AFTER THE RIVIERA

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 277, 19 August 1944, Page 6

AFTER THE RIVIERA

Invasion Army’s Tasks PROBABLE ALLIED MOVES (By E.A.A.) The task of Allied armies landing on the Riviera coast has been officially stated to be to link up with the Allies operating in northern France. Probably those northern armies will have extended their hold to the vicinity of Paris by that time. The landing in Normandy and the landing on the Riviera are, however, very different. It will not be possible entirely to assess the new operation in the light of knowledge gained on the Normandy beaches. The Normandy landings were made in the face of strong opposition on a coast which had received particular attention by the Todt concern. Moreover, the narrow lanes of Normandy gave access to an inland plain stretching from Nantes to Paris. .Once the coastal crust was cracked things started to move. In contrast, the landings on the Riviera were made against only minor opposition and large forces are stated already to be installed well inland. Those inland areas, consist of a mountain region with peaks rising to several thousand feet, where it has been possible to link up with Maquis who already dominated large areas of this mountain block. It would seem, therefore, that the Allied methods in the new area will develop along two distinct lines involving totally different forms of ingThanks to the Maquis in the mountains east of the Rhone, and its northern tributary, the Saone. the Allies may be able to infliltrate northward toward the Jura Mountains and the German frontier at Basle. This operation involves mountain warfare in which tanks can play only a minor role. It will require special equipment and infantry trained as carefully in this type of warfare as others have been in. the jungles. There ig. no denying the significance of an operation of this nature. It will provide a solid core of troops right on the flank of German forces ip France. It will threaten the very frontier of Germany if extended northward satisfactorily. Moreover, it will provide a direct threat to the upper reaches of the Rhine, west of Munich. One would expect these Allied infantry to encounter their first really serious resistance inland along the line of the river Durance. This river rises south-west of Turin in difficult mountain country and flows in a south-westerly direction for 200 miles, till it joins the Rhone some 40 miles north of Marseilles'. The Rhone Valley. Westward along the coast from the Riviera the country opens out into the broad valley of the Rhone. This valley at the mouth of the Rhone is nearly 100 miles wide. The two defended areas round Toulon and Marseilles bar the way to the Rhone. This river is in itself a formidable military obstacle. Near its mouth at Arles it is 300 yards wide. Furthermore, for 50 miles inland the main stream subdivides and the country is intersected with canals and waterways. If the Germans concentrated as many divisions in this area as they did in Normandy an advance into the Rhone valley would be slow and costly. If would appear, however, that it is unlikely that this will be the case. Once the Allies reach the lower Rhone two routes become possible. Ono leads up the valley of the Rhone and the Saone for 250 miles to Dijon in hilly country. The river valley narrows to some 30 miles with the Cevennes mountain system on the west. An advance up the Rhone in the face of determined enemy divisions would create a task not dissimilar to that in the early stages in Italy. Its success would depend very largely on the Allies holding -the mountains east of the river and the two operations would thus become closely interlinked. The other choice of route skirts the Gulf of Lions and leads south of the Cevennes via Beziers to Toulouse and the flat country around Bordeaux. It also leads into a military blind alley, because little purpose will be served except to give access to an Allied army of occupation in south-west France. Whatever be the Allied plan, there is no doubt that if the Germans had the divisions they could make things very tough. The area involved, however, has long been a rallying centre for ever-grow-ing bands of Maquis. The people of the Cevennes, indeed, have always been famed for a sturdy independence which in history before now has taken the form of tinned force. This factor, coupled with the probable inability of the Germans to snare the 20 or 30 divisions required will contrive to speed up the advance to a tempo demanded by operations in the north.