THE TOMMY IN PALESTINE

Dominion, Volume 32, Issue 94, 14 January 1939, Page 8

THE TOMMY IN PALESTINE

It did not require a War Office statement, issued for publication in Empire countries, to vindicate the activities of British troops who are engaged in the thankless task of restoring order in Palestine. British peoples in even the most distant lands are sufficiently familiar with the traditions and training of the Army to know that whatever measures are being taken to suppress Arab terrorists and hoodlums, no vindictiveness, wantonness or licence will be either ordered, or tolerated. The statement (which we printed a few days ago) is comprehensive and restrained. Doubtless it will have value in combating the harmful propaganda that has been sown throughout the Near East and further afield. But, on the other hand, there is a danger that such a review, coming from military headquarters itself, may.be looked upon as an apology rather than a justification for what is being done. , . , No apology whatever is required for the martial measures in Palestine., Were they not being adopted, the situation long since would have deteriorated from sporadic encounters between Arab and Tew into open warfare, probably accompanied by large-scale massacres and the 'destruction of much of what has been done to transform arid wastes into fruitful and populous areas. If criticism is to be forthcoming for British administration of the mandate and it is not to be denied that criticism has been invited by laissez-faire policy, o the recent past—it must in fairness be directed at the civil authorities. It is for the Colonial Office rather than the War Office to pen reviews of the existing position. The War Office is simply in the invidious position of having been called on to stifle disorder while a puzzled home Government searches for some means of meeting the extreme and, so far, incompatible demands of the opposed factions. The history of military measures in Palestine as they concern the existing upheaval can be briefly told. When unrest first became manifest, and for long after, the British troops stationed in or near the affected areas were unable to take effective action. Control was in the hands of the political authorities, through the civil police, and military intervention could not be undertaken, or assistance given, unless asked for. For some time it was not sought, the authorities remaining hopeful that the situation would improve, and during this period unrest flamed into serious insurrection. When, ultimately, the problem was handed over to the military it was a vastly more difficult one. As any policeman knows, it is comparatively easy to put an end to a streetcorner disturbance when it is at the stage of stubborn jostling and occasional blows. But when tempers are fully roused, when everyone round has become excited enough to take his coat off,. and semiorganized rowdies have joined in the set-to, several policemen arc required—and it becomes necessary for them to use their truncheons. As is pointed out by the War Office, it is impossible by the very nature of the rebel tactics to segregate the Arab population, into peaceful and hostile groups. Rebels and peaceful citizens are inextricably mixed, and the armed marauder by night, as like as not, is an apparently harmless villager by day. In these circumstances personal and house-to-house searches are unavoidable where there are grounds for suspicion. It is seldom possible to isolate rebel bands and make an example of them: they have to be searched for and prized out of innumerable hiding-places. This form of warfare—if such it may be called—holds no compensation for the soldier. It is not. only risky and onerous, but heartbreakingly slow in producing decisive results. Rather than be made one of the targets of the disapproval voiced over the Palestine question as a whole, the British Pommy should be thanked for holding the line between Arab and Jew. That he is doing so honourably and with the good-humoured tolerance for which he is famous, may be taken for granted.