A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 127, 22 February 1941, Page 10

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Amphibious Britain I WAY TO VICTORY ! It was the late Lord Fisher who, in one of his penetrating criticisms of British strategy in the war of 1914-18, complained that the Royal Navy bad been relegated into a “subsidiary service.'' He recalled in 1919 that when be was First Sea Lord of the Admir ally in IPOS he had hazarded a prophecy that “should we be led ... by compromising attendances of great military officers at the 'French manoeuvres into a sort of tacit pledge to France Io land a British Army in France in a war against Germany, then would come the biggest blow to England she would ever have expert enced—not. a defeat, because we never succumb—lint a deadly blow to out economic resources and by the relegation of the British Navy into a sub sidiary service.” Inflexible Resolve

During the first eight or nine mouths of the present war it looked as if Great Britain, fighting side by side with France, was committed once again to a "Western Front strategy." But the German invasion of Norway, Denmark and the Low Countries, followed by the complete overthrow of France, completely changed the scene. Britain succeeded in extricating het Expeditionary Force from what looked like complete loss, but the “colossal military disaster” of France left her to face victorious Germany—and Italy —alone.

All that happened eight or nine mouths ago. In a notable speech iu the House of Commons. Mr. Churchill calmly reviewed the grave situation, and spoke of “our inflexible resolve to continue the war—our professional advisers of the three Services unitedly advised that we should do so and that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory.”

Mr. Churchill, after referring to Britain’s island garrison, said: “After all we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that. We must remind them.” He insisted that as far as any threat of a sea-borne invasion on a great scale was concerned we were far more capable of meeting it today than we were at many periods in the last war and during the early months of this war. If invasion became more imminent we, being relieved from the task of maintaining a large army iu France, had far larger and more efficient forces in Britain to meet it. Ou: position had been worsened by the fact that Germany had conquered a large part of the coastline of Western Europe, which aggravated the possibilities of air attack and added to our naval preoccupations. It in no way diminished, but on the contrary definitely increased, the power of our long-distance blockade.

Check To Germany Mr. Churchill’s masterly survey of the situation last June, has been more than justified by the events of the last eight months. The Royal Navy and the R.A.F. have kept the threat of a German invasion still “on paper.” Of the work of the Royal Air Force Mr. Churchill has reminded us that “never before have so many owed so much to so few.” The British Navy is supreme on the seas. Our sea-borne commerce has suffered severe losses, due mainly to the advantages gained by the enemy in his possession of the French Atlantic bases. But, on the other hand, the blockade of German Europe has been tightened, greatly to the enemy's disadvantage. The last eight months have seen Germany held in check and her Axis partner subjected to humiliating defeats on sea and land in the Mediterranean. The victorious campaign against Italy, in Northern Africa, is the most remarkable example in modern times of the flexibility, the celerity, and the bafflimr nature of that amphibious power which Britain alone wields, but which she has so often neglected. During the last eight months Britain has been waging war in her traditional manner. Britain’s Strategy

This is emphasized iu a remarkable, broadcast from Boston of which the salient points are given in today’s news cables. This neutral commentator says the very completeness of the German victories in the first half of last year enabled Mr. Churchill to discard the line of strategy which Britain followed during most of the campaigns in 1914-IS. . . . With the disappearance of the Western Front myth, Britain becomes united in her strategic outlook. . . . Britain may have lost most of the Continent, but the Continent is a seething mass of discontent and incipient rebellion, so the German occupation is only partially effective. Moreover, if Britain does not control Ihe land she controls the sea and the air to cover the enemy’s weak points ■with absolute sureness. The Nary is the key to Britain’s policy today. Ills critics have accused Mr. Churchill of making mistakes during the lasi war. He may have done so, but his strategic insight was rarely at fault. He it was in September-October, 1914. who sensed the importance to Britain of the Channel ports and made the effort to save Antwerp. He sensed the immense possibilities of the Dardanelles campaign which was was wrecked largely by the cast-iron opposition of the "'Western Frontons." No Western Front

"We built up a great Army, bu; ive wrecked our shipbuilding,” wrote Lord Fisher. "Again, ve did not foster agriculture, and wc almost, ceased building merchant ships, and robbed our building yards and machine shops nf the most skilled artisans and mechanics in tlie world to become cannon fodder! But a wave of unthinking Militarism swept over the country and submerged the Government, and we were in May, 1918, hard put to it to bring Hie American Army across the Atlantic as we were so short of shipping.”

New Zealand and Australian soldiers. who paid heavily in the 1916-17 campaigns wore not deceived by the claims of tlie "Western Front.ers” about the “killing of Germans.” In Hie Battle of the Somme British casualties were 750.000 to Germany's 500,000. and at Ypres in 1917 they were much the same for little gain. There will be no Somme or Yyres this time.

It was the pressure of Britain's seapower, fully exerted during 1917-18 that finally broke Germany's will. Yet, even in the formulation of the armistice terms, the Western Fronters were not disposed to recognize this. Marshal Foch—and others highly placed —fought hard to cut down the naval armistice terms in favour of the purely military terms, but the British admirals rightly had their way.

The Navy is truly the key 10 Britain's policy today. She is wielding her amphibious power from Iceland to tlie Fa,- East with an imagination, resourcefulness and resolute energy that will win great victories ami finally break the Nazis. — (S.D.W.)