ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA.

Evening Post, Volume XXIX, Issue 111, 13 May 1885, Page 2

ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA.

The vote of censure on Mr. Gladstone's Government has, wo regret to Bay, beon defeated by a majority of 30. A different result was oertainly hoped for, although not expeoted, and would have been reoeived with almost universal acclamation throughout tho Australasian Colonies. The colonies judge the Government by its foreign and colonial policy. The House of Commons no doubt judges it mainly on its Home administration. Therein lies the scoret of the division and the strength of tho Gladstone Government. There is a well-founded fear of tho return of the Conservative party to office, because 'there is strong reason to believe that its domestic policy would not be satisfactory. Probably many of those who voted against Sir Stafford Northcote's motion in their hearts condemned Mr. Gladstone's Afghan policy as thoroughly as the Conservative leader himself. The few colonial sympathisers with Mr. Gladstone seem to base their admiration onthq f aot that he has avoided plunging the nation into war. Were that the case really there would be some ground for their admiration, but it is not a fair statement of the faots to so put the case. A man who should throw a child into the sea, and risk ita life by drowning, would not doßerve much credit for saving tho child's life if he pulled it out at the last moment. His possible merit in the latter operation would naturally be lost sight of in condemnation of his evil doing in the first instance. He would deservedly be condemned for interfering with the child at all. Mr. Gladstone has simply got the country out of the mess he first got it into. He is to be more blamed for the latter than praised for the" former act. Assuming that Lord Granville's statement ia perfeotly acourato, and that the settlement now come to is perfectly satisfactory to both England and Russia, it may well be asked why was it not arrived at in February last ? So far as we can make out, the arrangoment now come to ia practically identical with that whioh M. Letsar came specially to London to offer, but which was then indignantly rejected by the English Government. Either their rejection of it in February, or their acceptance of it in May was wrong. Had it been accepted when first made, all the millions since expended in war preparations would have been saved, and the lives of tho3e slain in General Komaroff's attack on the Afghan forces would probably not have been sacrificed. England also would have been spared the humiliation of having made imperative demands which she was not prepared to enforce when they ware treated with oontonpt. If Mr. Gladstone deserves credit now for having accepted M. Lessar's proposals, then assuredly he deserves far greater blame for having rejeoted them three months ago. The responsibility for all that has since occurred in regard to the matter rests with him. His aoceptonoe now is a oonfession that England has been wrong and Russia right in all that has taken plaoe since M. Lessar's proposals for negotiation in London were first declared inadmiesable.