PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 79, 30 September 1914, Page 8

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

GERMAN METHODS CRITICISED "STRATEGICAL OFFENSIVE" WEAKNESSES. What may be called the first 6tage of the German campaign in France consisted in the rapid advance and the still more rapid retreat, and terminated on [ the taking up of the strong defensive positions on the Aisne, Oise, and Somme. When the Germans dug themselves in along these rivers, they turned down the first page of their war chapter, and began to write a new one. That first page told the fate of their plan of conquest-by-lTme-table. Their dream of smashing France in a few weeks, and then returning to crush Russia, had faded. The German strategy which Colonel Repington summed up as "the spirit of the offensive pushed to its extieme limits," was discredited. Their offensive was 'converted into precipitate retreat; and their present defensive appears to have resulted, so far, in a deadlock. ADVANTAGES OF OFFENSIVE. The turned down first page is well worth study in the light of a volume fresh from the press, entitled ."Sea, Land, and Air Strategy," by Sir George Aston, based upon lectures given by the author at the Staff College at Camberley. In this book the arguments for and against the German "strategical offensive" are very clearly set forth. On the one side Sir George Aston summarises the affirmative case as stated by Field-Marshal Yon der Goltz (now Military Governor of South Belgium) ; on the other side the author gives the British views. The German argument is that the moral factors, which are all important in war, are strengthened by taking the offensive. Tho forward marches, skilfully arranged, facilitate concentration of force, and this is made easier by the fact that the common objective is obvious to all subordinate leaders, while to those on tho defensive all is uncertain until the enemy appears in front of their position. Also, the strategical offensive, by always leading the army into fresh country, has a most refreshing upon the troops. Another factor is that the enemy's people suffer the countless- horrors arising from the fact that the war is in their country, and the Germans well know how to make those horrors real, and how to conduct a terroristic campaign calculated to persecute the populace of occupied territory into moral and physical submission. Another argument special to Germany herself is that her coal and iron districts are mostly near her frontiers (the lower Rhine and Silesia are instances in point), and that as a French occupation of the lower Rhine, including Essen, would probably paralyse Germany, the strategical offensive is more than ever desirable. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PICTURE. Dealing with the general arguments outlined above, Sir George Aston makes comments which could be given an absolutely literal application to page No. 1 of the German war-chapter ; that is, to the rapid advance and retreat of the Germans in France. He points out some of the effects that the strategical offensive has on the striking force at the front, the force that fights the decisive battles. The further an army marches into the enemy's country, the weaker it becomes, because of the detachments required along the line of advance, and tho constant wastage from other causes. For these reasons, the foremost body of troops of an army amounts to a comparatively small fraction of the total fighting strength employed. Napoleon 1 arrived at Moscow in 1812 with 95,000 | men out of 442,000 that crossed the I Niemen three months before. In 1870 the Germans reached Paris with only ■170,000 out of the 372,000 that crossed the frontier six weeks before. Out of 460,000 ' Russians that crossed the Danube in 1878, barely 100,000 reached Constantinople, ani the fighting strength of these was only about 43,000. The moral is that the " ever-diminishing power of the strategical offensive " is an unavoidable drawback that cannot be ignored ! in military strategy.- Sir George Aston | also emphasises the difficulty of supplying | a huge army on the modern scale with food and ammunition, when the troops have outrun their transport — and this was exactly what the German right wing did in France. Food and ammunition both failed, and the strategical offensive swung back like' a pendulum. THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE. • Field-Marshal Yon der Goltz is not one of those Germans who expect to be always victorious. He is satisfied with, the strategical offensive, whether in victory or defeat. If it leads to victox'y, that is a big step towards the annihilation of the enemy and the conquest of his country ; while defeat \ will only mean "a temporary abandonment of the project in hand." Is the present abandonment of tho march on Paris only temporary? That is one of the questions dependent on the prolonged battle of the Aisne. A Japanese General has said that the winner of such battles is he who can suffer quarter of an hour longer than his adversary. It is a test of supreme, protracted suffering. On the authority of the military correspondent of The Times, it is stated that the entrenched lines of the Allies are gradually approaching the German position. As the fighting has been described by Sir John French as approximating to siege warfare, the gradual nature of the progress, in face of the German shell-fire, is easily understandable. Fortunately, the men in the Allies' advanced trenches are so placed that they can be relieved and given a "spell" away from atmosphere where the nervous tension is such that attacks by the enemy come as a positive relief. Those who look to North Belgium as the quarter from which the flank of the Germans will be turned, by an oversea force, must continue to be patient. Stories from Belgium vary from day to day. Now it is said that the Germans are "making no main attack on AntTHE CARPATHIANS. These Russian cablegrams, which are liable to be anticipatory, tell of the Russians operating in the Carpathian passes, and even crossing the Carpathians fioni Galicia into Hungary. In the Uzsok (Uzsoker) Pass, by which the road from Sambor crosses into Hungary, tho Russians are reported to have penetrated to Hungarian • territory, making captures en route. Uzsok does not appear to carry a railway. The railway from Przemysl across the Carpathians into Hungary goes via Meso-Laborcz ; and a Lemberg railway crosses the mountains at Vereczke. It is not clear whether the Russians .propose to cioss the Carpathians in force. They may prefer to concentrate on tho pursuit, of the Austrians through Western Oalicia and towards Silesia. But Russia should have plenty of troops to spare, and an army thrown across the Carpathians would embarrass the Hungarians (Magyars), who are probably tho best fighting men of the Dual I Monarchy. In thfs way a blow at Hungary via the Carpathians might help the main campaign against Silesia bj divert' ing the defenders' attention. But the Cracow and Silesian position taken up by the Austro-Gorman armies is ceitain t<j be a strong one, and to force it will need all the fighting men that Russia cun piofitabJy employ in that section of her extended front.