Evening Post.

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue XC, 7 October 1915, Page 6

Evening Post.

THUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1915. GERMANY'S TRIPLE PLOT ■♦> The Salonika disembarkation lias unmasked the whole- conspiracy. It is now certain, as was suspected,, that Germany had Bulgaria within her net. It is also fairly clear that Germany had nobbled and hobbled Greece to a far greater degree than was suspected ; and the same thing may yet be found to be true of Rumania. In any case, the GermanAustrian plot was undoubtedly tripleheaded. It bad completely succeeded in u« Kniffsu-iaii rvwfcs it had jwueJdiarted. ,

deeply in the Court at Athens, and it had at the very least produced an impression in Bucharest, where the Rumanian Premier, adopting something of the Sphinxlike attitude of his Bulgarian rival, still continues to mask his thoughts behind equivocations. In Bulgaria the magazine was ready and the train was laid. With the aid of the German officers and the sympathetic Ferdinand, a coup d'etat, involving Bulgaria in hostilities, would have been much easier than it was in Turkey — where the Sultan and the more sober statesmen wei - e unsympathetic — and would undoubtedly have succeeded. At the appointed time, when everything was ready, it would have been done so quickly that, popular second thoughts in Bulgaria would have had no time to express themselves; and a Slav people would have been swept into war against their liberators, the Russian Slavs, simply because of the machinations of German incendiaries, aided by a Teutonic princeling who stepped out of the Austrian army to the throne that Russian bayonets created. The Bulgarian army having been mobilised under the mask of supporting diplomatic pressure on Servia, and having been then placed under German direction, the ultimate issue of the plot was inevitable. Then, with Bulgaria in the field, and Servia placed between the upper and the nether millstone, Germany, using her personal leverage in the Athens Court, would have tempted Greece, ' with a hundred arguments and inducements, to desert her ally. How deeply this principle of deserting the Serbs has penetrated in Greece is now revealed by the statements in the Chamber of the Opposition leaders, who profess to regard the SerboGreek alliance as invalid because of an act committed, with Greece's knowledge and virtual acquiescence, in 1913. Flushed with her Bulgarian success, Germany would have appealed to' Athens (already undermined) and to Bucharest ; and i would she have appealed in vain? Was there not the greatest danger of a Balkan bloc of neutrals falling into line behind a masterful Power showing such brilliant j initiative ? It was at this stage that the initiative passed — and, notwithstanding our regret at any breach of neutralities, rightly passed — to the Entente. The howl of indignation produced in Germany by the Salonika disembarkation shows how shrewdly the Germans appreciate the tactical value of the counter-blow struck by the Entente in anticipation of their own. If the situation is to be saved in the Balkans, only a bold policy can do it, for the Balkan States have reached a tension calling less for words than for deeds. To wait and witness the almost irresistible development of the German triple plot was, for the Entente, impos sible. It may be that the disembarkation at Salonika has come too late to prevent the Bulgarian Government and the German interlopers from dragging the Bulgars into war in terms of the military convention (with Germany and Austria, against Servia) now revealed by the Bulgarian Premier. But the Entente's action at any rate gives holding ground to the popular dissent and to those Opposition leaders who have already pointed out to Ferdinand the perils of his adventure. And it is now by no means certain that, even in Bulgaria, the German plot will work with the calculated smoothness. As to Greece, the resignation of the pro-Entente Premier M. Venizelos, in circumstances unexplained at time of writing, reveals a tremendous struggle between the Teutonic influences and Greek nationalism. In this the German hand of King Constantine's better half, and that of his German entourage, have certainly played a part, but, though the resignation has been accepted, there is no certainty that it is not an aggressive move 1 by M. Venizelos rather than a retreat. M. Venizelos resigned once before, and the King, after ruling for a while without a Parliamentary majority, had to recall him. Will Constantine, in this time of crisis, dare to govern Greece against the popular feeling, and without the statesman whose majority in the Chamber (142-102) admits of no denial? Anyway, it is better that these grave matters should be put to the test, and if Constantine's crown is to take the same risks as Ferdinand's, it is well to at least know who is friend and who is foe. A cardinal element in this phase of the situation is Greece's liability to naval pressure, and it is very hard to believe that that country will ultimately be found on the side of the enemy, despite German intrigue within and without. Rumania's attitude now becomes of the highest importance. Her Premier still declines to mobilise, but a later message announces the sending of troops to the Bulgarian frontier. The acid applied by the Entente at Salonika has produced a rapid reaction, and it is yet too early to say how the precipitation will result. But it will certainly be more favourable to the Entente than would have been the case had the German chemical process been allowed to reach its normal issue.