Evening Post. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1914. BISMARCK AND GERMAN POLICY

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 60, 8 September 1914, Page 6

Evening Post. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1914. BISMARCK AND GERMAN POLICY

.*, . In these days when German diplomacy stands amazed at Great Britain's devotion to " a scrap of paper" — the treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality — it is of interest to recall the teaching of Bismarck. No treaty, said the Iron Chancellor, can "guarantee the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text." This Machiavellian principle, striking at the root of treaty law and international obligations, is more than a choice piece of Bismarckian cynicism ; it has been grafted into the Austro-German policy, and Europe has seen the effects of it prior to the present year. In 1909 Austria, under the guidance of the late Baron Aerenthal, backed by Berlin, annexed the " occupied " provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus violating the public law of Europe as laid down in the Treaty of Berlin and the Declaration of London of 1871. Russia, France, and Great Britain strongly protested against Che Austrian action, and Russia strenuously refused to recognise the annexation, until suddenly the Kaiser revealed himself "in shining armour" beside his ally, and sent such an urgent intimation to St. Petersburg that the Russian Government, without even taking time to discuss the position with its ally and with Britain, dissociated itself from the view it had hitherto held in common with them, and accepted the German-Austrian standpoint. On that occasion " the scrap of paper " was successfully thrown to the winds, and Russia, exhausted by her Japanese defeats, was unspeakably humbled. In 1914 Germany has again appeared in the role of treaty-breaker, and has not only made war upon a small nation whose neutrality she herself guaranteed, but has heaped upon that injury further outrages in defiance of the common rules of war. It has, therefore, become an issue between the Bismarckian estimate of the force of treaties, and the old-fashioned conception that the public law of Europe, like the internal laws of nations, is something to be respected. No better example of the blood-and-iron methods, of Prussian militarism can be found than this cynical principle of Bismarck and the brutal way in which his successors have put his precept into practice. "It is one of the first political principles," wrote Frederick the Great, "to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason wo have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back free as long as it lasts." Bismarck acted on this principle of Frederick, and succeeded in a wonderful way in ' giving it force throughout almost the whole period of his official life. A volume cuuld be

written upon the diplomatic skill by which, even after he had concluded the Triple Alliance contrary to Russian inteiests, he still kept the Tsar in open or secret league with the Kaiser, and thus detached Russia from the thing that he most dreaded — a Russo-French Alliance. Like Frederick, he fully appreciated the importance of having Germany's "back free" and of making an ally of the worst potential enemy ; and one of the earliest acts of his long diplomatic career was to win Russia's regard by helping her to oppress the Poles, a fact which is no doubt still retained in the Polish memory. At the same time, the leagues which he engineered between Germany, Russia, and Austria — with Germany as arbiter — had for part of their object the balancing of Austria's Balkan designs against those of Russia, so as to embarrass the policies of 'both nations, and make them more and , more dependent upon Berlin. It was not till the late 'eighties that Russia' finally satisfied herself of the double dealing and malign influence of Germany ; and the Russo-French Alliance of the early 'nineties, terminating the isolation of France, was the ultimate result. Modern German diplomats have departed sufficiently from the Bismarckian model to deal Russia the knockdown blow of 1909, and they are paying for it to-day. Their backs are no longer free, and if Mr. Stead's spiritualistic bureau could secure interviews with Bismarck and Frederick the Great, they would prove interesting. The blood-and-iron policy has run its course. After two generations of successful application by the Prussian autocrats, it has at last met its inevitable remedy, which is more blood-and-iron. Hereafter, perhaps, international obligations and respect for other people's liberties may at last regain something of their old-time force.