on 29th July; but "tho promulgation of all three decrees for general mobilisation took place on the same day—the 31st—Austria's at 1 o'clock in the ffl?!?t|t!lgi Rn»Bi!»'f> in tfie fflVMiOßtlj ©«¥= pjaay'i »t }wo« v " Even *t, tb.wi gtnga—

even, indeed, on the day of the rupture, Ist August—war could have been averted had there been a will to avert it, because the German contention that mobilisation means war was met by the Tsar's specific declaration that it did not. " The Tsar's word of honour that his mobilisation did not mean war," writes Mr. Hill, "could have been made the reason for a. suspension ; and the British proposal, which Austria had accepted the day before, but which the Kaiser had never communicated to the Tsar, might have been sent to him with the statement that all the others had agreed to it." The failure to take any such step at the eleventh hour is an additional and convincing proof of Germany's guilt.