Evening Post. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 1916. BULGARIA AND GREECE

Evening Post, Volume XCII, Issue 55, 2 September 1916, Page 4

Evening Post. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 1916. BULGARIA AND GREECE

While the position of Rumania is now beyond challenge, the attitudes of Bulgaria and of Greece continue to be the subject of most perplexing assertion and counter-assertion, so that we are not yet certain even as to whether Bulgaria has declared war on Rumania. But without pretending to a"n exact knowledge of events which are still the sport of yes-no correspondents in the Balkans, it is possible to point out that the idea of bringing Bulgaria, and Greece, as well as 'Rumania, into line with the Entente is confronted with certain obstacles inherent in the nature of the Balkan races and countries. That is not to say the thing is physically impossible, but the idea is certainly much more difficult of attainment now. than it was when it broke down before under the strain of Balkan jealousies. Cast memory back a bit, and the picture presents itself of a still unbeaten (in fact, a victorious)' Servia and Montenegro, and a neutral Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, At that time the theory of uniting these countries, under the Entente aegis, against Austria-Hun-gary and Turkey was widely held, and on paper it read favourably. By the theorists the map was partitioned off, at the expense of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, somewhat as follows: —The Turk to be kicked out of Europe ; Russia to : have Constantinople and the Dardanelles, I with rights of pa-ssage tor the Black Sea States" (Rumania and Bulgaria); Bulgaria to have a frontage on the Sea of Marmora (including Rodosto),,to extend her Aegean Sea,frontage up to and including Kavala (lately occupied by the Bulgars), and to receive a portion of Servian Macedonia; Greece to be com-' pensated for the loss of Kavala by the gain of certain islands and of a section of the Greek-populated littoral of Tur-key-ln-Asia (an arrangement which M. Venizelos appears to have approved); Servia to be compensated for the surrender to Bulgaria of part of Macedonia, by the cession of a substantial Adriatic frontage to Servia and Montenegro, by the cession to Servia of Croatia and adjoining Slav districts of Austria, and. by the division between Servia and Italy of Dalmatia, Italy to secure Trieste, Pola, and Fiume; Rumania's share to be Hungarian Transylvania.'. By 'this mapmaking everybody would have got something, and "only the Albanian question would have been left open." Such a complicated re-drawing of boundaries was bound to give trouble in a country where racial and religious and geographical lines cut perplexingly across each other Still, as a paper basis for uniting the Balkans against Austria-Hungary and Turkey, the plan appealed to many Subsequent events demonstrated, of course, that it had no chance of success, because Bulgaria was only playing with it. Bulgaria's intervention od the German side was caused by the proGerman leanings of the Kings and Courts of Bulgaria and also of Greece; by the personal ambition of the "Tsar". Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who wanted more power than the Entente's rearrangement would afford; in a lesser degree, by the fact that the Bulgars wanted more of Macedonia than the said rearrangement seemed likely to give; and an immediate cause was the 1915 disasters to the Russians and to the Anglo-FTench in Gallipoli, which induced Sofia to "pick the winner" too early. Now, what chance exists to-day of cancelling these causes ? Even if we assume that Ferdinand of Bulgaria is a sadder and a wiser man, -and that pro-German influences are now subordinate both in Athens and in, Sofia —a big assumption ! —the fact remains that Bulgaria is now in occupation of Servian Macedonia, and stands redhanded before the world with the stolen goods in possession. Can the Bulgars be induced to surrender the country which they have bled to conquer? Or, alternatively, can the Entente possibly make a bargain that in any degree neglects Servian interests ? Even if a line of compromise can be found between Bulgar and Rumanian, it is hard to see how, after the Servian bloodshed, the interests of Bulgar and Serb can be reconciled under the Entente Powers, who have a sacred obligation to Servia, to Bulgaria none. In Greece, of course, the position is entirely, different. Servia was not deserted by the Greeks, or at any rate not by the Greeks as constitutionally represented by M. .Venizelos, It was King Constantine of Greece, acting unconstitutionally, who decided that the Serbo-Greek treaty did not compel' him to fight in defence of Servia, and it was this attitude of the King of Greece (the Kaiser's brother-in-law) that enabled Ferdinand of Bulgaria to fall in the flank of over-weighted Servia. Neither on the moral plane, /nor' from the standpoint of self-interest, is there any insuperable obstacle to the Greeks, under the real (if not nominal) leadership of M. Venizelos, reversing the King's policy and fighting with the Entente; but what effect that reversal of policy would have on the King's own position is another question. Rumours of, the replacement of rulers by their heirs are persistently current. Yesterday these rumours pointed their finger at Sofia;'to-day it is Athens. Without relying in any degree on such reports, it is safe to say.that all the main tendencies in the Greek situation make towards co-operation with the Entente. Of Bulgaria the same thing cannot be said, and Entente diplomacy is hardly likely to make tho mistake of trying to run with the bare and hunt with the hounds. A melancholy instance of the failure of that N plan is found in the policy of Constantine. So long as the Entente does not 'strain unduly to place itself in line with Bulgaria, nothing is more certain than that Bulgaria will presently, perforce, place herself in line with the En