A SHORT WAY WITH THE MAORIS.

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XXV, Issue 3751, 27 July 1869, Page 6

A SHORT WAY WITH THE MAORIS.

To the Editor of the Daily Southern Crosi nnd "Weekly Netts. Sir,— The only plaa to bring aboul a speedy and effectual end to the war is the defensive system. Never go to seek the enemy. Let a line be drawn, and warning given, that any Maoris found crossing it will be shot. By these means the Maori would be cut off from all communication with the white man. He would be deprived of all those things wliich have become almost as necessary to him as to the European, such as tobacco, spirits, flour, sugar, blankets, munitions of war, &c. If the law were made more stringent as to the sale of arms, the natives would soon run short of these. Instead of a Gue the man who sella arms or other warlike stores to the natives ihould be shot. Some may say that this is very hard, but I do not think so, for the man that gives yo»r enemy the means of destroying you is just as much a murderer as if he killed you himself. He is a traitor to his countrymen, and the punishment of the traitor in war times is death in all European countries. Why should it not be among us ? What is a fine of a few hundreds when guna can be bought for a couple of pounds each, and sold to the Maoris for ten, fifteen, and twenty each ? It is Baid that the war is coating close on £400,000 a-y«ar, yet the settlers are driven in from all quarters, and their places destroyed. Suppose that thia money were used in arising a body of 8,000 men, ab a pound a-week each, and fifty acres of land, efficient officers were chosen, the men well-drilled, Bubject to military law.supplied with the Snider rifle, and all settled in a continuous line of military settlements along the frontier of the disaffected country, with good redoubts into which they could go in case of an attack, or every night, with the women and children. Six thousand men would cover an area of 231 miles in length by two in breadth. Each 1,000 men would cost £55,000 a-year (omcer'« pay included), which would make £330,000 for 6,000. Such a force would hare this advantage, that it would be a permanent benefit to the colony, whereas both the men and the money would be lost by employing British troops, and we would still be without a frontier guard as a guarantee against future invasion. This force also would contribute their £5 10a. towards the revenue of the colony, which would amount to £33,000 a-year. This would reduce the actual coat of the force to £297,000. So as to have the frontier line as compact as possible, it would be well not to give the officers any more land than the men on it, but give them the balauce immediately inside of the line of defence. If redoubts were erected along this line every two miles, capable of accommodating fifty-two men, with the women and children, they would always be able to command a hundred and fifty -six men within half an hour, as there would be threa reredoubts, within two miles of each other. One hundred and fifty-six men, armed with the Snider, would be able to hold out until their more distant neighbours arrived to assist them. There is one item that I almost forgot, i.e., arms. The arms in the firht place would have to be supplied by tha Government. The Snider rifle* would cost about £5 each, whioh would amount to £30,000 for 6,000 men s making the whole cost of such a body £327,000 a year. Of course the arms would not need to bo renewed every year. The military settlers should be engaged for four or six years, and proper provision should be mado for supplying the vacancies in case of ,'death, or otherwise. To guard the coast against smuggling it would bo necessary to have four light steamers — two on tho East and two on the Wast Coast. Each of these would cost £10,000 : the four would be £40,000, chargeable on the first year. £10,000 would cover the yearly expense of these after the first year. They should be kept continually running along the disaffected coast, and all vessels on which the least suspicion fell should be examined by them. If they did their duty, very little would get in to replenish the rebel camp, especially if traders knew that death would be the penalty of being caught. Theaa would cost £50,000 the first year— £4o,ooo first cost and £10,000 yearly expense. This added to £327,000 will make, £377,000, leaving a balance of £23,000 out of the £400,000, for incidental expenses. On the expenditure of the second year there would be a reduction of £30,000 for arms and £40,000 an the first cost of the steamers, which would be £70,000, making the actual cost £330,000 a year, with an annual ailowance of £23,000 for incidental expenses. If we consider this force of no benefit to the colony, so far as contributing towards the revenue, even then the sum will be less than the present war is costing, and with no prospect of its evar coming to an end. The whole would then be £363,000. The advantage of this plan would be that all the line inside the frontier line would be safe ; it would bo enhanced io. value, aud rapidly settled up. To meet the expense, and to avoid borrowing any more, there should be an incomt, and, if necessary, a property tax put on. An income tax alone would defray half the expense. At present the wealthy pay no more to the revenue than the poor, which is not right. If provincialism were done away we would have but one instead of ten Governments to keep up, consequently not so many salaries to pay. The revenue of the provinco last year was £83,000, and the Superintendent in his opening address Baid that it would be all consumed in paying interest; on loan and salaries. If the half of this were employed in putting down the war, it would be iufinitely better for tho colony. An income tax, and the money wasted on provincial institutions, would nearly — if not altogelhei* — cover the expenses of the war. •It may be said that we have tried the rnilitmy settlement system, and it has failed ; but that was not the fault of the plan, but through it not being properly executed. The military settlers of tho Waikato, instead of being fcettled on their land when brought here, were kepi; for nearly the whole time of their service, moving from place to place ; so that when the time came for them to settle on their land they were enervated for labour on the farm. The Government had no power to compel them to stay, and, worst of all, they were without the meana to settle. Their pay ceased just when they most wanted it. Had they been settled on their furucs at once, and received pay for three or four years, only having to fight when attacked, they would have been enabled to get their farms into such a state that they could have lived on them without assistance. 4 Have we degenerated that we should still continue to crave assistance so unwillingly given ? Are 200,000 British subjects, if properly governed, not able to put down 50,000 natives, when there is only a fraction of that number in rebellion ? It is true, the colony ia greatly weakened by the large force it had in the field while the Imperial troops were here, and although our friends at home would make it appear that we were unwilling to help ourselves. Still, with economy, and usi i£ severe mecßures,— for the colony is so much wasted by the foolish leniency of the British Government that vr£ Are not in a position to play with the Maoris, — they can be put down. If, when everything had been done by the English Govermment to prevent a war and failed, it h*d curried on the war with vigour, until the natives were thoroughly subdued, it would not,only have saved the Maori race, but a great deal of European life, and prevented any future \rar. Th 9 only sign of submission that ahould be acknowledged should be the surrender of their arms, the abdication of the King, the giving up the murderers, and being willing to aubmit to European law,

Th« heading r>f thin letter any sex m pa ai< x oii *B defensive warfare is geuerally of lo;ig dura i .i>. Compiired with the time the present system is liKely to J»st, it^ would be Bhmt. Up in the interior, with nothing to live on but what they (the nutivet.) •ouW produce, they would in a short time feel the hehfki the Europeans hay« been tothem, and, instead of aetpising, would learn to respeot our power. Therefore ifc would be the shortest and m»st i»erciful policy, an there would be leßs life lost on both and the natives would see clearly tbeir post/aon.—l am, &c, Bellum.