THE FALL OF KINBURN AND OTCHAKOFF. (From the Morning Chronicle, Oct. 25.)

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XII, Issue 898, 5 February 1856, Page 3

THE FALL OF KINBURN AND OTCHAKOFF. (From the Morning Chronicle, Oct. 25. )

The fall of Kinbirn has been quickly fallowed, as we anticipated, by the destruction of the opposite fortress of OtchakofF— a destruction executed by the Russians themselves, who were unprepared for defence, and had no mind to allow another of their g urisons to become prisoners of war. T!ie result of these successes, so skilfully planned and daringly exceute'l, lays open to the allied forces a wide a-ad important district, in which we may expect to hear of further operations. It is not likely that an expedition, so auspiciously inaugurated by the desti uction of the main obstacles to success, would suddenly stop short in its careei of victory as if afraid of temptiug fortune too fir. Admiral Lyons, after forcing the passage at Kinburn, will not allow trifling obstacles to deter him from making his guns heard at Kherson. General Spencer, who gallantly posted his men in a position to intercept all communication with the main land, w ill not be slow to under - ( taKe a maich to Xicholairff. Seconded, as thoy will be

by their gallant comrades of both arms of the French servioe, we may expect them to follow up the important successes they have already gained by other undeiv takings to which the«e are but preliminary. Indeed, it may be observed, from Sir Edmund Lyons'a despatoh r that the Allied fleet has taken full possession of the estuury of the Dnieper, as his despatch is dated off that river. From that point to the town of Kherson the distance i 3 but fifteen leagues, with a depth ot water sufficient to allow the smaller vessels st least to reach the town. In point of fact there is u L-hoL-e of op.iations lor the Allies, whether to proce n d first agam"l Kherson or Nicholuieff. The impoitance o't ihj iouner consists in this, tha* it is the d?pot of supplied for the Cnmea: of the latter, in that it is the dockyard of the 1 fleet. It will be for the commanders to determine where the greatest blow can be first struck, and to tako their mesures accordingly. The moral effect of the3e successes is not less remark' able than the material and strategical gains thus ob* talned. After tho stubborn resistance made at Sebas--topol, one would have expected a similar defence to be" made at every other point. But it is not so. We now see what was long ago suspected — that the defence of Sebiatopol wat nude by didfting into its ganison the whole resources of the empire, and by draining all oth< r fortresses of their proper compliment ot troops, in oril r to keep up the prestige of the great stronghold of Southern Russia. Now that Sebastopol has fallen, ai d? t v e arms of the Allies are leit free tor ulterior operations, the hollow ness of the system is made manifest Fortress and tower are levelled with a facility that isperiectly surprising, and which goes far to show that m conquering Sebastopol we have in fact conquered the main forces of the Ru^um empire. The nations that have so long sheltered themselves under the sway of Russia, or that have crouched and trembled at fter power, must now be alike undeceived as to the invincibility of the Czar, who lar from being able to defend* them, is reduced to see one fortress wrested from hi tin after another, without his being able to strike any blow in their defence. The results of this summer's campaign are indeed remarkable. Sebastopol, Kertch, Yenikale, Taman, Taganrog, Kinburn, and Otchakoffy with a. fair prospect of being able to insciibe on the list, before the season closes, the names of Kherson and Nicholaieff. What a bril'iint list of achievements since the day when some of our statesmen would have induced; us humbly to beg of the Czar to allow us to retire unmolested from before the walls of Sebastopol. Of the main armies opeiating in the south of the Crimea we hear little, and of that little the details arenot clear. There Russia still musters her forces — that is the field in which she concenti ates her strength. To- ! dislodge her army from the position they have here assumed is the great object of all the othec expeditions ; \ brilliant as may be the success of each considered in itselt, their importance is to be measured with reference to its bearing on affairs in the peninsula ; and the operations on these points well illustrate the different phases ol war, and attest the mastery in that art of the ailed commanders. On the outside, and as episodes in the great drama, we have blows struck with rapidity,, energy and immediate effect : within the circle Of the main opeiations we have caution, deliberation, th° securing of every step in the pi ogress beiore another is hazarded. The reason is ob\ ious. In the formei ca&e much may be hazarded foi success where failure would not materially interfere with tli^ main object ; in the latter, every step must be deliberately weighed, for a false move would be tatal. Hence while we hear in one place of a rapid descent upon the coast, the bombardment of a fortress and its occupation almost simultaneously, in another we hear of nothing but reconnaissances, letreats, road-making, and other cautious preparations. It is satisfactory to know that every step gained by the Allies is pertinaciously held. Their advanced posts seemed to be pushed inside the line of the enemy's defences upon the Bolbek, but the head-quarters of Maishal Pelissier are at Skelia, on the Upper Tchernaya, and a military road 13 being formed on the ground, as it h won piecemeal from the Russians. Skirmishing, we learn, takes place almost daily on the outposts ; but, as a rule, both parties decline to take the offensive, prefening rather cautious! v to watch each other, and ready to profit by the first false movement on either side. With such an enemy, and in such a country, the essential importance of roads, for moving artillei y and other military equipments, becomes abundantly manifest. Little has been heard of opeiations at Eupatoria. TheBritish cavalry had landed there, but nothing has yet been hoard of the infantiy under Sir Colin Campbell, or indeed of their departure from before Sebastopol, except in the telegraphic despatch from General Simpson to Lord Panmure, about ten or twelve days ago. When the different corps shall have been concentrated there, it is probable we shall hear of some forward movement from that quarter. We may hope that these dispositions will not be without their effect on the mind of the Russian General. With his supplies destroyed at Kherson, the line of his retreat menaced horn Eupatoria, and an army as numeious as his own, high in hopes and flushed with victory, pressing him vigorously in. iront, his position \\ ill be serious indeed. As far as we can form an opinion it will hardly be tenable during the winter. Whether he will fall back upon Simpheropol, or evacuate the Crimea altogether— or whe'her, refusing; to abandon the peninsula without striking one biow for its defence, he offer the Allies battle in some one or other of the mountain gorges that seam the southern surface of the peninsula, must soon be determined. The gieat objection to a battle on his side must be that if h& assume the initiative, he at once forfeits the advantages of his position. Strongly entrenched on the hill slopes as he is on the one side, his adversaries occupy precisely the same position on the other. There is no plain of Waterloo —no field for a fair stand-up tight between the opponents ; the aggressor puts himself in a worse position than the knights of old did when they fought with both sun and wind against them. That is an ewl to which Prince Gortschakoff will not llighty expose his already dispirited aimy.