COLONIAL DEFENCES. (FROM THE "NELSON EXAMINER," APRIL 23)

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XXIII, Issue 3058, 15 May 1867, Page 7

COLONIAL DEFENCES. (FROM THE "NELSON EXAMINER," APRIL 23 )

We hare already referred to, the subject of our colonial defences in speaking of the removal of her Majesty's regular troopt from New Zealand. This, not unnaturally, leads to the consideration of the laat considerable item of the ordinary expenditure of the colony for this year. The sum total of more than £159,000 is a startlingly large one, it must be oonfefied, but we must not hastily conclude that it is on that ground unreasonable. A close examination of the proposed expenditure of this turn will show that at all events a large part of it is required for temporary purposes only. Thus, there was a sum of devoted to paying off existing liabilities for the Defence Force at the beginning of the year ; £25,000 to pay the remaining charges for the final settlement of the military settler* in the Northern Island ; and £25,000 for the survey and administration of confiscated lands, by way of advance. Thus a lum of £87,000 may be legarded as devoted to wholly temporary purposes, some of which must, and all of whioh may, expire with the present year. It is not our intention to enter upon any consideration of the muck-vexed question of the military settlers and confiscated lands, or to inquire how far mismanagement may hare rendered the first inefficient, and the second unproductive. The question 6f cost is the one before us now, and this has no necessary connection with Tesultt, as our previous inquiries into our Government departments have convinced us. It is very probable, indeed, that the sum of £25,000 will require to be farther supplemented next year so as to finally complete the location of the military settlers at Tauranga and Opotiki ; but in spite of these suspicions sanctioned by past experience, it is abundantly clear that the military settlers will sooner or later be all located, just as the confiscated lands will in course of time, no doubt, be all surveyed, and, let us hope, all sold. The remaining charges are all entailed by the need of a Defence Force or standing army, and the necessity of keeping up a reserve force of militia and volunteers in something like a serviceable, state of efficiency. The Government expected to do this for £72,000 during the present year, at least this was the whole sum demanded for the purpose from Parliament ; and the most interesting and important part of our present inquiry must be connected with this item of expenditure. New Zealand is probably the only one of the colonies that requires a standing army. In our ■ister colonies of Australasia a few companies of the Imperial forces are maintained almost entirely for ■bow. In Canada, on the other hand, the only need of a standing army would be that arising from a war between the United States and England, a contingency better provided for by a trained militia and volunteer force than by anything like a small standing army. But in New Zealand, ■o long as we have a native difficulty, there appears no escape from maintaining a standing force of some kind. That it must be a colonial force has been an opinion long gaining ground in the colony, and finally endorsed by the recent action of the English Government in ■withdrawing the British army from New Zealand. The form in which this question now presents itself is therefore somewhat new in colonial experience even here. Hitherto we have dabbled in standing armies it is true, by now embodying and now disbanding a company or two of colonial troops ; but nowjit is manifest that some decision must be come to about what is really required, and how it may be procured at the least cost to the colony s To a very great extent our experience of the past disturbances in New Zealand may serve as a trustworthy guide in this matter. It is quite conceivable that even the most experienced military man, if asked how we could defend our scattered settlements by means of a standing force, would suggest the employment of several thousands of men as the very least number that would answer the purpose. To this, however, experience at once finds the answer, that no great force has ever been brought into the field at onetime by the rebel natives ; and that even when disturbances were at the worst, it was always possible to confine war practically to a single district. These facts ought to prove very efficient guides to our Colonial Ministry, in determining upon thecbaracter and extent of tbe force they must ask the colony to provide for a standing army. In 1865, Mr. Weld proposed to maintain a force of 1,500 men, in .substitution for the British troops in New Zealand, rgaoh a force as this is at once evidently beyond our means and our requirements now, whatever it may have been two years ago. It was then proposed to station six companies of these troops in the Waikato districts-others at Tauranga and Opotiki, and others at Wanganui and at Taranaki. Now, however, we find that Waikato does very well without them ; that Taranaki does not apparently require more protection than its own Militia and Volunteers can very well afford ; and that at the East Coast and Wanganui the standing force of the British hitherto maintained lhas been of very little use. The moral of what hag transpired in the last two years seems to us to be, that a standing force in New Zealand is only required so long as districts of the country are in such a state that offensive operations may become requisite. By this we do not mean that so soon as no good reason exists for making an expedition to chastise the tribes at Rotorua, or Opotiki, or Wanganui, we should disband the force ; but that it should be of a kind specially suited for offensive operations, and not be constituted on a basis more permanent than the probable duration of such a state of things. The expenditure for a Colonial Defence Force we look upon as a proper, and necessary one at present, but we think |$ very essential to bear in mind that it is not to be a permanent branch of expenditure in the colony. The Colonial Ijefencg Force lias' don_e admirable service as an offensive force, and there may yet be room 'for' it tx> do more, as a sjnall, thoroughly effective force of, say,' 3QO to 5,00, men j but we hope never to see it perverted into the nucleus of an army— a machine for parades and guards of honour . A very little of this sort of thing ought to suffice in a colony like this, and that little may well be left to our Volunteers and Militia. One thing, however, must be borne constantly in mmd — the colonists must either consent to serve readily as Volunteers and Militiamen when requested, or they must lay their account with paying heavily for a regular standing army — call it Defence Force or Constabulary, or what we will, but, in any case, costing a great deal of money every year. To a great extent, this rests with the people, but we think that to some extent it rests also with the Government. It is for them to bring it home to the public by insisting upon *■ the regular training of the Militia, a course certain to lead to the great increase in number of Volunteers throughout the whole colony. ' Of course we do not advocate doing this for the Northern Island only, for this would certainly defeat its own intention. All our young men must be trained to arms, or practically very few will' be. If the people of the South object to being called out and trained, the people of the North will object to it also, and we shall have to pay the penalty in the shape of a large expenditure upon a standing army for -the colony. Thj present apueard to us to be the time' to make? a move in the fight direction. So long as active offensive operations have to be undertaken, we 'must have an active, easily-handled, thoroughly-efficient force to undertstke them ; this, however,' should never be looked upon as a thing to last. The country is to defend itself, not to be for ever at war, and it can only do so satisfactorily by means of-a well-trained and patriotic body of Volunteers and Militia. Of these two forces the Volnnteera are, we contend, the belt ana naost Miable in every 1 way, arid it benoves the Govern* inent mow to take such measures as are likely to increase the popularity and efficiency of the Volunteer force of New Zealand.