BEATTY, JELLICOE AND JUTLAND.

Dunstan Times, Issue 3380, 27 June 1927, Page 7

BEATTY, JELLICOE AND JUTLAND.

Being extracts from “The Truth About Jutland,” by Rear-Admiral Harper, shortly to be published by Messrs John Murray. In the introduction to his present book, Rear-Admiral Harper writes: I want to make it quite clear that this is not the so-calfod “Harper Record,” so frequently demanded in the House of Commons. . . . which was simply a

plain, straightforward narrative of the sequence of events, together with track charts showing the movements of every ship present on both sides. It was, in • fact, “the truth aboirt Jutland,” from start to finish, in the form of an unvarnished statement based solely on documentary evidence and free from comment or criticism.

Had the record been published in its original form, it would have been of no great interest to the reader looking for something sensational, but it would have prevented the flood of misconceptions and misrepresentations with which the public has been misled for some years past. . . On the other hand it is a very good thing that in its ultimate form, it never did see the light of day. The whole story of the deletions, alterations, and additions. . . demanded by those in authority cannot be told in these pages. The vicissitudes which the original record underwent must, however, be patent to anyone who followed the series of> tortuous manoeuvres and official prevarications in Parliament whenever it was asked fyr. Turning to the battle itself, Admiral Harper recalls Jellicoe’s confidence that Beatty could hold his own if the met the enemy, seeing that besides his six battle cruisers he had with him the four “Queen Elizabeths” of the Fifth Battle Squadron. He writes ;

It is probable, however, that Jellicoe would have been somewhat less easy in his mind if he had thought Beatty would divide his forces and go into action unsupported by these four powerful ships. . Beatty now made a decision which was to cost us dearly a few hours later. At 10.10 a.m. the Fifth Battle Squadron was ordered to take station on a compass beoring N.W. and distant five miles from Lion (Beatty’s flagship). It is incomprehensible why such a position was selected for this powerful force. He made the fatal and elementary mistake of dividing his force so that he could only engage with part of them. This produced results which can only be termed disastrous.

When the enemy was reported insight: Beatty’s battle cruisers had just altered course to the south-east word, the signal to do so having been made by flags. . . The flags could_ not be distinguished by Barham, flagship of the sth Battle Squadron, at the distance she had been stationed, and it was not repented to her by other means at the Lion’s disposal. It was some minutes, therefore, before 'Evan-Thomas realised that the battle cruisers had altered course. As they had also increased speed to 22 knots, the sth Battle Squadron was soon left over ton miles astern, and was for some time actually out of sight. This failure, in the Lion, to convey the executive order to turn to the Barham still further delayed the time at which these powerful battleships could come into action to support the battle cruisers.

Having described the first stage of the battle, Admiral Harper proceeds: Thus ended the battle cruiser fleet action and, as Jellicoe said in his dispatch, “the result cannot be other than unpalatable.” Let us consider the first phase of this action; between the time of opening fire and the time of sighting the enemy battle fleet. We find that Beatty had under his command four battleships and six battle cruisers, as against Hipper’s five battle cruisers. . . In spite of this overwhelming preponderance of power we lost two battle cruiser’s, sunk by gunfire, while the enemy lost none. Considerably more damage was caused to our ships than they inflicted on the enemy. It is unpalatable, extremely unpalatable, but nevertheless an indisputable fact that, in this first phase of the battle, a British squadron, greatly superior in numbers and gun power, not only failed to defeat a weaker enemy who made no effort to avoid action, but, in the space of 50 minutes, suffered what can only be described as a partial defeat. This regrettable result cannot be entirely explained away by the hick of armour protection of our battle cruisers, the poor quality of the British shells, and the disadvantage our ships suffered after the first quarter of an hour in regard to light. , . . We must find other reasons, which were, without doubt, firstly, the delay in bringing the Fifth Battle Squadron" into action, and, secondly, the inaccurate shooting of our battle cruisers, which has been specially remarked on by the Germans.

Describing the arrival of tho Grand Fleet, Admiral Harper remarks;

Jellicoe had no reliable information on which to deploy. . . The deployment he eventually made enabled our fleet to cross the enemy’s “T” and placed our main force between the enemy arid his base. A deployment which achieved these results is above adverse criticism,.

Beatty is criticised for his failure to re gain touch with the High Sea Fleet after one of Its repeated, evasive movements Admiral Harper writes; In liis dispatch Beatty states. . . “can Ron forbade me to close the range too much with rny inferior forcel” Beatty’s force was now six battle-cruisers against the enemy’s four; in this respect, there fore, Beatty hod superior force and am pie superiority in regard to speed. Of a subsequent move by the Grand Fleet we read:

Jellicoe had, again, secured a position of immense tactical advantage, and only the poor visibility saved the (German fleet from suffering an overwhelming defeat there and then. At , 7.50 p.m. Beatty made the following signal by wireless to Jellicoe: “Submit van of battleships follow bottle cruisers. We can then cut off whole of enemy’s battle fleet,” As our battle fleet was not in sight from the Lion, it is not clear how Beatty could know in what direction it was then steering. . . . Again, it is not dear what ‘‘cutting off” is referred to. There is no suggestion that part of the enemy could be cut off from the main force, but that the whole brittle fleet could be cut off. Presumably, therefore, it refers to cutting the enemy off from his base. The position, course, and •speed of our battle fleet could not have been improved upon for this purpose. As a fact, at the time the signal originated tho van of the battle fleet was steering the same course as the Lion; it was practically following tho battle cruisers, and it was also nearer tho enemy than the Lion. . . . The message sent was, therefore, quite unnecesaiy, and likely to mislead tho Commander-In-Chief.

Admiral Harper suggests that indiscreet signalling by Beatty’s flagship may have betrayed to the enemy the secret “challenge and reply” used hy ou» ships at night. The escape of the German Fleet during the night of May 31-June 1 is attributed to the failure "of certain of onr ships to inform Jellicoe that tho enemy was breaking past the rear of our line on his way to Horn’s Reef. Several German battleships were identified, but no report was sent to the Commander-in-Chicf.

In the absence of any information from any of his light forces, some ten miles astern, or from the Fifth Battle Squadron, known to he astern, Jellicoe could not have known, or even suspected, that the enemy battle fleet was crossing astern. It would have appeared to him next to impossible that such a movement could take place without someone in the ships astern directing it. If detected, ho would naturally expect to be given information.

Turning to previous published versions of Jutland, Admiral Harper writes:— The “Official Narrative” is a curious, disjointed production. Important facts are often half hidden in the form of footnotes, especially where they refer to our battle fleet, while Lord Jellicoe’s dignified and fully justified criticisms of its errors and defects, published in the form of an appendix, are answered by querulous interjections quite out of keeping with an official publication. ... As an authentic record it can only be described as thoroughly unsatisfactory. Mr Winston Churchill, who has lately given us his views on Jutland, must be suspect from the time (when he claimed to have ‘discovered” Admiral Beatty, and tried to impress on the public that the “decisions which I had the honour of taking (as First Lord of the Admiralty) in regard to him were most serviceable to the Royal Navy and to the British arms.” This being so, we cannot expect to find Mr Churchill indulging in criticism which might reflect gravely on his own judgment, but we do expect from a statesman of his eminence and a writer of his distinction impartial handling in his presentation of facts. Unhappily ... he fails as badly in this respect on more than one occasion. . . .

Mr Churchill states: “As the action proceeded, the British battle-cruisers, although reduced to an inferiority in numbers, began to assert an ascendancy over the enemy. Their .guns became increasingly effective, and they themselves received no further serious injury.” It has been shown, conclusively, that the gunnery of our battle-cruisers Avas not of a high standard, and the evidence is clear that, at the time to Avhich Mr Churchill alludes, it was not the guns of the battlecruisers Avhich “began to assert an ascendancy,” but those of the sth Battle Squadron . . . Why any commander (i.e. Beatty) should bo praised, and not blamed, for losing tAvo “divisions” out of six Avhen opposed by only five “divisions,” Avhich were left intact, is not clear. Mr Churchill, however, again ignores the sth Battle Squadron—part of Beatty’s force. Beatty had 1 10 ships to 5, 6to 5, and after the loss of his two “divisions” the odds in his favour Avere still 8 to 5, and yet, as Mr Churchill says, he “could not defeat” the enemy. It is Avell that land war cannot be compared to sea war. The author (Mr Churchill) Avould find some difficulty in Avithholding blame from any army commander Avith 10 divisions at his disposal if he failed to defeat, and left intact, an enemy for ce of only 5 divisions Mr Churchill, Avhen discussing the first retreat of the German fleet, at 6.35 p.m., states: “Jellicoe, threatened by the torpedo stream, turned aAvay according to his long-resolved policy.” . , . Jellicoe did not turn away from any torpedo attack at 6.35. After the first German retreat, and as soon as he was) clear of the perilous wake of the enemy, he at 6.44 p.m. closed the enemy, first il degrees and, ten minutes later, by a 45 degrees turn, making 56 degrees in all. He thereby brought the battle fleet right across the head of the High Seas Fleet, Avhen Scheer blundered back 17 minutes later. The public, as a Avhole. wants a clearcut verdict: Was Jutland a British victory ?

With regard to the battle-cruiser action, which was in the nature of a'distinct and separate encounter, we must admit that the Germans have considerable justification in claiming a victory. What are the facts? Beatty had under his immediate control a fleet of considerably greater power than that under von Hipper. Taking capital ships alone, the British force consisted of four battleships and six battlecruisers, as compared with the German ono of five battle-cruisers, a majority of two to one in our favour. In this duel we lost two battle-cruisers and two destroyers, ns against the enemy’s loss of two destroyers ; moreover, our surviving battle-cruis-ers had received more damage than they had inflicted. We can only acknowledge frankly that the “first round” went definitely’in the enemy’s favour. The final verdict in any match does not, however, depend on the result of the opening rounds. When the main action was joined and Jellicoe had assumed control, we again had the stronger fleet, but the proportion in capital ships in onr favour was not now two to one but about seven to five. From then on the British losses were one battle cruiser, three cruisers and six destroyers, as compared with the enemy’s loss of one battleship, one battle cruiser, four cruisers, and three destroyers. The German fleet received far more damage than it inflicted, both in actual losses and in hits on surviving SI ! PS ’. Scheer had had enough. He declined and successfully evaded, further combat by working his way home tinder cover of the night, as the pugilist who has lost heart and knows himself defeated throws up the sponge” and leaves the ring, never again to challenge his victorious adversary. r fo Jellicoe, therefore, must go the verdict of that impartial referee —accurate History.