THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 23, 26 January 1918, Page 4

THE WAR

Colonel Repington, after iris resignation from the post of military corrfiaDonden i of the London Times, was Immediately attached in a similar. capacity to the Morning Post. His firltf contribution to that paper is, as might be expected, an outline of his military policy, and it does not differ in any noticeable degree from .the line he lias previously taken up in The.Times. His resignation from the famous London daily was explained to be due to" the Unwillingness of The Times to criticise thetrovernment's methods with sufficient frankness, notwithstanding that Lord Northcliffe himself has not minced words wh'en he has coneidered it advisable to tell the Lloyd George Administration of shortcomings which he has detected, especially after his visit to the United States. So far, however, Colonel Repingtoii, at all events in the cabled summary of his article, has not, either destructively or constructively, gone beyond what he hae been able to say in The Times.

Colonel Repihgton is a confirmed "Westerner." That is, he sees that the bulk of the enemy's forces are on the West; that there is no visible reason why they should go anywhere else; and that the West is therefore the only place where the Allies must seek a decision. Dealing as he does with th'o military problem, -he quite properly disregards for the moment the political influences which may at any time have enormous effect upon the course of the war, but which, especially in this war, are incalculable, and stick's to the question of men. If the enemy is_ to be smashed, it is the soldiers' business to smash him soon. If it were merely a question of fighting, there is no doubt that sooner or later the Central Powers must be defeated; but for obvious reasons, of which the British expenditure of seven and a-half millions sterling a day is by no means the least, the sooner the better". Colonel Repington does not believe that the 'British and French, on the present army figures, have strength enough to do what is wanted. The figures he gives in the article quoted to-day do not suggest that the enemy can put more troops into line than the British and French can, but they certainly do suggest that the Allies' balance of superiority will not be nearly enough to break up the stalemate. And there is the danger that, if the enemy does undertake a great offensive in the West (and the Germans are compelled by force of circumstances to be "Westerners" if they take the offensive in the decisive sense), they may make a breach of which the results may be highly satisfactory to them. For though a break in such a front as that in France is fraught with danger to the attackers, ther.6 is. always the Unforeseeable . chance that it might, in the hands of a daring and clever commander, turn into a notable victory.

• Colonel Repington advises, iri order to increase the British man-power to the maximum, a much sterner draft upon the manhood of Britain, and the transfer to the West front of 100,000 of the men now engaged in distant theatres of war. As to the comb-out, the problem is one which is being dealt with up to a certain point by the Ministry of National Service, and if that organisation does not obtain what men. are needed though they are available, there must be something wrong either with the Ministry's policy or else th 6 conditions in which it has to work make it inexpedient to call upon the nation for the required numbers. As for the withdrawals of troops s. from distant theatres, Colonel Repington's proposal does net give a great additional number of men, and there are very powerful arguments, worth probably more than five divisions of soldiers, for not relaxing the efforts in those far-off campaigns, costly thoiigh they are in fighting effort and: in transport.

It has become unfashionable lately to speak of the "war of attrition," but the fact remains that attrition is. still the main weapon in the hands of the Allies. It has been so from the beginning of the. real struggle, and so it will remain until the on each side compel ;i surrender vnhout- defeat by decisive lwtla pr miftble the isU-oorw sitU to inflict p.a the*-weaker a defeat which will

admit of no discussion. The two things—attrition and decision—necessarily merge into each other, and any large condition may move the merging point forward or back in time, as we may see in the history of the past year. Evidence of this, appears in the present storm of criticism levelled against the British High Command. This subject is dealt with elsewhere in this issue, where it is pointed out that judgment in the absence of evidence cannot be arrived at. Against such facts as the critics bring into line, however, must be considered these : That the offensives of 1916 resulted in a large retreat by the Germans, who had suffered very heavy losses at the hands of both British and French; that in_ 1917 both British and French made gains which, while not so extensive as those of 1916, were strategically and tactically more valuable in their results and left them with a great general advantage in position, with the enemy's fighting machine discounted both as to material and as to method; that the Germans, having thoroughly planned their defensive organisations, were hammered out of them, of whatever variety; and that thia was done, right up to the close of the fighting season, in spite of the fact that the Germans had secured, by the defection of Russia, greater reserves for the West front than was contemplated by the Allies.

One does not need to hold a brief for Sir Douglas Haig or the High Command generally to be prepared to admit that the difference between victory and postponement of victory may'have been due entirely to the assistance derived by Geimany from the Russian Revolution. Attrition depends as much upon patience as upon effort; and those who had keyed their patience up to the point of expecting a decision to be brought about after the wearing campaigns of 1916-17 were bound to feel disappointed when a new mass of resistance grew up out. of the Eastern mists. The trouble is of course largely one of point of view, and the Allied public has, probably unavoidably, been grsatly misguided in the past by being led to expect everything to happen "in the spring." Successive springs have in fact only been marked by progress towards the end which is inevitable if the Allied nations stand the strain of the war. The value of patience with the process of wearing dowrr the enemy is greater than/ever with America's weight slowly gathering' for the final effort.

The present storm of criticism in England is perhaps not so bad as it seems; but it should be borne in mind that elements necessary for such an outburst are necessarily present at any time. It lws burst now because of the Cambrai reverse; but to suppose that that unfortunate affair has any bearing upon the question whether the Allies should or should not have broken the West front before now is 1 to misunderstand both the general problem and the affair of Cambrai. There is just about as much relation between th,e'n as there is between the designing of a house and the cutting of drie of its rafters to the right length.