THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 88, 12 October 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

The Balkan. Peninsula has become the theatre of two competitive efforts by the principal belligerents to link up with their isolated, or partly isolated, allies. Sealed up by the enemy in the Baltic and the Bosphorus, Russia, strong in men but weak in technical equipment, found herself without means of communication with her western Allies, except by the more or less distant ports of Archangel (Arctic) and Vladivostock (Pacific); both liable to be frozen up. An effort by Britain and France to force the ice-free Dardanelles and (ultimately) the Bosphorus was the logical conclusion. Equally, it became an objective of German policy to link up with the isolated Turkish ally, by way of the Balkan Peninsula. Russia to the western Allies represents a great reserve of men, awaiting only the military polish and the technical equipment. Similarly, there is in Turkey a considerable reserve of men, good fighting material if subjected to the manufacturing art of the German drill-sergeant backed by Krupp. While a forcing of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus by ' the Allies would bring needed equipment — military and industrial — to Russia, it would also bring Russian grain to Britain and France. Germany, also, would have something to gain from the Balkan grain-fields, and much to gain by breaking through the j ring that now hampers the Central Alli- • ance^ Considering what each side has to reap", and how urgent it is for each to check the effort of the other, one can easily understand why the Balkan Peninsula has become the scene of great rival efforts to drive a through passage. The lines of advance cut transversely across each other; one must succeed and one must fail. In effect, Britain and France and Italy, from the Mediterranean, are endeavouring to shake hands with Russia; and Germany, from the Danube, is endeavouring to grasp the swarthy paw of the Turk. Both cannot succeed unless they shake hands across each other; which in war is impossible. From the very nature of things, the Anglo-French struggle towards Russia must depend mainly on sea transport, while the German drive towards Turkey is an overland affair. It is, in fact, a contest between eea-power and landpower; a struggle between the British genius and the German genius. The Anglo-French entrenched lines in Gallipoli are separated from the Narrows forts (the key to Constantinople) by "only a few miles of sand and ridge" (to use Mr. Churchill's historic phrase); the way is short, but the mission is hopeless unless the sea is held and reinforcements of material and men are poured in. The distance from the Danube to Constantinople is very much longer, but the "nobbling" of Bulgaria by Germany has reduced it by at least two-thirds. For the moment, the Entente's hopes rest upon the Servian defender of the hills of north Servia ; Germany's money is invested on the Turkish defender of th» Gallipoli heights. And each side is trying to come to the aid of its protege. The attachment of Bulgaria to Germany —signified by the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and th« Entente—has given the Central Allianc* great political advantages; whether mili tary one* are to be added the next fevr days should decide. But, with the loss of Bulgaria, the movement of the Balkan States towards Germany and Austria seems now to have been stopped. Considering the frightful political tangle that the Balkans have presented sine* the war started — and now also, for that matter — it is probably unjust and certainly useless to blame Anglo-French diplomacy for the Bulgarian incident. Bulgaria, being more open to "military than to naval operations, has been magnetised to the German eagle; while ; Greece, sensitive to naval pressure, must almost inevitably side with the Entente. Rumania, most peculiarly situated of the , Balkan States, is tempted to irait and play her hand last of all. The effort of the Germans to march through Servia and their friendly Bulgaria,, from the Danube, has cast a new light upon our passage-driving operations in Gallipoli. The German-Bulgar activity precipitated that dramatic event, the disembarkation at Salonika of an Entente force, which has moved through Greece to Servian Macedonia, and is there concentrating to defend the Vardar railway. Now, the Entente concentration in Macedonia may be either defensive or offensive. If it is to be of any value, it must evidently be both offensive and overwhelming in scale; and the question to be considered now is whether, as far as the British Army is concerned, the main theatre in the Near East is to be the- Gallipoli Peninsula or Macedonia. It has already been shown that Macedonia is not only the road to Bulgaria and to Austro-Hungary ; it offers, via Bulgaria, the best road to Turkey, with a much greater width of elbow-room than is afforded by cramped Gallipoli. Undoubtedly, Gallipoli has military disadvantages. Whether the Dardanelles undertaking had military approval is not clear, but the resignation of Mr. Churchill was at least significant. Clearly, the Macedonian expedition raises some interesting questions. Is Gallipoli to be, or not to be, Britain's main scene of activity in the Near East? Considering that modern military progress is dependent on munitionment, can the reorganised munition industries* in Britain supply the huge needs of the Western offensive, and at the same time supply two expeditions in the N«ar East with the -all-conquering big {run* and th* tr«meadoue ammunition uuxoly tkuefor?

By launching out in the new Balkan offensive, Germany and Austria are endeavouring to carry on and supply three great campaigns. But are Anglo-French resources equal to carrying on three offensives, two of them direoted to the same task? And is such a policy, if practicable, well founded? Considering the failure (so far) of the Gallipoli expedition to achieve its main object, it is of the utmost importance that the Macedonian demonstration should not fizzle. A great force is required, and quickly. Servia is stated to be confident of her ability to hold the northern gate against the GermanAustrians (as she did against the Austrians) provided that the Entente holds her flank against the Bulgars. But :,hft Bulgarian army (according to a Russian statement cabled to-day) will total 400,000, and a small Entente army would probably be " swamped." It is true thai warlike operations by Bulgaria would probably bring in Greece as a belligerent on the other side. But that is not a probability to be gambled on. The larger the Entente force in Macedonia, the mow certain the Greek aid ; and, in the finish, it will probably require Servia, Greece, and a very large Entente army also to overthrow the German - Austrian - Bulgarian League. Another pertinent fact is that time is the essence of the contract. " While we are discussing," says a French paper, "the Austro-Germans are advancing." At present, the composition of the Macedonian expedition is not clear. It seems to be mostly French. If these are troops that were intended for Gallipoli, then their diversion to Macedonia will affect Sir lan Hayulton's offensive plans, and the curtain of silence over Gallipoli may not be drawn for some time. Diversion of military effort is always dangerous, and it would be worse than useless to make a demonstration in Macedonia unless there was a firm, resolve to back it with adequate force, and that promptly. If Italy has that surplus fully-equipped army that has been talked about, Macedonia is the place for, it. It will not find elbow-room in the mountains north-west of the Adriatic, but it will be able to help to turn Austria's position through And, above all, it is needed to smash the German drive and to prevent Bulgaria becoming Germany's stepping-stone to Turkey and the East. In the Near East there are now at least five fighting fronts : (1) North Servia, where the Serbs oppose Germans and Austrians ; (2) Gallipoli ; (3) the Caucasus (lapsed in silence) ; (4) Mesopotamia ; > (5) Sinai Peninsula, quiescent, but subject to revival. Macedonia is likely to see fighting soon, and a German paper suggests a British landing on Bulgaria's JEgean coast at Dedeagatch and a Russian landing on Bulgaria's Black Sea' coast. The crucial issue at present is the comparative progress of the German-Austrians in North Servia, and of the Entente's reinforcement of Servia in the south. For Germany, the road_ to Bulgaria is like the road to Calais ; she must force it at once, or her chance will be gone. Anglo-French troops arrived just in time to close the road to Calais, and for many weary weeks held on by the skin of their teeth. Will something similar occur in Serv}a? Will Christian soldiers defend the Servian mountains, and will the soldiers of Allah be confounded on the hills of Gallipoli? At the moment, no heights in Europe are of greater importance. — — — — — So far, the geographical information cabled concerning the German-Austrian advance in Servia is not illuminating. It tends to show that the Germans are attacking North Servia in a sphere further east than the Austrians attacked in their three invasions in 1914. If so, the Germans are shaping their course with a special view to linking up with Bulgaria. Precise information is lacking, but no permanent line of advance ' can neglect the Morava Valley.