ITALIAN POLICY

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 154, 26 March 1938, Page 2 (Supplement)

ITALIAN POLICY

Mussolini’s Predicament EFFECT ON EUROPE. It is more than a. year ago that the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was signed in Rome, says the “Manchester Guardian” editorially. Its purpose was to prepare the way for an improvement in Anglo-Italian relations. The attempt to prevent Italy from annexing Abyssinia had failed. Over 50 Powers, led by Great Britain and France, were arrayed against her; British naval reinforcements had been sent to the Mediterranean; and Italian foreign trade was slowly being strangled. But the prospect that Italy might prefer to “go down lighting” rather than capitulate “ingloriously” brought “sanctions” to an end.

War in the Mediterranean, victorious for the League as it would doubtless have been, might have given the Germans occasion to achieve the union with Austria. [She has now more than accomplished this.] It was this, together with the sudden collapse of the war in Abyssinia and the possibility of losses in damaged ships and aeroplanes at a time when German rearmament was rapidly growing, which in actual fact —if we are dealing only with what happened and not with the question whether it should have been allowed to happen—made Great Britain and the ’ members of the League decide to abandon' the attempt to stay the hand of Italy in Abyssinia. A fresh situation arose in the .Mediterranean, and it has grown steadily worse. Whatever else may be said about it. it is certainly bad for Great Britain, for France, and for all the Powers interested in the maintenance of the European order; it is also bad, not least, for Italy herself. Italy’s Hold on Abyssinia. The success of Italy in defying more than 50 Powers has left her in possession of a new colony, but it has not left her in a sanguine frame of mind. Her hold on her colony is precarious. All organised Abyssinian resistance was broken by the advancing Italian armies, but unorganised resistance goes on. The development of the still unpacified country has turned out to be difficult beyond expectation. There is an outflow of capital instead of the inflow there should be in a territory that is being “opened up.” Abyssinian trade has come to an end, and where there should have been reconstruction and reorganisation there is a good deal of ruin and disorganisation. In so-called “normal” times it would be possible to say that the Italians will try and try again and perhaps succeed in the end. But times are not. “normal.” The international situation is one that makes it dangerous . for Powers with even greater security and greater resources than Italy to suffer any weakening, however transient, whether in a military or in an economic sense. Italy’s Prestige. Italy has a whole series of problems, each one of them intracable, dangerous, and costly. She is almost as deeply committed to intervention in Spain as she was to war in Abyssinia. Germany has been more cautious, for while intervening no less effectively in Spain she has been silent on the sub-' ject, so that her people are but dimly aware that she is taking any .part at all in the Spanish civil war. In this way her prestige is far less engaged. .But Mussolini’s dictatorship, like, all dictatorships of its kind, is largely based on prestige, so that he is ill able to bear defeat, seeing that the exploits of his troops in Spain have been vaunted by Italian orators and journalists.

Italy is also, and at great expense, maintaining—and has of late even been reinforcing—an army in Libya, whence she can threaten, or appear to threaten, Egypt and Tunis. Tunis is strongly defended by a sort of "Maginot Line,” and as for Egypt an attack would mean a war in which Italy would face a fleet and air force far more formidable, rearmament and the reconditioning of warships having made rapid progress, than at the time when “sanctions” were being enforced. Her rapid defeat would be as certain as anything can be in war, and she would lose Abyssinia. These are not the only burdens Italy has to shoulder. Her internal situation is very bad. Not that the dictatorship is directly menaced ; the technique of modern despotism is such that political opposition can, as a rule, be quelled in its beginnings. But continued depression at home and the continued drain of unsuccessful enterprise abroad are destructive of the prestige that every modern dictatorship requires if it is to live. Italy, or rather Mussolini, for her policy is his policy, is in a blind alley and a dark one. What is the way out? The classical way would be war, and it would, no doubt, be taken if the chances of successful war existed. But apart from the immense superiority of any prospective coalition that would be arrayed.against Italy and any possible allies of hers shtp is short of the most necessary raw material, especially oil. There is reason to believe that she has not enough stocks of oil to last her for more than a few weeks, and in a war her importations would cease. Britain’s Interest. It is all very well to say that Italy herself has chosen the blind alley and that her predicament is no concern of Great Britain's, but Great Britain is vitally interested in the freedom and security of the Mediterranean. In a general crisis the presence of a Mediterranean Power Unit is even potentially’ hostile would mean a general weakening of the armed force at the disposal of this country and of France. But Italy's main vital interest, the freedom and security of the Mediterranean, is also a vital interest of Great Britain. It is obviously desirable that the tension between the two countries should, if at all possible, be brought to an end. But Mussolini has for some time made it impossible. He not only insists that his conquest of Abyssinia must be “recognised”: he fights an Italian war in Spain while professing “non-inter-vention”; he puts the screw on us and France from Libya: he seeks to poison the Near East against us by’ propaganda. How much of this would he abandon for the sake of the agreement that we would all desire if he would make it reasonably and honourably possible?

An angler had a four hours' tussle with a huge salmon before he was able to land it. When he related his triumph to his wife he laid special stress on the time it took and the energy lie had to expend before he could secure the salmon. “But. my dear.” said bis wife with a puzzled expression, “why didn't you cut the string and get rid of the brute?”