THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 109, 5 November 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

Tho Austro-German armies have now Teached the line of ifche TagKamento Biver over tie greater part of its length, and iifche enemy reparte that the east bank of the river is dear of the Italians over a long stretch. Ati Italian communique records increased , enemy pressure upon the left wing of the river Kne; that is. on the noTtth. The invaders have Teached the river at least as far as the Fella valley, which carries the railway that passes from Austrian territory into the Tagliamento valley and south to. Udine. The principal danger to the Italian defence is that ibhe enemy may be able to break a way through in this mountain region, cross the Tagliamento valley, and pass down on its west side of the great river obstacle. There should be no difficulty about holding the river against frontal attack. In the meantime it is not clear whether the Germans and Austrians have sufficient strength available to carry on an extended offensive against Italy. The present disaster has been the result of a wonderfully skilful attack; and thero i» a* present no reaeon to suppose that, even w^tft the reljutoroements tha enemy.

has received, and the losses the Italians nave suffered—something in the renon of quarter of a million men—the Italians are outnumbered on this front. There has, it is gratifying to note, been no further evidence of disaffection among the troops, and the -correspondents describe the army as making most heroic efforts to check the invaders so as to enable the.retreat to he conducted without panic. With such vast numbers of men to remove, it is astonishing that worse results did not occur. Aa the Observer s correspondent remarks, a touch of .panic might have converted the retreat into a disaster. As it was, it proved impossible to save the . vast stores accumulafted m the Friuli country. Having 5? °<H; thl? rich -with his soldiers, Mackensen is now permitting terrorism w have fuE sway. The late Ally of the Teuton combine is being drastically punished for her "treachery" to -ihe causa 01 kultur, and kultur is making an impressive lesson out of its opportunity. Having lost a large part of theChemin-des-Daines ridge as the result of the recent French offensive, the Germans have now decided that it was no longer worth while to hold on to the scraps of the heights they still retained. . "With catf tr.f4' ,they allege» they stole away from their foes and crossed the Ailette River. ( But the French seem to have known all about it. . The occupancy of the whole of the heights between the Aisne and the Ailette, the eastern end bf which is near Craonne, gives the French a. very great advantage of position. The immediate effect 15 to place the enemy in the Ailette valley under direct obful whether the position can Be maintained except by outposts. The backbone of the enemy's position is the Ste Orou ridge, north of the Ailette. But this ridge- terminates at Ste. Croix, and there are possibilities for enterprises on the part of the Allies - along'the Aisne Valley with the object of clearing the enemy out of the Reims district. In a review of the third year of the war, Mr. Hilaire Belloc wrote: "In August, 1916, rt 6 W ***' net Ween the Vos Sefi ™* the North Sea, all the pointe of observation. He overlooked the French from the heights above Verdun, from Moronvfllers, from the hilW Reims, from the Ai ß ne ndge, and from the bmghts south of Feronne. _ He overlooked the British liom the ridge west of Bapanme; from the Vimyridge, from the ridge of Mesrines. In 1917 all this etate of affairs was, reversed. The French success adds to the completeness of the reversal-; of the enemy s dominating positions the hill of Bnmont, north of Reims, and the hill of Nogent lAbesse, east of the city, alono remain in his hands. - One of the Germans' commerce raiders .probably one of the type which destroyed the Scandinavian convoy last month," if not one of the identical vessels, has fallen victim to the enterprise of British vessels. She was met by a destroyer flotilla in the Kattegat—a regioK which has hitherto not been the scene of a naval battle in this war. The importance of the news lies not so much in tie fact that a powerful and dangerous enemy' veVsel has been destroyed; but in the locality of the encounter. Sir Eric Geddes in replying to the critics who urge greater offensive operations on the part of the Navy, has pointed out the objections to sending the fleet into the Baltic, where it would be in grave peril of being cut oil by the enemy seizing the neutral islands behind it.' The fact that the Orermans would not hesitate to do so is of course, no argument that the British should protect themselves by forestalling them with a similar outrage against Scandinavian neutrality. But the presence of the destroyers in the Kattegat shows that the fleet is in close touch with the entrances to the inland sea, and is a striking indication to th« inactivity of the' Germans in defending a most important avenue for their U-boat traffic, lie.fight, according to a report from Copenhagen, took place twelve miles north of Sullen, which is a cape on the Scandinavian coast a* the northern entrance to The Sound. The official report that the British naval patrols off the Belgian coast deJ stroyed an "electrically-controlled highspeed boat" sent out to attack them is too inexplicit, as English experts point, out to enable a definite conclusion to be reached. But it is quite possible that i? D iemy be?n experimenting with small_ boats containing powerful engines, carrying no crews, and controlled by wireless. Such boats have been constructed, but hitherto have been regarded as scientific curiosities, They have no visible use except for purposes of war; and they are in effect practically surface torpedoes. The ordinary torpedo, -like a projectile from a gun, is beyond control as soon as it .is fired, and much ingenuity has/been spent in the effort to make a submerged weapon subject to subsequent direction, either by wires reeled out as it goes, or by wireless. So far these enorts seem to have had no important results The crewless boat is no less attractive to inventors, .but it is not particularly promising as a fighting weapon. It cannot use guns in a practical way, if at all. Its most suitable missile weapon is a torpedo, but the difficulty of arming a torpedo accurately at a moving vessel from a controlling station miles away or even in the air are enormous. It results that practically the only way to ensure a hit is to send the boat extremely close to the target ship; it may even b& necessary to ram the enemy vessel to make sure of a hit. This of course, makes it far more likely that the attacking craft will be destroyed first. All the advantage in manoeuvring, even with a comparatively slow-moving vessell, Ees with the one that carries men; and the offensive aoVantage is overwhelmingly in favour of the vessel with guns. The crewless bpat has,. except in the matter of speed, all the disadvantages of the early submarines, without the counter, vailing advantage of concealment.