THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 80, 2 October 1915, Page 4

THE WAR

Colonel Repington states that the Allied attacks have used up the German local reserves of troops at the points attacked, and the enemy general reserves are now up, which means probably a bigger and perhaps longer struggle for the German third line. It -will resolve itself into a. question of superiority in numbers of shell and men. In both cases the superiority is with the Allies, but the price in blood will have to be paid. At the end of June, Colonel Maude wrote: "Let anyone take the map of the western frontier and note the points at which * the Germans are now threatened by forces of not less than double their own numbers, and fully equal to them, unit for unit, from the sea to the Rhine." And since Colonel Maude wrote that, many units of Kitchener's Army have crossed the Channel. But superiority in numbers does not mean a, headlong rush through. If that were attempted, the superiority in numbers would soon cease to esistj The superiority in shell must first be applied to prepare the way for using the superior numbers in personnel. The British started by driving a broad wedge between La Bassee and Lens, and the French (adjoining them to the south) drove a wedge between Lens and Arras. The British wedge covers Hill 70 (which, despite an ambiguous earlier message, appears to have been held), but the i French wedge does not yet appear to have completely asserted itself over the Vimy plateau. When the French wedge has accomplished this primary purpose, both wedges will then advance side by side to the secondary operations. Meanwhile, the British wedge is a "little in the air," because the German fortifications in La Bassee and Lens remain a thorn in either flank. As the wedge deepens and broadens, the Germans will be levered out of both these strongholds, but that cannot be done in a day, considering that the German general reserves are now gathered ahead in strongly defended positions. Of course, the massing of German reserves weakens the enemy's line in other , places, and it may be that the Allies will attack in new spots that nave been thus weakened. The number and nature of such new attacks (whether serious or feint) will depend on the degree of the Allies' superiority. The stronger the attacker, and the greater liis mobility, the more he can spread his operations ; but in any case the number of serious blows must be limited. The aim is concentration, not. diffusion, of effort; and for bams -tfime to coma it may be difficult t&

decide what attacks are really penetrative, and what are designed for a, lesser purpose. To mislead the enemy and compel him to make needless concentrations ; to destroy, by aerial bombardmentj gun-fire, or by sudden attack in force, his communications, and thus limit his mobility — in fact, to make him commit a maximum of errors, and to •hinder his capacity to Tepair them, constitute a big factor in the operations. For instance, it is difficult to say whether the Allies' bombardment of North Belgium by sea and land is an effort at diversion, or represents a serious attempt to drive the enemy from the Belgian coast and tarn his right flank. If he lost Ostend and •Zeebrugge, and therewith his dream of invading England from that shore, he would have far less inducement to hang on to Lille, La Bassee, and Arras, and the rest of his front line in Flanders and North France; and his 3a,nk might be forced back in the direction of Antwerp. On the enemy's other flank — the left, or south — a successful turning movement by the French would be as dangerous, to South Germany, as an Anglo-French-Belgian corresponding movement would be to German Belgium. To again quote Colonel Maude: <sNear5 Near the Rhine the French now command a full forty-mile strip of Upper Alsace, a district large enough to contain an army so strong that it could pass over the Rhine and sweep downwards through Baden." That "sweep" sounds much easier than it is; stfll, a turning movement on the Upper Rhine would uncover South Germany in somewhat the same way as a turning movement in Flanders would uncover North Belgium. But to cripple Germany, a western invader must strike ultimately at her industrial heart, the Lower Bhme. Aft the campaign progreaces there^rillbe better evidence as to whether the French commander's main object is a penetrative drive in the centre (in the Champagne district) or action on the flanks. In any case, pressure on tie enemy's wings is necessary to help the central penetration. If, as is alleged, General Joffre is actuated by the modern French strategical ideas, based on a, study of Napoleon, the Champagne may represent the fixing of the " operative corner," on which manoeuvres to either Bide will pivot. Concerning the French operations here, it may be said that Sonain, Mesnil, Perthes, Beaaeejour, Massiges, and Ville-sur-Tourbe are grouped about midway on "the Reims-Verdun line. From Massiges and ViHe-sur-Tourbe the French are pushing northward on the road that leads to Monthois, which crosses the Dormoifie (the stream " piled with corpses," etc.) at Cernay, and near here a hill (199) has been taken from the Germans. Thus the French are approaching tite same important lateral railway that they already threaten (farther west) at Auberive. At Camay, about six miles separate them from the railway ; at Auberive, about three. The suspension of private telegraphing from England and France to neutral countries suggests important developments. Germany is beginning to" apprehend that a western offensive by the AJlie» might decide the whole war. A completely mobilised Bulgaria was recently likened in these columns to a powder magazine. The match is now forthcoming in the shape of German officers. Taking charge of the situation, they fired the Turkish magazine in 1914. Will they not strive their utmost to do the same thing in Bulgaria in 1915? In Turkey they carried the country into war in spite of the people and the Sultan. In Bulgaria they (or, at any rate, the Anstrian officers) find in the reigning Ferdinand an old comrade-in- v arms. No wonder, then," that Sir Edward Grey has issued to Bulgaria a grave warning. If Bulgaria goes to war the hand that precipitates the fighting will be the hand of the Austro-Genuan officers, but the voice that called them to Sofia will be that of Tsar Ferdinand and his pliant Premier. There is still time for Ferdinand to revoke his verdict; hence the British Foreign Minister's intimation that the German migration to Sofia nwst be regarded with the utmost gravity. With it revives the news of an Austro-German offensive concentration on the Danube. And a very significant report comes from Sofia to the effect that the two resigned Germanophile Ministers have re-entered the Bulgarian Cabinet. If this is true, it suggests that Ferdinand's high-handedness has suddenly intensified. On the Entente side, some reliance had been placed on the modifying influences of the Opposition leaders, especially M. Gueshoff and M. Malinoff. The Slavs of Moscow appealed to M. Gueshoff and Dr. Daneff not to forget that Russia was Bulgaria's deliverer. But now the indications are that Ferdinand is hardening his heart against the modifying attitude of the Opposition. It is ominous that M Malinoff, one of the best of the younger leaders, refuses to join Ferdinand's Cabinet, believing that Bulgaria should side with the Entente. Contrast this with the solidarity in Greece,' where the Opposition leader and ex-Premier, M. Counaris, supports M. Venizelos. There may be a Bulgarian throne for sale when all this is done. Some of the features of the Bulgarian military position on land were referred to yesterday^ The danger of a Bulgarian flank attack on Servia, placing Servia between two fires, cutting her sea communications over the Vardar railway, and driving a wedge between her and Greece, was explained ; also the fact that Bulgaria is the best overland road 'for any invasion of Turkey-in-Europe. To-day, the sea aspect of Bulgaria's position comes under notice. Prior to the Balkan wars of 1912-13 Bulgaria had a frontage to the Black Sea, including the port of Varna. The net result of those wars gave her a frontage also to the Aegean Sea, including Dedeagatch and the lesser port of Maronia (but not the coveted Kavala, nor Salonika, which fell to Greece). This Aegean coast-line constitutes a new front door to Bulgaria (the sort of frontage that Servia longs for) j it looks directly out on to the Aegean Islands used by the AngloFrench Gallipoli expedition as a base, and it looks nearly directly on to the Gallipoli Peninsula itself. Athens reports that Bulgarian troops have been sent to the Aegean coast line — to Dedeagatch and Maronia* — to guard against an' attack by sea. Athens is not the essence of reliability, but on this occasion may easily be telling the truth. Equally suggestive is the statement that four German submarines have been seen, off the Bulgarian Black Sea port, Varna. Fo» some time the dearth of any news of German submarine ODerations in the Aegean Sea has suggested that the antisubmarine methods of the Allies' Aegean fleet have outwitted the German underwater commanders. In the circumstances, it is likely that the German submarines would be diverted to the Black Sea. Here there is Russian merchant shipping to prey on, and it may be that the Russian Black Sea navy is not entirely skilled in the latest anti-submarine tactics. Unless the Goeben had the protection which arises from the presence of friendly submarines, it is doubtful whether she would have made her recent cruise into the Black Sea. If, then, the German submarines are devoting their first attention to this great inland water, it is very important to them to secure on it a local base ; and Bulgaria's Varna would be just about the thing. Here, then, is another reason for bringing Bulgaria into the war. The Russian Black gea fleet has jjfojied such hsxoc vrith, tho L

ships carrying coal from the Black Sea south coast (Turkey's only available coalfield) that the Turkish navy had to make some counter- move, as coafis the motive power of industry and war. Defensively and offensively, therefore, Varna is of importance. Though as a port it is lacking in shelter, it must not be forgotten that Varna was chosen by France and Britain (the irony of history !) as the depot for the Allied armies fighting against Russia in the Crimea. In the near future, Varna may complicate the Allies' problem of re-opening the Russian grain trade via the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. After Constantinople has fallen, Varna may yet remain, a nest of sea pirates.