ANALYSIS OF VICTORY

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 278, 21 August 1944, Page 4

ANALYSIS OF VICTORY

Allied Team-Work Triumph In Normandy (By E.A.A.) Many readers have asked for an analysis of the operations in Normandy, specially as regards the relative significance of the two roles which the Allied participants played in the general pattern. It would appear indeed as if there were in the minds of many a desire to subdivide these roles and apportion the honours of battle as between British troops and Americans. It is unfortunate that any such subdivisions should ever have been suggested, because the two roles were in reality one; the two nations were one nation in battle. It is a fact, however, that the Nor--mandy operation lends itself to consideration of two. very different types of action —the slogging match in the vicinity of Caen and the mobile thrusts which emerged- from a gap in the western flank. Comparisons ot the merits of the personnel who were destined to give reality to the roles are as impossible as comparing the relative merits of the bow and its cord or a door and its hinge. If the bow breaks the cor.l is of little use. If the cord snaps the bow is useless, though it is made from tried and trusted material It is doubtful if Allied, strategists had laid down beforehand exactly where the break-through would be arranged. There were two obvious places—round Caen in the east, and along the western coasts of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Breakthroughs in these two places carried entirely different implications. A breakthrough round Caen would have rolled up the German communication flank and led to disaster swifter and surer than any other in military chess. It was therefore equally obvious that the Germans would concentrate their best troops on this the more dangerous flank. There comes a limit to the number of troops which can operate in a given area. The British troops round Caen rapidly reached- that saturation point without being able to stage a spectacular break-through. Their subsequent role was to hold on with bulldog tenacity to the enemy's tender flank while operations proceeded on the other flank. If a break-through hud occurred round Caen one may assume justifiably that the British and Canadian forces would have reaped the fruits as skilfully as did the Americans. Moreover, the results would have been even more spectacular, not because of any relative merits, but. on account of the nositions of- the forces on the military chessboard.

The type of operation which demands tenacity whether in defence or attack brings forth profound characteristics usually dormant. The psychological effect of this form of operation tends rather to discourage than to encourage. Battering against a stone wall does not produce snowball effects. It is a grim form of fighting in which the troops sec little advancement and a whole heap of hard work and destruction. Military historians will no doubt stress this fact when the history of the Normandy battles is written. We should lie proud that it was British troops who had the honour, probably fortuitous, of undertaking this role. Great Skill Required. By the time the Allied western flank was in a position to exert its maximum weight the American troops outnumbered British and Canadian by roughly two to one. They were operating on a flank against which the enemy placed what might be best described as his second team. The main bulk of the German armour was unable to disengage from the Caen maelstrom. Nevertheless, the Germans had at their disposal strong defensive areas, specially cast and south-east of Avranches. The operations which introduced tile switt initial break-through called for skill and military experience which would have extended an army with years of fighting experience. This refers specially to the staff work and instant decisions required. A few American generals, including General Omar Bradley, had been openminded enough in Africa to analyse those details in which the then untested American troops had more to learn. These generals had looked facts in the face, and had taken steps to deal with them. It is a tribute to these American generals that troops which had had only slight previous battle experience or none at all conducted operations in a manner which would have produced praise -for

seasoned veterans. Que cannot, however, compare the two difficult, roles which the Allied forces on the western and eastern flank were asked to undertake. One cannot even assume that these two roles bad been previously allotted 'by the strategists. The roles eventuated as a result of the uncertainty of battle. Let us, therefore, praise not only the teams but, above all, the team-work which gave us victory. The subsequent American breakthrough, the stemming of a violent German jab against the bottleneck at Avranches, and the spectacular mobile thrust into the heart of France were conducted in an exemplary manner. A war of movement is always more spectacular than a static operation. For that reason let us not try to compare the incomparable. The two Allies earried out their difficult tasks with an ease and smoothness which if they had been attained in many previous wars would have recast history.