ENFORCING SANCTIONS

Ellesmere Guardian, Volume LVI, Issue 89, 26 November 1935, Page 5

ENFORCING SANCTIONS

PROHIBITION OF IMPORTS

NO BLOCKADE NECESSARY

The excuses when members of the League of Nations sub-committee have given as to why the countries they represent cannot enforce sanctions against Italy illustrate the difficulty which a country will experience in preventing its products from being exported to an. aggressor country says the Sydney "Morning Herald." A general prohibition of export is sufficiently easy, but prohibition directed against a country or a group of countries cannot be surmounted by export to non-prohibited countries.

What is not so difficult of accomplishment is the prevention of a country, against which sanctions are granted, obtaining credits with which to finance the purchase of foreign goods. In that way exports to-the prohibited country may be at least impeded, if not altogether prevented. There is not only the prohibition of direct credits, but also the prevention of an intermediary securing credits on behalf of the aggressor country by means of the sale of imports from the aggressor. The prevention of imports from a country against which sanctions are being enforced is comparatively easy. The country of origin is known, whereas the destination of exports might be given with a view to misleading the authorities.

Further, as Sir Arthur Salter points out in "The Spectator," exclusion of imports is politically easier than the prohibition of exports, because people object more to being forbidden to sell than being forbidden to buy. It is complete in itself, and does not, as in the case of exports, compel either withdrawal or blockade measures. It is administratively much simpler because the customs machinery is immediately available. Above all, it means loss of foreign exchange to the aggressor country, which is thus deprived of its means to substitute purchases in another country for any it is prevented from making in a given country.

The argument applies most of all to imports into the principal creditor countries from the aggressor. Where the imports are comparatively small, as in the case of imports from Italy into Australia, prohibition of imports would not have the desired effect, as the credits obtained in Australia would not be so large as to purchase what exports would be required from Australia. If credits were obtained in Paris through import from Italy the credits could be transferred to London and with them purchases could be made of Australian products. It is, therefore, in the prohibition of export to Italy that the most effective pressure from Australia will come.