DR. FEATHERSTON ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XXII, Issue 2717, 2 April 1866, Page 5

DR. FEATHERSTON ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

I am glad also, because I believe that whatever differences of opinion might three months since haye seemed to exist between you and me, have disappeared; and especially because I feel that, should I express opinions adverse to those you hold, you will, after the intimation I have given of my earnest desire not to stand again, give me credit for stating opinions not taken up to-day, but formed after long and mature deliberation. If I remember rightly, the principal wish expressed by those who signed the requisition was, that I should explain how it was that 1 gave such a lukewarm, negative sort of support to the Weld Ministry— how it was that 1 neither supported them with my voice nor my vote. It would be a sufficient answer to say, that I was absolutely, by ill-health, prevented attending the House more than three or four times. But I give no such answer. I will answer your q.ues tlo ii by telling you plainly and distinctly why, if I had been in my place and been able to take part in the discusi sions, I neither could nor would have given any active support to the Weld Ministry. I never believed in the cardinal points of their policy— the principles they enunciated and embodied in their bills were principles which I had ever denounced. ■ There was scarcely a single measure of the slightest importance proposed by them which to my mind wasnot open to grave objections. But still I felt that Wellington had received such fair play at their hands, that I could not have been any party to turning them out. ( And now, before explaining the cardinal points of their policy on which I disagreed, allow me very brieflytoallude to theclaims which the Weld Ministry had established to the support of the Wellington members. Sir, no one is disposed to award greater praise to my friend Mr. Weld than I am, for his having put prominently forward, as one of the conditions on which he was willing to undertake the formation of a Ministry, the immediate removal of the seat of Government to Wellington, and for the firmness with which he effected that removal. And, sir, if there wa3 in the Assembly one man to whom more than another the colony is indebted for the removal of the seat of Government, it is Mr. FitzGerald,.for he was mainly instrumental in carrying the resolution through the House. Still, to Mr. Weld belongs the credit of its final removal. Then again, with respect to the Panama service, the Weld Ministry deserve our warmest thanks for losing no time in carrying out the decision of the Assembly, in entering into negotiations with the Australian colonies, and especially in insisting upon Wellington being maintained as the port of call. But, then, let us do justice, and let us not forget that in every proposal made during the last twenty or thirty years by various companies and associations for the establishment of the Panama service, Wellington has, with one exception, been indicated as the New Zealand port of call and departure. Still less ought we to forget that we owe the stipulation that Wellington is, in the present contract, to be the port of call, solely to Mr. Crosbie Ward, who, in spite of positive instructions to the contrary, made that a condition of his agreement with the then existing company. This , does not detract from the credit due to the Weld Ministry. I am only anxious that we should not ignore the still greater services in this matter of Mr. Crosbie Ward. And, gentlemen, after the experience which members of the General Assembly have already had of the advantages which Wellington presents for the seat of Government, and which they will, I trust, shortly have of its advantages as the Panama port of call — I confess I do not believe it will be in the power of any Ministry to change either the one or the other. At any rate, lam assured that my friend Mr. Stafford has not the slightest intention or desire to make the attempt. I come now to the policy of the Weld Ministry, and I am prepared to challenge every one of you to show that I have ever concurred in its cardinal points, or that in respect to them I have ever conceded or swerved from my opinions. The cardinal feature of his policy undoubtedly was what was termed self -reliance. Now, what did that mean ? By referring to the resolutions that Mr. Weld submitted to the House immediately after he had formed his Ministry, we shall find that it meant the immediate removal of all the Imperial forces. The resolution explaining this so-called self-reliant policy, as originally submitted to the House, was this :—": — " That this House, recognizing the right of the Home Government to insist upon the maintenance of the system of double government so long as the colony is receiving the aid of British troops for the suppression of internal disturbances, accepts the alternative, and requests the Home Government to withdraw the whole of its land force from the colony, and to issue such instructions to his Excellency the Governor as may enable him to be guided entirely by the recommendation of his constitutional advisers in native as well as in ordinary affairs, excepting upon such matters as may directly concern Imperial interests and the prerogative of the Crown." Gentlemen, I think you w3l agree'with me, that if this resolution meant anything, it meant first that Ministers insisted upon the immediate withdrawal of the whole of the troops ; and secondly, upon entire Ministerial responsibility being established in native affairs. I confess as soon as this resolution was tabled, I was surprised that men who had repudiated Ministerial responsibility in native affairs when they might have insisted on it when responsible Government was first established in 1856, who had so recently as 1862 refused the Duke of Newcastle's offer to hand over the entire management of native affairs to them, who actually then turned Mr. Fox's Government out on that very question, should all at once have become such converts to the evils of the system of double government, should so suddenly have become enamoured of the principle of Ministerial responsibility in native affairs. But, gentlemen, I was still more amazed at the proposal to dismiss during a time of war, of a war which threatened to assume larger and larger dimensions, to dispense with the services at a moment's notice of some 10,000 Imperial troops, without having made the slightest provision for supplying their place with anything like an adequate colonial force. Sir, I don't know whether I went to Mr. Stafford or whether he came to me, but after a consultation we found ourselves so thoroughly agreed as to the absurdity and danger of the policy thus enunciated, that after in vain urging Mr. Weld to modify it, we called, with Mr. Weld's consent, a meeting of his supporters with the view of testing their opinion on the question. The meeting was most numerously attended, Mr. Stafford being in the chair, and a long and animated discussion took place. It was soon evident that a very large majority of Mr. Weld's supporters were not prepared to swallow his resolution for the immediate withdrawal of all the troops, but were equally anxious to maintain him in power. To show how strongly I felt upon this subject, and how determined I was not to be a party to an immediate withdrawal of the troops, when the question was put, "What are you prepared to do in case Mr. Weld refuses to alter his resolution, and is defeated upon it ?" I at once said that we had no right to discuss the matter unless we were prepared to accept the responsibilities of an Opposition, and to undertake the formation of a Government, and that 1,, rather than be a consenting party to such a resolution, would certainly not shrink from that responsibility. I mention these facts simply to show how strongly I felt on the subject-jhow fully my mind was made up. The result of this meeting was, that a deputation was appointed to wait upon Mr. Weld, with a request that he would alter his resolution in the sense previously indicated, to him by Mr. Stafford and myself, and adopted by the meeting. Mr. Weld met us by proposing to substitute for the resolution embodying the self-reliant policy, this resolution, to which we agreed, and which was subsequently passed by the House ; and I do earnestly invite your ■ attention to it. It was— "That the resources of New Zealand have been already heavily burdened and their development retarded by the great sacrifices that have been entailed upon the colony by the native insurrection. That, nevertheless, the colony is resolved to make every further possible effort to place itself in a position of selfdefence against internal aggression, with a view to accept the alternative indicated by the Home Government, namely, the withdrawal of her Majesty's land forces at the earliest possible period consistent with the maintenance of Imperial interests, and the safety of the colony, thereby enabling the Imperial Government to issue such instructions to his Excellency the Governor as may permit him to be guided entirely by the recommendations of his Constitutional Advisers in native as well as in ordinary affairs j excepting upon such matters as may directly concern Imperial interests and the prerogative of the Crown." Now, sir, the first resolution embodied Mr. Weld's own .policy. The second resolution embodied the policy insisted upon by Mr. Stafford and myself and others, as the condition of our support. Mr. Weld proposed the immediate withdrawal of all the land forces. We protested against their removal until that removal -was consistent with the maintenance of Imperial interests and the safety of the colony. Mr. Weld abandoned his first resolution, and adopted that which fully embodied and endorsed our policy. I abide, and ever have abided by the terms of that resolution. How, then, can Ibe charged with mii consistency, or with failing to give the Weld MinisI try the support they were entitled to? But now

let us examine the grounds upon which they urged the immediate removal of the troops. Those grounds, as far as I remember, were these — that the troops were not fitted for New Zealand warfare — that the colony could not afford to pay the price demanded for them by the Imperial Government— and that upon their withdrawal, he should obtain th 6 entire control of all affairs, pakeha or native — and should be in a perfectly independent position in all respects of the Imperial Government. Sir, I ever have demurred to these pleas in favour of the immediate removal of the troops — and I need not say recent events have not altered my abjections. I readily admit that 10,000 troops under General Cameron did little or nothing, that they were rather a hindrance than an assistance in the pacification of this country. But whose fault was this ? Who is responsible for the inactivity in which they were kept ? Surely no one will tell me that the British army has degenerated— that they are no longer of the same stuff as those who have in all ages fought and conquered — who have carried and planted the British standard in all parts — to the remotest ends of the world— who have raised the military reputation of the British Empire higher — far higher — than that of any other nation that has ever existed. Will any of you run your eye over the lists of the regiments that have been or are now in New Zealand, and then say that regiments which have covered themselves with glory on many a hard f ought-battle field in every part of the world — upon whose banners are inscribed the greatest victories that have ever been achieved, are unable to cope with the Maoris— are useless in such a struggle as that in which they have been for some years, and still are, engaged.? WiU'any of you say that your old friends of the 65th, or that any other regiment which has been in this colony, are not the same men they ever were — have not the same pluck — the same indomitable courage in New Zealand which they have ever evinced nt other countries ? Will any one dare to say in this meeting that the men who have so freely sacrificed their lives in Eangiriri, at the Gate Pa, at the Orakau, and at other engagements, are unable to cope with the Maoris — unequal to New Zealand warfare ? If any such there be, what do you say to the sequel— the glorious successes recently achieved on the West Coast, between Wanganui and Taranaki, by General Chute, with a flying column of some 400 or 500 men? General Chute's campaign has, I trust, once and for ever given the lie to any aspersions that may have been cast upon the troops in New Zealand, and has dispelled the delusion under which the late Ministry laboured — that British forces were of no earthly use in New Zealand. That campaign has demonstrated that, when British troops are properly handled, the natives dare scarcely make a stand. But the second reason urged by the late Ministry for the immediate removal of the troops was, that + he colony oould not afford to pay the price dema r led for them by the Imperial Government. But who, except the members of that Government, ever dreamt of the colony paying for them ! The Weld Ministry had, over and over again, admitted that the wars in which the colony has been involved have resulted not from the action of the colonists but from the action of her Majesty's representatives, at a, time when the absolute control of native- affairs was in their hands, independently of Responsible Ministers, and when their operations have been approved of and encouraged by the Imperial Government. And, sir, I have so entirely concurred in these views of the Weld Ministry, that I have never held any other language than that this colony was not liable for a single farthing of the expenses of the wars into which it has been dragged. Nay, I have always gone much further, and maintained that this colony has a fair and equitable claim upon the Imperial Government for a refund of the two millions it has already expended on war purposes. And, sir, 1 believe that that claim, if properly urged, will be conceded by the Home Government, that public opinion at home will force the Government to recognise it ; and for these reasons : — The Governor of the colony, and the colonists, have repeatedly pointed out how this wretched rebellion might be crushed. And why has it not been ? I say openly and I speak advisedly, had General Cameron discharged a single one of the duties which devolved upon him — had he instead of employing his time in inventing and propagating the vilest calumnies against the colonists — had he, instead of preaching to the officers and men under his command, that the war was an unjust one— a war undertaken solely for the purpose of satisfying the settlers' greed for native lands — had he, instead of doing his utmost to demoralise his army and establish a fear of 'the tomahawk, followed Sir George Grey's instructions, and simply led his men, or allowed his officers to lead them against the enemy, the war would long since have been brought to a close ; the rebellion crushed, and such condign punishment inflicted upon the rebels, that they would have hesitated long before they again took arms against the Queen's authority. But, sir, when we know, as we know now, that General Camerons instructions to his officers were not to undertake any operation against the enemy— not to allow the men to go a hundred yards from the redoubt — not to fire upon the rebels even when they were prowling past the camp or redoubt, but to conciliate them in every possible way — I do say that we are fairly entitled to call upon the Imperial Government to repay to the colony the two millions General Cameron has forced it uselessly to expend, nominally on war purposes, but really to aid him and his staff in the conspiracy in which they were engaged against the colony. And, sir, that General Cameron has recklessly wasted two millions of the colony's money, is proved beyond a doubt by General Chute having achieved with a flying column of 300 regulars, about the same number of colonial forces, pakeha and Maori, w.li*fc General Cameron with some five or six thousand men dared never to attempt. The other plea urged by the Weld Ministry for the removal of the troops appears to me equally untenable, and to come with, an exceedingly bad grace from him and some of his colleagues. I refer to the plea that, as long as the troops are retained in_the colony, we have no right to claim the management of native affairs. When I remind you that when Mr. Sewell in 1856 came down to tho House with the conditions on which Governor Browne would grant responsible government, one of the conditions being that the management of native affairs was to remain in the hands of the Governor, I urged the House to reject the conditions unless native affairs were placed equally with all other matters under the control o£ his advisers ; when I remind you that in 1862 I urged the House to accept the offer then made, both by the Duke of Newcastle and Sir George Grey, to hand over the entire administration of native affairs ; and that Mr. Weld and his supporters moved amendments declining the offer, and succeeded in ousting the Fox Ministry, you will find some difficulty in believing that the Weld Ministry were sincere in putting forward such a plea for the removal of the troops. But whether they were or were not sincere, will any of them say that during their administration Sir G. Grey had not as potential a voice in the management of native affairs as he ever had? Will the present head of the Government say that, if the troops were withdrawn to-morrow, the representative of the Crown would not exercise as much influence in native affairs as he does at the present moment? The truth simply is — it is impossible and absurd to attempt to define the relations between the Governor and his Ministers. Her Majesty's representative must ever exercise an important influence in the administration of affairs, whether ordinary or native. To show how absurd it is to expect that Governors can be reduced to mere nonentities, I might refer you to the action taken at various times by the Governors of the Australian colonies. It was only the other day that the Government of "New South Wales resigned because the Governor refused the dissolution they asked for; and a report is current that the Governor of Victoria is likely to be recalled because he has been backing his Ministers in strangely illegal and unconstitutional proceedings. But the absurdity of their plea is made still more manifest when you remember, that at the same time that they urged the immediate withdrawal of the troops, they prayed the Home Government to give them an annual grant of between £200,000 and £300,000 for the payment of the colonial forces. Surely, sir, if the Imperial Government were entitled to interfere because they paid the Imperial troops, they .would be entitled to interfere if they paid the colonial forces. But don't let me be misunderstood. I never have believed that an army of 10,000 men was necessary in New Zealand. Half the number, or even less, if properly handled, would easily have have done the work before them. lam far from being opposed to a great reduction, but I do deprecate the sudden withdrawal of the whole of them, as calculated to induce the natives to persevere in the struggle, and rekindle the flames well nigh extimguished. Besides, however brilliant have been the achievements of our colonial forces on the West Coast and on the Fast, I don't think it would be either wise or safe for the colony to rely exclusively upon them. And, however trustworthy our native allies have hitherto been still there is undoubtedly danger in" arming them; and their management defends far too much on personal influence to justify us in depending solely upon them. But, sir, even in a point of view, the withdrawal of the troops would be folly, for to maintain a body of fifteen hundred colonial forces would cost the colony

mow than 4,000 troopi, even if you bid to pay at the rate of £40 a man. I repeat then that whether you agree or disagree with me, you cannot accuse me oThaving in this question failed to give i the Weld Ministry any support they had • «ga* » expect from me. But if I disagreed with them on thumain point of their policy, I was equally opposed to other •parts of it. I nave ever been an ultaaprovinciaSrandstillamso. You .will f remember that when I first contested the election of this city, the difference between me and my -opponent was, that while I advocated restricting the "*»*£** General Government and Assembly to purely federal Far^m having seen reason to change these views, I Uv?yeaTb>y^ been confirmed in them, and I fcX,™ that the unity of the colony can only be Svedby c*Sy£g them out to the f ullest extent SotrSfnmSlbf expected to give . .cordial and aetiveYupport to the Weld Minutry, which in every wav-in every measure showed an unmistakable desire to constitute, at the expense of the provinces, a .trons central government If you want proof of this yon have simply to call to mind the declaration that the Customs revenue ought to have been regarded and treated as purely general revenue— to their proposal to diminish the amount hitherto paid to the provinces, and to repeal the Surplus Bevenue Act. It was, in fact, their centralising tendency, their anti-provincial policy, which more than anything else lost them the confidence of those who at the commencement of the session were disposed to support them through thick and thin— at almost any cost— any sacrifice of principle. When their supporters saw in every bill encroachments upon provincial powers, the doom of the Ministry was sealed. A feeling was created that the real policy of the Government was gradually to absorb the Provincial Governments and to create a strong central government— a suspicion which I need not say went far to make some regret that they had e?er supported the removal ojc the .seat of Government to Wellington. Sir, believing as I do, thatjthe cry of Separation will only be allayed by an entirely opposite policy— by carrying out the principles of ultra-provincialism— by enlarging the Provincial Governments! — by confining the action of the General Government to matters of purely federal concern lam glad to perceive in the course pursued by my friend at the head of the Government unmistakable signs of his adoption of such a policy. I scarcely think that I need detain you by any reference to the native policy of the late Ministry, forTE don't believe that even my friend Mr. PitzGerald would now defend any of the nostrums of last session. It is quite clear that he did not himself believe in them — for, instead of having recourse on the East Coast to the powers conferred by the Outlying Districts Police Act, he preferred the simpler remedy of martial law. If, however, he ever did believe in the application, the foul murders of the messengers of peace, Kereti and Broughton, must] have undeceived him. Sir, I never had any faith in any of the native policies that have ever been propounded. I have ever adhered to the opinions that I expressed more than twenty years ago— that as it was utterly impossible to preserve the race, to"preventjits speedy extinction, our chief duty was to make the dying couch of the race as easy, as comfortable as possible. The same causes which were in operation when I then wrote, are acting with increased intensity eve*y succeeding year. It may be a matter of regret that such a race, which possesses many noble qualities, should disappear from, the face of the earth ; but their disappearance cannot be attributed to their contact with the white man, but to the barbarous custom of, during their intertribal wars, putting to -death their female offspring, thereby producing such a disproportion between the sexes as to render the preservation of the race impossible. Twentyyearsagotheirnumberswere generally estimated at from 80,000 to 100,000 ; at the present moment no one believes that they could muster 40,000 souls ; while in another twenty years they will be reduced to a mere handful — a mere remnant. What then is the use of these elaborate native policies which are every now and thenhatchedP The Times in an article of January, 1865, so completely expresses the views I have held that you will pardon me if I give the extract : — " Our policy towards the natives in New Zealand is comprised in one word— ' Wait.' Temporising expedients, delays, dilatory negotiations, all manner of devices which are of little avail in ordinary cases, are of the greatest use when we have to deal with a race which is continually decreasing, on behalf of a race that is continually increasing. It is easier to grow into the undisturbed sovereignty of New Zealand than to conquer it. " Such a policy may be termed Fabian, and so forth, but I . am more than ever satisfied that it is the only true one. Then with respect to finance, I scarcely think you would either thank me or be edified were I to go into a long array of figures for the purpose of analysing 'the conflicting statements of Mr. Sewell and Mr. Stafford. The late Government claim credit for having wiped off an over-draft at the Bank of £800,000. But this is scarcely a fair statement. Some months before they assumed office the colony no doubt was overdrawn to that extent, but then the sale of a million of debentures, half the proceeds of which were paid into the bank in August, and the remainder by instalments in a few months afterwards, paid off the advances of jj t the Bank ; but this did not lessen the indebtedness of the colony. The colony, as Mr. Stafford justly remarked, simply changed creditors. Then, again, the late Ministry teems to claim credit for having in some mysterious way retrieved the finances of the colony, but in what way has never been explained. The facts are, the Whitaker-Fox Government got through during their term of office about one million of the three-million loan. The Weld Ministry (including the halfmillion paid to the Imperial Government) managed to get through at least another £1,200,000 or £1,500,000, leaving an unexpended balance of the loan of not more than some £600,000 ; and I nave no doubt that by the time the Assembly meets Mr. Stafford will be able to show that he has managed to get;through that. Then Mr. Stafford promised to reduce the expenditure for the current year by £240>000, or at that rate. Mr. Sewell declares that he has rather increased than diminished that expenditure. Mr. Stafford replies that he has effected a saving at that rate. I don't pretend to judge between such high authorities. Then Mr. Stafford promised'to continue the grant of the threeeighths of the gross Customs to the provinces. Mr. Sewell demonstrates to his own satisfaction that he can do no such thing. All I can say on this point is that Mr. Stafford has paid the threeeighths, and I believe he will continue to do so. The proof of the pudding here is clearly in the eating. But I hope Mr. Stafford will be prepared to do more than this, and will pay a little bill of some £112,000 of surplus revenue for the year ending 30th June 1865j a bill about which neither he nor the late Government have ever said anything, but which is pretty certain to be presented in due time by the provinces. The great question, however, is how the extraordinary expenditure of the colony is to be met without crippling the means of the provinces. All parties are thoroughly agreed that the credit of the colony must be maintained, and that this can only be maintained by increased taxation, aided it is hoped by considerable retrenchments ; but whilst the late Ministry believed that by the imposition of stamp taxes they could make both ends meet, Mr. Stafford intimates in all probability that he shall be obliged to have recourse, in addition to the stamp duties, to an income tax. Now, however strong the arguments that may be urged in favour of an income tax in an old country, they scarcely apply in a colony like this, where income is so uncertain and precarious, and where, from the absence of the requisite machinery, the cost of collection would swallow up a great portion of the proceeds. I believe that Mr. Stafford will find that the means proposed by his predecessors will be found amply sufficient to meet the current expenditure, and that he will see the expediency *oi abandoning a proposal he has no chance of carrying. Sir, great as are our financial embarrassments, still I cannot regard them as desperate—nay, I take rather a hopeful view of them, and I will tell you why. In the first place, I believe that the neck of the native insurrection is so thoroughly broken that we shall soon get rid of our war expenditure ; then again from the large population which is being attracted by the goldfields, " we may confidently look for a large increase to our revenue. But I rely for the means of enabling the colony to tide over its present difficulties to the power given by the Loan Act, authorising the raising of the three-million loan. That Act does not simply -authorise the issuing of three millions of debentures, but the raising of three millions sterling, so that it matters not at what discount you dispose of your bonds, your borrowing power is no* exhausted until you nave raised three millions sterling in hard cash. Until that amount is realised you can go on issuing your bondi. If Mr. Stafford exercises that power? aa I myself undoubtedly would were I in his position, he will obtain some £400,000 That being the probable loss on the sale of bonds— an amount which would, in all probability, enable him to meet all the engagements of the colony, without having recourse to undue and oppressive taxation.

But, gentlemen, in whatever way our liabilities are to be met, we are, I Tepeat, all agreed that the public credit must be maintained. Sir, there is only one other point that I will touch upon, and that is this— Mr. Stafford ia charged with having acted in a most arbitrary and unconstitutional manner, for having obtained a promise from his Excellency that, in the event of the House meeting with a vote of want of confidence, or refusing the , supplies, he would dissolve. Sir, in my opinion, a more ridiculously absurd accusation was never made against any man ; for what are the facts ? The late Ministers, at the very time when they had a majority in the House, threw down the reins and advised the Governor to send for Mr. Staftord. The Parliament itself was expiring by effluxion of time. Sir, I think that under the circumstances Mr. Stafford might, without being chargeable with shirking the responsibilities which fairly attach to the recognised leader of a party, have declined the task thus thrown upon him. But having undertaken it, I am prepared to maintain that he had not only a perfect constitutional right to stipulate on certain contingencies arising for the power of dissolving the expiring House, but that if he had failed to insist upon such stipulation he would simply have rendered himself the laughingstock of the whole colony. Should I have omitted any subject on which you are denrotu of having an explanation, or of ascertainmg, my views, you have simply to remind me of the omission. But you will have no difficulty, from the purport »f my remarks, in gleaning that my views on all the leading questions of the day are far more in unison with tbo3e of Mr. Stafford than with those of the late Ministry, and that therefore I am earnestly desirous, no matter who your members may be, that the same fair and' generous trial should be afforded to his Government which has been accorded to all preceding Ministers.