THE BOWEN-STREET FATALITY

Evening Post, Volume LXXIII, Issue 29, 4 February 1907, Page 8

THE BOWEN-STREET FATALITY

MR. JUSTICE COOPER'S COMMENTS CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY. Somewhat extended reference was made by Mr. Justice Cooper, in charging the grand jury at the Supreme Court this morning, to the charge of manslaughter against O'Brien and Spry, arising out of the death of Mrs. Kensington, who was killed by being run down by the motor flre engine at tho Bowen-strcet crossing a few weeks ago. The deputy superintendent of the Fire Brigade (Mr. O'Brien) and the driver of the motor fire engine (Mr. Spry), said his Honour, had been committed upon a charge of manslaughter. Detailing tho circumstances of the case his Honour said that the engine 'proceeded at a high rate of speed along Lambton-quay. j What that rate of. speed was, was, of course, a matter of doubt. It was very sokiom they would find two witnesses agreeing as to the actual rato of speed at which a vehicle was proceeding, but it appeared that the engine was procooding along tho quay at from fifteen to perhaps eighteen miles per hour. The engine turned into Bowen-street, a dangerous curve, and there again the evidence would no doubt show varying rates of speed. No doubt evidence would be given that at the turning the driver reduced the rate of specd — some of the witnesses would say ten miles an hour, some more, some less, but this, he thought, would probably bo established, that the rate of speed was comparatively high. The evidence would also, no doubt, show that the driver, when the collision was Imminent, did all he could to prevent the impact, but ho was not successful. The law, said his Honour, was this — that every one who was in charge of or had under his control anything whatoA'er, whether animate or inanimate, which, through the absence of precaution or caro, might endanger human lite, was vmdor the duty of taking reasonable precautions against accident, and was criminally responsible for his failure to carry out such precautions. It wa3 a question of fact whether under the circumstances tfao deputy superintendent, who was in charge of the motor engine, and tho driver, who was controlling tlic movement of the engine, were using reasonable caro to avoid danger. The driving of an engine at a high, rate of speed through a crowded street necessitated a very much higher degree of care than if the same engine was being driven through a street in which there was vory little traffic, either pedestrian or vehicular. No doubt they had to take the circumstances into consideration. They had to consider whether these two persons were recklessly or negligently driving the engine at a speed or in a manner which was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature and condition of the highway and the amount of the traffic which was actually there at the time or might reasonably be expected to ba there. No doubt when there was an alarm of fire it was necessary for the brigade to reach tho scene of the fire with all possible despatch. That, however, did not justify reckless or dangeious driving. It might bo that the driver of the fire ongino along a crowded highway had act the same high degree of responsibility upon them as the driver of an ordinary motor car,- or an ordinary cab or b\is. In tho exercise of their duties they^had to got to tho fire as soon .as possible, but they must use reasonable care and precaution to avoid dancer to tho traffic, especially in a crowded street. If the jmy thought tho accused were not using that reasonable care anu precaution which was. undor the circumstances, cast- upon them to avoid injury to those persons lawfully using the highway, it would bo thcix- duty to return a true bill. If, however, the jury thought, that they did uso all reasonable care and precaution under tho circumstances, they would not como within the limits of the criminal law. It was a regrettable case, no doubt. There could be no question that these two men were on tiuty at the time, that they wero doing their best to get to the fire as quickly as possible, Dut ho was bound to tell the jury this, that if the ovidenco disclosed recklessness on their part under the circumstances of the case, more particularly in connection with turning tho corner, however painful it might be for them to place thoso men upon their trial, it would be their duty to do so, leaving to the common jury the question of whether they had a lawful excuse for the high rate of speed at which they were proceeding.