The Franco-Soviet Pact

Dominion, Volume 32, Issue 160, 1 April 1939, Page 1 (Supplement)

The Franco-Soviet Pact

' T the present moment French opinion seems to be running in favour of making a clean cut of all Central and Eastern Euro- / pean commitments and recognizing German predominance in / that region as inevitable,” writes Mr. J. A. Spender in Hie “Yorkshire Observer.”

"The French are an extremely practical people,” adds Mr. Spender, "and though for various reasons they are angry with Russia at the present time, they would not lightly go back on their pact with her if they thought her capable of performing the part assigned to her in it—that of coming immediately and effectively to the support of France in the event of her being attacked by Germany.

“It is doubts on this point which are causing them to hesitate. “In this connexion an article in this month’s ‘Revue de Paris.’ supposed to be by an important military personage, is being much discussed. It is supposed to embody the conclusions which weighed with the French Government during the September crisis. The details are too long to report, but the general results can be stated in a few words: —

"Russia has now, as always, immense reserves of men, and her army is efficiently mechanized in the modern manner, but its cadres are inadequate ami ill-organized, and tiie intrusion of politics and political quarrels has seriously interfered with its discipline and the right training both of officers and men.

“These drawbacks might be overcome if the army could be got into action quickly on a patriotic impulse. But in this respect mechanization has actually increased Hie difficulties which were so evident in tiie last war. Little or nothing has been done to provide the railways and roads necessary to a mechanized army, or the transport to keep it supplied. "Along the whole Russian front of about 1400 miles there are only two possible lines of advance for a mechanized army. One is through the defiles

of Rumania, which the writer thinks too difficult; tlie other across the plains of Poland between Rumania and the Pinsk marshes. All the rest is either marsh or impracticable forest.

“It is regarded as certain that Hie Poles would resist any traverse of their territory by either Russians or Germans, and that any attempt by Russians to cross it would immediately throw them into the arms of Germany. “The general conclusion is that, so far as Hie Russian Army is concerned, it could not give the immediate assistance guaranteed in the Franco-Soviet Paet.

“There remains to be considered the question of air power. The latest Russian aeroplanes, as tested in the Spanish war, are said to have outclassed both the German and the Italian, but though tlie production of these could be, and is being, rapidly expanded, the machines actually in use are oldfashioned.

“As to the pilots, opinions differ, but the writer thinks that a great deal of time and effort has been wasted on training troops to descend by parachutes behind Hie enemy’s lines—a plan which he considers to lie impracticable against anti-aircraft defences.

“On the whole, the writer thinks it probable that, in the event of war, Russia would sit back and keep her forces intact to exploit the revolutionary situation which she foresees at the end of it.

"This, he adds, is a hypothesis which is by no means invalidated by experience during tiie September crisis.

"Now, if this is true, or even approximately true, it raises a most serious question for France and, indirectly, for us. The Franco-Soviet Paet, instead of being a help to France, is, in that case, a most serious liability, since it ties her to the East and increases Hie causes of quarrel witii Germany without guaranteeing any corresponding support.”