FRIENDLY SOCIETIES' RULES

Evening Post, Volume LVI, Issue 21, 25 July 1898, Page 6

FRIENDL Y SO CIETIES' R ULES

[ «, JUDGE PENNEFATHER'S DECISION. The keenest interest has been aroused amongst the member* of friendly societies by the decision of Mr. Justice Pennefather over-riding the obstacles which have long been interposed by the Friendly Societies' office against Ihe registration of the rules of various societies. Though the action was brought by tho OLigo District of the Manche.«ler Unity Oddfellows, most of the other societies in the colony were directly iuterested, for rules of. the Foresters, Aniericau Oddfellows, and Druids, and probably others, were hunj, r up by objections in the Registrar's oflice. These objections, it is believed, will be swept aside by the judgment, which considerably curtails the power that the office has hitherto claimed. It seems from his Honour's judgment that an Act of 1856 gave power to the Attorney-General or the Revising Barrister under the Friendly Societies' Act to examine whether rules presented for registration w^re reasonable or not. But this power was taken away in 1867, and has not been revived. Under the proposed Otago rules secession and dissolution (of branches), which havo heretofore been legislated for in one rule, are divided, the necessities for secession being (1) the consent of the District Committee and (2) tho consent of three-fourths of the members of the lodge. But for dissolution the necessities are to be the same as at present. The Revising Barrister's grounds of objection were :—(1): —(1) That tho provision as to unconditional consent isarbitravy and unreasonable; (2) that such a provision would not, in accordance with the English practice, be registered in England; and (3) that the general rules of the Order contain no such provision as to consent by a district or the parent society." ' llis Honour, after reviewing the Statutes relating to tho revision of the rules by various authorities, goes on to say —" The discretionary power contained in the Act of j 1556 has, therefore, never been revived. It has indeed been argued that the word ' perusal' implies an, authority to the Barrister to consider generally whether a rule is desirable or not, but the answer is that the object with which the Barrister is to peruse the rules is to see whether they are consistent with law. 1 am of opinion, therefore, that the Revising Barrister exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to register these rules on his first and third {'rounds of objection. I must still, however, examine his second ground. Here if it wore shown to me that J the powers of the Registrar in England were exactly the same as those of the Barrister here, and that the Registrar had refused to sanction rules like these on the ground that they were contrary to law, I might hesitate before differing from the opinion of so learned and experienced an otticer. In the case of amendments he (the English Registrar) is to give his certificate if the amendments are in conformity with law. ... No doubt if the Registrar was of opinion that a rule like the present one would not carry into effect the object of the persons desiring to form a society, he might advise with the Secretary on the subject, but no case has been cited or evidence produced to show that the Registrar has ever refused to sanction such an alteration of a rule. lam of opinion, Uierefore. that if an application were made for an order in the nature of a mandamus to compel the Registrar to register these amendments —(the case now argued was a special case)—it should be granted."