LAVAL’S BARGAIN WITH HITLER

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 95, 16 January 1943, Page 4

LAVAL’S BARGAIN WITH HITLER

There seems no reason to doubt the accuracy of the report by tin foreign editor of the London Daily Express concerning the agreement reached between Laval and Hitler at Berchtesgaden last month. On the face of it, the bargain struck between the two, with the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano, present apparently as’-a mere looker-on, is a piece of bare-faced presumption which ignores entirely the rights and sentiments of the French people, among whom it cannot fail to produce deep and widespread resentment. Those pai ts of the agreement that touch most closely their interests and lives are the suriender in perpetuity ” of the two important French departments of Nord and Calais, which he nearest to Britain on the Channel coast, the passing of French industry, finance and agriculture completely under German control, and the pledge of the Vichy Government to send 400,000 unskilled workers into Germany. This bartering of French national interests and lives has a transparent purpose. It is plainly the price demanded by Hitler, and which Laval is being forced to pay, for German assistance in maintaining that unscrupulous and traitorous French politician in his pi esent position as a virtual dictator. The concessions he has obtained from Hitler make that quite clear. As for its intrinsic value as a binding arrangement, the agreement is worthless, as every agreement with Hitler lias proved to be. Nor can it have any moral value as binding the French people, for the Vichy Government is a government without a mandate, and Laval a usurper of dictatorial powers. Another concession, Hitler’s promise that Laval's will be the last French Government with whom he will negotiate, has been taken to mean that the dictator of Vichy has thus been assured of immunity against his political rivals, Doriot and Deal. But it may mean a great deal more. Hitler no doubt has cynically envisaged the possibility that Laval’s career might be abruptly terminated. He could then use his undertaking as a pretext to justify action to reduce J* rance to a state of complete vassalage to Germany, with every department of French administration passing into German hands, in the same wav as a large part of it is now to be absorbed tinder this agreement. It may be doubted whether I his new development will be taken as scriouslj’ by the Allies as Laval and Hitler might presume to hope. An agreement of this kind might have borne a more serious aspect and significance, had it been made at an earlier stage of the war. But at tins time of day, with the odds steadily mounting against the resources of the enemy, it will no doubt be regarded as having very small significance in relation to the general strategy of the war. German domination of France being what it is, the agreement should actually make little difference, if any, to the military factors in the situation. Its most likely and immediate result should be to stiffen the antagonism within France to the Laval regime, and give fresh zest to the revolutionary elements.