THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 77, 29 September 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

Wrote the ' Observer in July ; "By the late summer a large consignment of big guns will put a. different complexion on the main features of the (Russian) campaign, and will enable Russia to pour an immense body of men into the field." Most people nowadays have no desire to build a superstructure of airy optimism on a frail foundation — there has been far too much of that sort of castlebuilding — but this prediction of the English paper is worth recalling in connection with the new vitality of Russia's offensive (in the south), and of her counter-attacks in the north and centre. From the south it is reported that the Russians have reached Kovel (on the Lublin-Khohn-Kovel-Rovno railway), and that their territorial gains in the Kovel region since early in September are estimated at seventy miles. This would seem to clearly indicate that the railway advantages are with the Russians. Rovno is the junction of the railway from the great Russian centre, Kiev, with the railway from the north, and the Rovno-Kovel line can thus be fed by Russia with munitions. But between the Rovno-Kovel line and the Lemberg network of railways (re-conquered by the enemy about three months ago) there is only one rail connection via Brody. Consequently the conveyance of heavy munitions from Lemberg to the Austrian front facing the Rovno-Kovel railway depends largely upon roads, and there are only two centres, Vladimir Volynski and Lutzk, upon which such roads converge. That explains the struggle for Lutzk, where the Austrians, (according to their own story) have again captured the bridgehead. The Russians are bound to have the advantage in the transport of munitions, and if they also have the advantage in supply, their superiority on this front should be maintained. There is a report that the Austrians have evacuated Brody, near the Galician frontier and situated on the only railway connectiri£ Lemberg with the Rovno-Kovel line. Otherwise, the intervening belt is railless, and, so far as local conditions are concerned, the Austro-German retreat in this quarter is likely to continue. Local conditions, however, do not entirely govern the situation. Russia has her middle and northern spheres to defend, and the concentrated German effort in the north, near th 6 Dvinsk sectiou of lh» iJvinji, call* for a couiit«r-couc*H ■

tration of defensive and offensive force. To sum vp — the Austro-Germans are, on the whole, losing ground in the south ; the German central forces who cut the railway near ' Sventsiany (between Vilna and Dvinsk) and tried an enveloping movement towards Minsk have suffered heavily at Molodetschno and Vileika, and are barely holding their ground; and the German higher command is looking to the northern armies to save the centre and con tinue the offensive by capturing Dvinsk. By a mastery of Dvinsk and the Dvina, the northern German armies could to turn the Russian line that a further withdrawal of the Russian centre eastward would almost necessarily follow, despito the success of the Russian offensive in the south. Faith in the idea of a fresh supply of Russian heavy guns and shells is encouraged by Petrograd's statement that "our ability to develop a hurricanb of fire at Novo Alexandrovsk is a gratifying proof that the defenders of Dvinsk are well equipped with ammunition. * German and Russian accounts of gains in the centre and in the north are so conflicting that it is difficult to make any deductions therefrom; but it seem* to be a sound proposition (despite a statement attributed to some German prisoners on the western front) tha-t the Germans we sufficiently deep into Russia, sufficiently resisted, and sufficiently close to winter to make it a' hard matter for them to materially reinforce the western front. No doubt Germany started with an immense reserve of heavy shell. In her progress from East Prussia and West Poland and Western Galicia to her present Vilna-Brest Litovsk line, she must have consumed much of her shell reserve, and has now to operate with much less shell and much greater transport difficulties. On the other hand, it is known that Britain and France have been building up -a shell reserve, and it is confidently believed that Russia has in this respect considerably improved her position. That is the main reason for the hope that a back-swing of the pendulum has begun, certainly on one front, possibly on both.

For the present, however, it ie to the West that one must look for the hammer end of the hammer-and-anvil tactics. Colonel Maude somewhat breezily remarks that "with reasonable luck" (an all-embracing safeguard) " the Allies should drive the Germans to the Rhine in two months." But a two and a-half j mile penetration is only a short step to the Bhine; and it is to be noted that' ofher critics deprecate undue optimism,, and point out that we have only seen successful opening moves to a game which will be long-drawn-out. A Paris communique states that in the Champagne the struggle continues without intermission before the Germans' second line ; and Le Matin gives a timely reminder that the Germans put their trust not so much in their first lines as in the •defensive organisation of their second and third lines. It is only> "the first results " that the Allies have achieved. But their anticipatory measures aim at a greater task — so much greater that the Allied aeroplanes have been operating on railways and supplies as far as forty miles behind the German line. All the various methods of cutting communications and hindering the movement of the enemy's reserves of men and material have been in operation — air bombardment, gun-fire, ieint movements, and holding attacks. In the latter category the Pall- Mall Gazette places the British operation eastward from Ypres on either side of the M^nin-Toad, where no gmin resulted on the north side of the road, and an advance of 600 yards on the south; but the Ypres attack served its purpose by handicapping the reinforcement of the German line southward on the La Bassee-Lens front, where the real British effort took place. Besides making feints to deceive the enemy as to the real point of attack, the Allies seem to have worked their preliminary bombardment in such a way that it left the enemy 'guessing as to where the main blow would fall. This suggests an enor r mous consumption of heavy ammunitionj the supply of which is now generally conceded to be a sine qua non.

In the La Bassee-Lens attack, .the British have certainly advanced along the middle of the line, at Hulluch and Loos. The. exact position with regard to the terminal German strongholds on this line — La Bassee in the north and ' Lens in the south — is not clear. Lens is south of Loos, and the Germans declare that a British attack south of Loos collapsed. But Hill 70. near Loos, was captured, and concerning this height two statements are cabled — one that it dominates Lens, the other says the road to Lens. The matter of immediate interest is whether the British advance will invplve a German evacuation of Lens and La Bassee, which are railway centres that in this district rank second in importance only to Lille. If the British effort leads to the regaining of La. Bassee and Lens, and later Lille, it will have achieved much ; after that there will be ample time to look to Belgium and the Rhine. In the Champagne, one of the crucial points is on the Suippe at Auberive, which is about on a line drawn east from Reim6 to Verdun. Here the immediate objective is a lateral., railway highly important to the enemy's mobility It is notable that, for the first time since the Marne, the Paris censor passes the word "victory."