ON WHICH FRONT

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 85, 10 April 1917, Page 2

ON WHICH FRONT

SHALL DECISIVE BLOW OF WAR

BE STRUCK?

RETIRED FRENCH GENERATES

OPINION.

; The whole world is holding its- breath, for a little- until the. spring offensive begins. Spring is a manner of speech, for there is a general feeling that winter may see decisive attacks. On which front will the great attack be made? West or east? That is the most actual question (declares the Paris 'correspondent of the,N«w York Evening Post, in a message dated Ist February).

It is taken for granted that any present offensive along the Western front can be made only by the Allies. The Germans, at most, may feign or, even attempt a desperate attack at some par- ' ticular point, to keep the Allies' armies at'attention and hinder them from surprise attacks. Everyone is familiar with the new method which, the English. I troopa seem to have begun. It may be. called the method of small raids, never letting up and really producing; larger results than many more formal attacks. They are prepared by the usual heavy artillery .fire and protected by curtainfire" —and, as the phrase is, they "clean up" i the enemy trenches at a restricted point. That is,, they kill some and take others prisoner, and force the rest to flee through the bowels of communication, doing their final damage by throwingl hand-grenades. ' ■ -

These sudden dashes end by, changing the front along one, or. two or sometimes more miles,"which is something. in this endless line of siege warfare. They undoubtedly keep the enemy an tenterhooks, never allowing him to concentrate, his forces. What most interests the general public is that, last Bummer, they proved to be the immediate forerunner of the big offensive along-the" Somme. By the- time this is read, it will bo luiown whether they, are the same now. There is no saying beforehand what is or is not possible or~p_robable in our sudden changes of winter from frost and snow to liquid mud and sticking, clinging, impassable ground. Nowadays the war. prophet must be a weather prophet as well, west or east. EAST VERSUS WEST. It is another question whether, with a view of ending the war, the Western or the Eastern front is more important just now. In France," as in England, there has always been a certain number: of war critics opposed to any offensive along the Eastern front. They,barely tolerated the Salonika expedition; and they still cry aloud that the war will end, shall end, can end only in the West. This is almost a truism, but it does not follow that their vague policy for. the East can be entertained. The insistence' of the Allies' note that the Turk.must go 1 puts a stop"to that." The war cannot end now unless the East, too, is; cleaned up. , , ... The retired French' General Malat'erre, abounding with the military science and experience needed for competent opinion, has jiist' put .the case in its.'mpst : " paradoxical form. ""To; talk of driving out the Turks and" of the Russian^ entering Constantinople when three-quarters 'of Rumania has fallen.in,three months'time into the hands of the Germans,, when the Russian defensive has to pull itself, together to bar once more the threatened ways, when the army of Salonika has not been able to get beyond. Monastiiy, when German submarines infest the Mediterranean, > and. Bulgarians and Turks share in German victories —how strange it must sound to certain neutrals. It. shows at least robust confidence in, the; outcome of the. struggle. Gan we imagine the Turks getting out of Constantinople,, the Bulgarians evacuating the Servian and Rumanian territories which they have conquered with their armies, and the Austro-Germans abandoning all,that East which they have[ so much at heart, if, the Allies' armies have not progressed and pushed them back and entered Sofia and Constantinople and Belgrade? And can we conceive victories of the Allies on the ! Western and Russian fronts important ' enough, by bringing about Germany's capitulation, to settle accounts in southeastern Europe, too, as the Allies have planned? , "In sum, have the Balkans, and: the Levant Jnow become fields of military operations so secondary that, without new efforts on that side, we have only to wait for the capital decision on the principal fronts? That, I believe, is the question ever since the check of the Allies in the. East." And already we see the fatal quarrel beginning. over again between interventionists and non-iter--. ventionists in the. East.

COLONEL REPJNGTON'S VIEWS.

After this plain speaking, it is evident that -the French/General is going to cross-examine the English* colonel, Repinffton, wbo is for making the entire efforts of the Allies on the Western iror-Jt. The-colon-el thinks that with the material -which will be ready in the | spring, the Anglo-French armies can be increased, to 5,000,000 combatants, and. so-do for the 130 divisions of German troops along the Western, front. OI course, the Russians must also "work on their, side and: keep tie Germans from dashing their reinforcements back and fonth from front to front. The French General .pursues his line of thought:— | . "The formula of a single front or a common front strikes the imagination, ■but it deceives the mind. There has Been no possibility of one'single front so iong as the East and West are separated t>y the Balkans and Turkey. The initial errorof the war -was-not to have realised from the-beginning this, indispensable junction between the two groups o£ the Allies through Constantinople and" the Straits." ' As may he imagined, General- Malaterre is not in sym-gathy with it-he plans followed in the first years of war to Bscure Constantinople. Ho says wisely, "History -will shed light on.them,' and, of course,, it is useless crying now over spilt milk. He discloses certain divergences of views. "Whereas (in 1915) the French plan sought Ito attack Constantinople by the two coasts _ a.nd m particular from the Asiatic side, the English plan went back to forcing tho Dardanelles." Even if the plan had succeeded, he contimies, the diplomacy I of 'the Allies had given the best chance j to Germany in the Balkans. Greece i defaulted,- and the "Allies took " a middle wa y "_' ■ they could not, save Servia and they could not force the Dardanelles." Then the real question of Salonica and the whole East cam© up. "It will bo the honour of France thalt she resisted those who advised, to give up and go away." .

MORE AWKWARD QUESTIONS.

Here General ..Malaterre puts some mow awkward questions—which aro of pressing interest for the future conduct of the war. . '

"Salonica not only saved the military situation, but also, and most of all, the moral situation of the Allies in the East. Why has the year 1916 passed in military inaction of the army gathered at Salonica ? Why has the intervention ot Rumania, which seemed a final act repairing all mistakes and faults, only brought with it new, reverses ? How is it that the advance of Russians in Armenia, has been stopped, while the 1 English have, been unable to get to Bagdad and have had the humiliation of capitulating xat Kut-el-Amara ? We know— but why tell it? Events speak enough by themselves." To those, who have not followed out every trail of information this is very exasperating. One remark the French general does make to satisfy curiosity : "It is said Kitchener-was opposed to Salonica. Possibly so, but: that ■ great, soldier had proposed something else which was another form of intervention in the East. It was an attack by Alexandretta. and Syria, to take the Turks by the rear in Asia Minor. This was also the, plan of General d'Amade." , It is curious to see the name ■of this latter French genera), who distinguished himself in Morocc*. and, has periodically appeared and disappeared during this war, thus crops up unexpectedly. But let us go on to the final conclusions oi General Malaterre —for they touch directly that which is now the burning question among neutrals also. "We are still at Salonica, still on the defensive. ■' But it would be a worse error than those, which w^nt Jbefore to evacuate Salonica. For that matter, the Allies do not think of such a thing —just the contrary. But in the presence of accomplished facts we- must pull ourselves together and look for the new manoeuvre that shall bring victory. We now, start with anVidea which grows stronger and stronger in our minds, and is penetrating deeply public opinion. We must finish the war in 1917—and this conviction comes to us from the very offers of peace by Germany. And in the present 'state of the military situation it seems to us that on the western front the decisive stroke must be delivered."-'