THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 85, 8 October 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

An important new point in the question of Greek neutrality emerges from the columns of the usually reliable Morning Post It may yet prove to be a decisive point, confounding German detractors. There has always been a cer tain amount of mystery as to the exact terms and conditions under which Greece holds the j3sgean seaport Salonika- That city, which is the port of disembarkation of the Entente troops, was one of the conquests of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and there has been a suggestion that, as a result of a share in that conquest, Servia has certain rights of transit with regard to Salonika, and the Vardar railway According to the Morning Post, " the recent treaty gives Servia the right to use Salonika." But in what way to use ? Recently, in these columns, the point was emphasised' that warlike stores had passed through Salonika ard over the Vardar railway to Servia; which, of course, is no breach of neutrality At the same time it was pointed out that the British navaJ guns and gun detachments on the Danube could hardly have gone any other way than through Salonika; and it was tacitly assumed that they ,had passed that way by the consent, active or passive, of the Greek Government. The Morning Post's remark raises, however, the question of Servia's right to use, as apart from use by permission. Whether that right in eludes the right-of-passage for troops allied to Servia, and summoned by Ser"via to her aid, depends lipon the treaty conditions to which- the Morning Post vaguely refers. If Servia's right in Salonika (as a connecting link with the sea) does not go to that length, it is at j any rate an important factor in the con sideration of the moral question concerning Greek neutrality. In the absence of exact information, more than that cannot well be said. But, looking at the question as a. whole, is it not aa anomaly that Servia's ally Greece, holding- (partly in trust) the sea-outlet conquered with the aid of SeTb armies, should claim to be -entitled to close that outlet against succour sent to Servia by her friends? It is noteworthy (vide Athens cablegram) that the Entente troops, after disembarking, passed through Salonika and the strip of intervening Greek terri--tory, and encamped on soil which is Servian. Their-object is the protection from Bulgarian attack of the Vardar railway, the vital necessity of which as a main line of Servian communications ! has been already explained. 1 A Berne cablegram builds an interesting superstructure on the basis that the Serbo-Greek treaty provides that Greece shall attack Bulgari? if Bulgaria attacks Servia. According to Berne, King Constantine of Greece holds that the obligation to attack an aggressive Bulgaria does not apply to 'Bulgaria's ally Germany. In other words," Greece undertook to fight if Bulgaria attacked Servia, not if Germany or Austria attacked Servia. Berne adds that this was the ground of difference^ between King Constantine and M. Venizelos; and that Bulgaria will now come into line with Constantine's attitude, by refraining from attacking Servia. If this is true, it amounts to a considerable modification of the original German-Bulgar design that has been in incubation for months. The modification would mean that Servia would not be placed actually between two fires; but, in. a lesser way, she would still be subjected to hammer-and-anvil tactics. Bulgaria, as the anvil, would be passive, but destructively passive,, because her mobilisation on the frontier, threatening I the vulnerable line of the Vardar railway to Salonika, would compel the concentration against her, as a vital precaution, of a Servian army badly needed by Servia to repel the Germans and Austrians in the north. The diversion of Servian • forces caused by Bulgarian mobilisation might thus be only a few degrees less deadly than an actual invasion of Servia by Bulgaria. (There is, indeed, reason to believe that this state of affairs is arising, hence the Entente march through Salonika.) Germany, alive to every move of the game, would quickly alter her demands to suit it. No. 1 plan (Bulgarian invasion of Servia) being too risky, she might fall back on No. 2 plan (Bulgarian menace of Servia, with Bulgarian invasion held in reserve). To-day's .messages give indication (not amounting to proof) that this is happening. King Constantine of Greece is in a tight place, but is disposed to maintain masterly inactivity if Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria does not attack Servia openly. Ferdinand, for his part, has had a fright owing to the Salonika disembarkation_ and to widespread disturbances in his kingdom, and is not nearly so desirous as he was to make open attack. Noting the new anxieties of both these German-advised kings, Germany might well moderate the pace ; hence it is not at all surprising to receive to-day this cablegram from Athens : " Germany has given formal assurances that Bulgaria will not attack Greece, and will not attack Servia until Servia has been crushed by Germany." After which, Ferdinand will come forward for his jackal s repast. s Germany, according to her own atory, is applying the hammer without delay. Berlin states that large Teutonic forces have crossed the rivers (Danube, Save,, and Djma) that form the northern and north-western boundaries of Servia; a Servian message seems to allege the repulse of the invaders. The cabled movements of Bulgarian troops are easily grasped with the aid of an up-to-date map Strumnitza, a town on the River Struma, is the Bulgarian headquarters m the angle of Bulgarian territory pro- , jectmg westward (Serviawards) to near the Vardar River. This is the region where (as indicated last week) the Servian Vardai is within easiest striking distance of Bulgaria. Directly behind (that is, west of) the river is the) railway; and about twenty miles south of that point is the Servian railway town Ghevgheli, where the Entente troops are i likely to concentrate to defend the line. It is in, reaching this Servian soil that they have to pass -through Salonika and a strip (about thirty miles) of Greece. The Athens cablegram -about Bulgaria's fortifying operations at Dedeagatch, and her mine-laying on her Aegean coast, is in accord with anticipation ; and probably there is more anticipation than evidence behind it. Astonished by the Entente's activity, Bulgaria hails this turn m her tide by making peaceful protestations to Greece and Rumania, and by denials concerning the presence of German officers. Italy, by dismissing the Bulgarian Minister, falls into line. with the Entente. So 'far as has been cabled, it seems that London papers of varying shades of opinion are behind the Entente's new offensive in the Balkans, recognising that it offers ultimately greater possibilities than the Gallipoli position, and that the Entente cannot stand by and see the Balkan States one after another fall into the control of Germansubsidised factions. The Morning Post and the Daily Chronicle urge the employment of large land forces, and the Chronicle significantly advises the despatch to Greek waters of powerful squadrons qi warships. M. Zaimis, a one-time Premier, has been resurrected to lead the new Greek Cabinet. No one can say what its policy will be, but in Greek waters the naval factor is decisive. In thfl Champasiw, in ih«* now familiar eenU'ft.ol' feh«" RftigUfrVwrdan ixM* the.

French have made a further notable advance by capturing the summit of the height of La Hure, between Souain and Cemay, centres of recent fighting. They are now within, one mile and a-half of the lateral railway already threatened at other places north of Massiges, and also at Auberive. The capture of at least 1000 German prisoners is convincing., and/ Paris claims that La Hure is a key position. Recent Petrograd messages tend to confirm an English contemporary's anticipation (to which reference was made some days ago) that in the late autumn Russia would receive tremendous supplies of heavy guns and munitions, from Japan and elsewhere. Munitionment is the key to the position in Rus&ia. Only because of superior munitionment was Germany able to make hei great advance. Unless she can maintain that superiority, she i must retreat, perhaps to the Bug, perhaps to £he Vistula. The enemy's 6uperior munitionment might e\£en force Russia from the strong line of the iVistula. And the Russian reports now claim that the advantage in munitions has passed to them, that Germany is giving way in the south and in the centre, and that only on the Dvina (Dvinsk section) is the invader showing his old energy. The Anglo-French offensive and the Russian recovery prove that the battle in the workshops is beginning to be won. The key to success is munitionment, and if the enemy opens a new offensive in the Balkans his energy will only increase the growing gap between his resources in material and men, and those of the sea-keeping and free-breath-ing Entente. Sea command, unlimited (thongh for a while unorganised) industrial resources, and superior numbers in all directions, are forces that must prevail ; and _ the measure of the enemy's resistance is the measure of his ultimate exhaustion.