POLICY AGAINST JAPANESE

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 308, 23 September 1943, Page 7

POLICY AGAINST JAPANESE

MacArthur Outlines Conception

STRATEGY OF BY-PASS SYDNEY, September 22. A wide difference of opinion in the strategy to be used in the drive against Japan is revealed in a statement issued in New Guinea by General MacArthur. The statement implies that Australia is the most natural and effective base from which to direct a major oficnsiie against Japan because it has the industrial and agricultural resources, communications, arsenals, and other, iaciiitie.s to support massive strokes, using the methods of the Lae campaign. General Mac-Arthur contends that sued a conception is the very opposite of the ‘’island-hopping” strategy involved in drives from Hawaii and the Aleutians, or from China by way of the Burma Road. General MacArthur made his statement when shown recent Press reports from the United States and Britain that Admiral Mountlbatten’s appointment means that General MacArthur's part in the war is to be progressively curtailed and reduced to a subsidiary role. “It makes little difference whether 1 or others wield the weapon, just so the cause for which our beloved country fights is victorious.”, said General MacArthur in his statement. Main Objectives Only. “My strategic conception for the Pacific theatre contemplates massive, strokes against only the main strategic objectives. utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power, supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite to the island-hopping which is a gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with consequent heavy casualties. Key points must, of course, lie taken, but a wise choice will be to obviate the need for storming a mass of islands now in enemy possession. “Island hopping, with extravagant losses, slows progress (some reports are indicating that victory will be postponed as late as 1949) and is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. The new conditions require for their solution and the new weapons require for their maximum application new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past. “I have no personal military ambitions whatsoever, and am perfectly content in such a role as may be prescribed for me.” Philippines and Malaya?

It is believed that the main strategic objectives mentioned by General MacArthur include such areas as the Philippines and Malaya. Island-hopping, it is argued, would involve naval and air attacks from Hawaii, the Aleutians,, or from China, via the Burma Road. Drives from these directions would have to be based cither on the far-distant west coast of the United States or on equally distant India. In addition, the Burma Road could not support operations on a major scale. General MacArthur considers the success of life co-ordinated campaign against Lae was a small-scale illustration of what could be done further north on a bigger scale. There is reason to believe that Lord Mountbatten’s command includes part of the South-west Pacific area, though this lias not been officially confirmed or denied.

Some observers link the present obvious differences of opinion between General MacArthur and Washington on Pacific strategy with the tendency in some political circles in America to sidetrack General MacArthur.

“SIDE-TRACKED SINCE BATAAN” Comment In America (Received September 22, 11.55 p.m.) NEW YORK, September 21. American correspondents interpret General MacArthur's statement as a virtual admission that he has been shelved and his command subordinated to Lord Mountbatten's. The New York “Daily News” correspondent, Sir. Turcott, writes: “General MacArthur has been side-tricked here since Bataan. He tacitly admitted Unit his plans for a Pacific victory have 'been rejected, and he is apparently commanding a third-rate unimportant drive against the Japanese.” The “New York Times” correspondent, Mr. Kluckhorn, comments: “In spite of his guarded tone, General MacArthur went about as far as a commander on active service could in expressing disapproval of the course of events. The statemeut is considered the strongest General MacArthur has yet made.” Mr. Kluckhorn says that the declaration is made at a time when reports that Lord Mountbatten will be supreme Allied commander in the western Pacific have not. been ollieiiilly defiied, ami when (lie Secretnry of the Navy, Colonel Knox, publicly .hinted that the navy unde:- Admiral King, will run its own show in. the Pacific. “One fact stands out —the United States senior experienced combat general who lias not been called home for consultation since the war began is seriously concerned about what he hears indirectly of Allied strategy in the Pacific and its cost in men and material. Thus, it is widely felt here that the statement is more than just one of repeated appeals to Washington for a few added sinews of warfare. It involves the issue of Pacific strategy?’ A Twofold Purpose. The United Press correspondent, Brydon Taves, says that the statement apparently has two purposes, first, to request clarification of General MacArthur’s position, vis-a-vis Lord Mountbatten; secondly, to defend strategic theories on which General MacArthur has based his conduct of the war. and which has apparently been rejected by London and Washington. “General MacArthur is arguing that Australia is the logical base for the . offensive against Japan, since this theatre is the only area where the need for island-hopping in the widest sense can he avoided,’’the correspondent says. Ofiicial quarters in Washington refused to comment pending further information. Senator Ewin Johnson, a member of the Military Affairs Committee, said: "General MacArthur feels pretty deeply about tile appointment of Lord Molinthatten to a job which rightfully should be his. 1 uni glad lie is speaking up.”