A GREATER VERDUN

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 13, 15 January 1918, Page 6

A GREATER VERDUN

Another and a greater Verdun is again spoken of in the cablegrams.- Mention in the cablegrams is never a guarantee, that a thing will take place. It does, indeed, often raise a presumption to the'contrary. . The Germans generally deceive by circulating false impressions, and it is only at odd times that they attempt to bluff through by relying on their reputation as perverters and by telling the simple truth. Therefore., public gossip is a very doubtful medium through which to expect forecasts of the development of German plans. But amid all that is vague there is one element of comparative certainty—viz., that the Germans must make some effective use of the time that must elapse between the concentration of their released reserves (released from Eiissia) and the arrival of the counterbalancing '. forces from the United States. Greatly as Germany relies on the submarine to check the latter movement, she cannot rely on the submarine alone. The pride of her armies would not permit it. They must do something to improve the shining hour, and the question is whether they will do it in the France-Belgium sphere, or in Italy, or against the Macedonian-Alban-ian front, or in the way of securing further possession of Russia. If the German army command is disposed, to bid for a military decision before the arrival of the new American armies, that bid can be made only in France and Belgium. But if caution dictates only a relative improvement of the war-map, then the first great enemy blow in 1918 may be delivered against Italy or against the quiescent mixed army holding tho lines across Macedonia and Albania.

Probably no one outside the German High Command knows whether the real aim is for a decision on. the grand scale or merely for war-map extensions in the direction of the Mediterranean. The most important evidence in favour of the former is the "huge masses of troops" reported in front of Cambrai by the United States Secretary of War. " A well-known neutral " attempts, in spite of his vague personality, to be very specific by locating the main blow at Verdun, " with secondary offensives against Calais and Italy." German Generals, it seems, claim that " the last effort at Verdun failed owing to the mud." Sir Douglas Haig also blames the mud for discounting the final phases of the Third Battle of Ypres. Certainly, the Germans at Verdun did start early—February of 1916—and their advance did slow down suddenly after about four days of success. But if a repetition of mud-fighting is to be avoided, some four months must elapse, and to the Germans time is of first importance. The secondary offensive against Calais would mean fighting a , Fourth Battle of Ypres, for the Third battle has regained most of the important higher ground that the British gallantly lost in the First and the Second buttles. All these twice-won positions must bu fought for again if the Kaiser's old cry "To Calais!" is to be revived with real significance, Tho fiiost interesting obttv-

vation of the " well-known neutral " is contained in the following: " Although the German machine is as powerful as ever, it is likely to collapse at the first military failure. Then tho masses of pacifists in the army and the civilians will bring tho responsible parties to account." If this is so, will the Germans put all their eggs in one basket, and stake everything on a bid for a. decision in France and Belgium? It is easy to see how keen must be. the domestic strife between the ambitious Ludendorff and the more cautious elements of the Central Empires. ■■