NAVAL DEFENCE.

Evening Post, Volume LXXVI, Issue 76, 26 September 1908, Page 4

NAVAL DEFENCE.

The essence of the scheme of Australian naval defence, as revised by the British Admiralty and now submitted to the Commonwealth Parliament, is the principle regarding which Mr. Deakin and Lord Tweedmouth came to unofficial agreement at the last Imperial Conferee ce — the principle of "Imperial naval co-operation. The new attitude of the Admiralty finally disposes of a bad argument that has frequently been ! urged in Australia and sometimes even in New Zealand : the argument that independent local proyision for naval defence, having as its ultimate object the creation of a local navy, implies disloyalty to the Empire. The .Admiralty's concurrence in the Australian scheme corrects once for all this strange perversion of ideas — leaving the future historian to wonder over the astonishing contention that when every poition of 'the Empire defends itself the Empire wiil be weaker ; and that true Imperialism consists in permitting Great Britain to carry the whole burden of the Navy, while the overseas dominions light-heartedly expect full naval protection in return ■for a subsidy which, in comparison with the risk involved, and with the cost required to shield us from that risk, is the merest pittance. In accepting the scheme for an Australian navy, the Admiralty has the House of Commons behind it; and it remains only for the Comn" onwealth to find the money, and to agree upon conditions, in order to be first to establish a plan which, far from loosening the bonds of Empire, will tend continually to make the structure of the Empire more cohesive. The provision for local defence will scarcely decirease at all Australia's need to reply upon the Empire for her security. A navy of her own that will make her secure is out of the question for a hundred years, possibly for five hundred jfears ; and the efficacy of a dozen small vessels is strictly limited to their object of coastal defence. If that object is gained, if Australia ( is set free from the menace of a sudden raid upon rich and imperfectly protected cities, her reasons for Imperial loyalty will be stronger, not weaker. Nothing would strain the links of Empire more than a successful attack upon , Sydney or Melbourne by two or tnree hostile cruisers, while the subsidised Australasian squadron was meeting the demands of naval strategy elsewhere. Consequently the new scheme is conceived essentially in the interest, not- only of Australia, but of the Empire. ' How will New Zealand fare if the Australian scheme is presently carried into effect? The Admiralty makes no secret of its desire and intention to escape, so far as the Australian Squadron is concerned, from any local fetters upon its movements. It is a condition of the scheme that the present restrictions upon the movements of the Squadron are to be abolished ; and, whether New Zealand contributes £40,000 or £100,000 in annual subsidy, the Admiralty policy will remain unaltered. ."Any attempt to wrest the supremacy of the sea from Great Britain," said the Committee of Imperial Defence two years ago, "can only be made by fighting great naval battles, in which the main fleets of contending Powers are concentrated for decisive encounters." "The object of making the Naval Commander-in-Shief oh the China station responsible forA the strategical distribution of cruisers on the China, Australian, 'and East Indies stations, is," the report continues, "simply to ensure that all ships of an enemy in these seas may be dealt with at the earliest possible moment wherever they may be found. Closely concerted offensive action by powerful seagoing ships will afford the only effective protection to Australian floating trade, whether on the high seas or in local waters." Of course this strategy is sound ; and Australasian insistence on the retention of the subsidised Squadron in Australasian waters is opposed to first naval prin-ciples-~unles& the Squadron is considered, as the Admiralty has never considered it, purely a Squadron for coastal defence. "Raids on distant portions of the Empire will be only of secondary importance," said the committee callously but truly. Yet those raids will appear of primary importance to the "distant portions of the Empire" that are raided. Obviously, then, the provision of an independent subsidiary 1 navy for coastal defence not only chimes with, but is necessitated by, the Admiralty's policy for the naval protection of the Empira as a whole. What Australia, is doing, New Zealand in her turn must do, in order to protect her shores from sudden and damaging attack by swift vessels able to evade the operations of the Imperial fleets, which must remain concentrated in order to strike decisively. But from the present Ministry, which will not even realise its responsibility in regard to land defence, it seems hopeless to expect even the smallest provision for bettering our defence at sea. It is so much easier to spend money in benevolent aid, and to discount the day of disaster. The Australian scheme- of coastal defence which enlists the support of the Admiralty is not varied substantially from the plan already published. Originally the Commonwealth Naval Commandants proposed the construction of four ocean-going destroyers for the defence of trade routes, and for harbour protection a mobile torpedo fleet of sixteen coastal destroyers and four first-<sass torpedo boats. The outlay involved by this plan would have been £2,250,000 during five years ; and this was the plan with which Mr. Deakin went to the Imperial Conference. The criticism of the Admiralty was apparently responsible for hiG return with new proposals for the construction of fifteen vessels only, as compared with twenty-four; and these, ,in the last modification, are definitely planned for coastal defence, leaving the protection of trade routes to the Imperial Navy. Even so, the cost will be heavy. The expenditure on the vessels is reduced to £1,277,500 ; but the cost of annual maintenance of the whole number rises

to £346,000. The Commonwealth does not propose, however, to assume the whole burden at once ; but to commence with probably three vessels, and add others yearly till the whole are in commission. The two cardinal points for debate are the question of pay and the question of control. The Admiralty concurs with the idea of employing Australians as far a.s possible, so that the vessels may become a nursery of Aus» tralian seamen ; but is unable to agree to any alteration of the scale of pay adopted in the Imperial Navy. This means that Australian recruits will be obtained only with difficulty, seeing that occupation on shore will be much moVe lucrative. The Admiralty again, while leaving to the Australian authorities complete control of the vessels in' time of peace, insists that in war-time they must come under Imperial command. Both conditions appear to be essential to the co-operative character of the scheme ; and both will be objected to as limiting Australian rights over the fleet which Australia views as a national fleet, although Imperial, and of which Australia exclusively will bear the cost. The plan generally is so good, and the necessity of the provision is ,so plain, that some compromise of opposing views should surely be made, even if in the beginning Australia concedes & larger share of control than will be required later on, when the fleet is really in being.