POSITION OF FRANCE.

Dunstan Times, Issue 3137, 2 October 1922, Page 7

POSITION OF FRANCE.

(By Sir Philip Gibbs.) Last week I gave some plain facts and figures about the situation in Europe which must be faced before any kind of' hopeful settlement cam be made. But of course life i,s never conducted on a basis of plain facts and! figures, because one has- to taken into account such things as passion, prejudice, popular emotion and endless varieties of conflicting views and interests.

It may be interesting to my readers if I try to lift the veil which conceals some of these hidden forces now working in European politics. Take, for instance, the relations of France' audi England, upon which the future of Europe utterly depends. Outwardly there is a fairly clearcut issue to bo decided between Poincare and Lloyd' George on behalf of their respective Governments.

It is just this: If for the sake of British trade and European peace France agrees to postpone or reduce the German debts, what security will Britain offer in return, what financial aid to France? The fact simply is that the problem is enormously difficult because French views on the minimum security arc in conflict with British views regarding the potential danger of Germany in the near future. Also they envisage a close military alliance between England and France which is not at all popular in England, where at the present time all military alliances are in disfavor, owing to the wave of pacifism among the masses of ordinary folk.

But if one digs deeper one finds many irreconcilable forces preventing an immediate' plain settlement. In France distrust of Lloyd George amounts to a secret mama; peasant, shopkeeper and politician unite in the belief he has deliberately undermined French rights with regard to Germany in order to destroy French supremacy on the Continent. Therefore any French statesman, whether Poincare or any other, is in danger' of committing political suicide by holding any conversation with Lloyd George—that mythical, monstrous character of our present world drama' —if they lead to any further concessions to Germany. That distrust is sufficient in itself to make heavy going, for there can be no business arrangement without confidence on both sides hot any boldness of vision. Every representative of France knows he will be disowned and overthrown by his owrf people if he agrees to any compromise. Brand was destroyed for that very reason. Poin-* care, whose cold nature, immense intellectual obstinacy and personal dislike of Lloyd George make him steel proof against any sentimental yielding to the little Welshman, will be destroyed also unless he strikes' a bargain which gives France much more than she is willing to yield in return. That makes the negotiation troublesome. The cause of the French distrust and dislike of Lloyd George is natural and inevitable. Having signed the Versailles Treaty be has slowly and surely weakened whenever the time came to enforce its severest penalties. Having promised the Kaiser's head to the British people in election speeches, he was very careful afterward to postpone and prevent any 6uch vengeance. Again and • again his hand has been traced as the influence which gave Germany respite from fulfilment of payment in gold and coal and reductions of other penalties. When the French occupied new German town® to enforce their claims and afterward' threatened to invade 'fresh territory, it was the anger of Lloyd George which revealed to the astonished French his whole-hearted support of that treaty which he helped to make and which" the French were determined to uphold. Now in every important speech .the Prime Minister pleads for the necessity of saving Germany from bankruptcy though her default of treaty payments means the financial downfall of France.

Is it any wonder the French people fail to understand this man who made the treaty and then spends his time breaking it ? They 3 regard him as a dishonest fellow, very treacherous, especially as they are convinced that he gained everything at Versailles for the interests of his own country, including the destruction of the German fleet, the possession of her mercantile marine and the capture of her colonies. They do not believe what is really the greater truth, that as time has gone by Lloyd George has seen the dangers* to Europe as a whole involved in the downfall of Germany. Lloyd George never thinks of yesterday, but always of the day after to-morrow, sometimes in rare moments of Saturday fortnight. That is the secret of his genius. Now in France at the present moment, below the surface of political tranquillity, there are seething passions and anxieties. Having at last realised that literal fulfillment of the treaty is impossible, and the fact that the German money on which they reckoned for their own immediate financial necessities in squaring the budget is not forthcoming, France is anxiously considering the future, but her people are not united in their convictions as to the best policy to be pursued. They are determined not to sacrifice two essential items of their victory, compared with which all other things are trivial.

The first is security from future invasion, the second is repayment for the devastated districts. I think they are perfectly right in holding to those essential needs at all costs. But they are not all of one mind upon the method by which those can be secured. There is a secret and severe clash between two schools of thought. > One school, including all in high "military command, the French aristocracy and a considerable body of public opinion, believes that security can be obtained only by using the financial default of Germany as a legitimate reason for increasing the hold on the Rhine and for obtaining stronger control of German customs. They are prepared to admit that such action would not result in full payment of indemnities, but they regard the safety of France of first importance and believe they could squeeze enough to pay for the devastated districts. Extremists of this £chool of thought are prepared' to act with or without British agreement.

On the other hand, there is a very large and growing body of opinion 111 France not only against further military action in Germany but also dead' against any policy that would alienate British support, which is their one mainstay against future German aggression, for they are prepared even to sacrifice some of their interests provided England reciprocates generously not only by cancellation of French debts but by' a definite pledge of aid in the event of future war with Germany.

It is, I think, certain, apart from a great deal of nonsense written in sensational papers, that there are secret forces and movements in Germany today preparing for the overthrow of the republic and I am firmly convinced that their failure can be secured only by new and generous concessions to German democracy by England ancJ France, Hut there again many French, I know, believe that such concessions inspire and encourage German militarists. They have the right to this belief. It is an uncertain factor in future history. In Britain there is not

quite the same conflict of doubts and uncertainties as in France. Apart from various groups and individuals, quite important but not numerous, the body of public opinion in England, so far as I can gauge it, is impatient of French fears, rather too intolerant of French claims and more and more friendlv to Gorman democracy. This' is not in the least due to unfriendliness with France, but to the English characteristic of not bitting a man when he is down; and the English business man is supported by the immense pressure of pacifist idealism which has taken , possession of all" classes. They may be living in a fool's paradise, they ' may credit Germany with honesty which is not hers. They may be too careless of French hostility and strength. They may believe there is peace when there is no peace. But in any case, wisely or unwisely —and I am bound to say I think wisely—there is an undoubted majority in Britain forcing the hands of Lloyd George, dictating the popular opinion policy of generous treatment to Germany, not inconsistent with generosity to France, by washing debts. Unfortunately, generosity to Germany is regarded by France as treachery to her; and in politics as in private life it is impossible to be all things to all men. Nor is popular sentiment the same thing as statesmanship, and Lloyd George must wonder how he is going to be generous both to France and Germany and save both from bankruptcy at a time when there are a million and a half unemployed in Britain, when there is an income tax of 5s to the pound, when there will be less revenue next year to finance the Britishi budget, when British taxpayers will be burdened, too. with £50,000,000 a year interest on the American debt. That is a pressing, problem which is being discussed wherever three Englishmen meet together, and they never reach an agreement on the way to solve it.