ARMY COUNCIL

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 142, 12 March 1938, Page 10 (Supplement)

ARMY COUNCIL

History And Functions INFLUENCE ON POLICY | In view of the recent changes announced in the Army Council, Sir Charles Gwynn explains in this article the history of the council and the functions it has performed. It is now nearly 34 years since the Army Council assumed control of the Army, which formerly had been vested in the Secretary of State and the Com-mander-in-Chief,| with the War Office H staff, in the main, responsible to the Secretary of State, he says in the London “Daily Telegraph.” On the whole it has exercised its functions with sur- | prisingly little friction, and with few changes in its initial composition. Its formation was one of the farreaching changes which sprang from the Esher report on army organisation following the South African war, and , the Commander-in-Chief who found his powers thus drastically curtailed was Lord Roberts himself. Originally it was composed of eight members —three members of the Goveminent, i.e., the Secretary of State, the Under-Secretary of State, the Fin- g ancial Secretary to the War Office; J. four serving soldiers —the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the AdjutantGeneral, Quartermaster-General and / the Master-General of Ordnance; and :■ the Permanent Under-Secretary of the | War Office. To these have recently been added a Director-General of Mu- | nitions Production, an appointment at present held by a distinguished En- | gineer Vice-Admiral, and the Director- / General of the Territorial Army. Dominance of Secretary of State. It was at first intended that decisions ; of the Army Council should be those of ;; its majority, with the Secretary of State presiding as primus inter pares, / but Mr. Arnold-Forster, who was Sec- g retary for War from 1903-5, came to / the conclusion that the Secretary of g State must hold a dominant position, g His decision to make this change—necessary as it probably was—led to the resignation of Sir Herbert (afterwards Viscount) Plumer, who at the g time was Quartermaster-General. The composition of the Army Council | is worth studying, for the average man is inclined to look on the War Office g as essentially a military organisation. ; j He may be surprised to see that | soldiers are actually in the minority on the controlling body. Moreover, as the ■ military members hold their appointments for a limited period, it frequent- ? ly happens that one or more of them have so recently taken their seats on the council that their opinions would hardly carry weight.

To some extent the same applies to the political members, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the Permanent Under-Secretary, on many points where precedent is involved, speaks | with great authority. On all questions of general military policy the Chief of the Imperial General Staff naturally carries most ! weight. The other military members ,5 represent the interests and requirements of their special departments in | giving effect to the policy which the ijs C.I.G.S. advocates. This is, of course, / particularly so when the C.I.G.S. is a |$ strong and dominating personality, g Moreover, in the 0.1.G.5.’s department fc is the Directorate of Staff Duties, / which has important co-ordinattag functions. What must be realised, however, is that in matters of policy, and especially in general financial control, the military members can be outvoted.

It may seem strange to confide the command of the Army—for that is what it amounts to —to a body with so little technical training and experience, and whose members have so few opportunities of contact with the Army itself. But it is perhaps the nature of its constitution which enables the C.I.G.S. of the time to make his influence felt and to save the Army Council from becoming a debating society incapable of arriving at clearcut decisions.

There is however, I suggest, a flaw in the organisation which becomes most apparent when military problems take new forms and changes become necessary. The C.1.G.5., as we have seen, holds his appointment for a limited period only, and to formulate and carry through a change of policy in that period is not easy. Moreover, opinions on policy differ, and should the new C.I.G.S. hold markedly different views from his predecessor weak compromises and delays may result before the council as a whole is convinced. Decision on the Spending of Money. In such cases the Permanent Undersecretary, from his long experience, may be tempted to resent changes and to quote previously expressed views. It is not easy for him to keep in touch with the reasons which have caused change of views. From the nature of its composition the council is called on to deal with a great variety of points, for the affairs of all the chief departments come before it for decision. Perhaps it would be better- if the C.I.G.S. were given a greater measure of authority over the working of the other departments, and especially in deciding how money should be spent. It is certain that one of the principal obstacles in carrying out changes of policy is the difficulty of obtaining financial authority for any new forms of expenditure. Where it is easy to get the necessary authority to incur expenditure on what may even be obsolescent, but for which there is precedent, it is difficult to break fresh ground. There is one matter in which military opinion has sole responsibility—that is in the selection of officers for promotion.

It is the Selection Board and not the Army Council which submits names to (lie Secretary of State. The Selection Board consists of the C.I.G.S. Adjut-ant-General and the Commanders-in-Chief of the four principal commands at home. The Military Secretary to the Secretary of State is secretary of the Selection Board, and is responsible for submitting the names of those who come before it for consideration. He does not, however, as some suppose, directly advise the Secretary of State in the matter.

The Army Council has served its purpose well, though it has obviously functioned most successfully when it lias included a strong C.I.G.S. or a Secretary of State with Haldane’s capacity. How it would work with a strong Secretary of State and a strong C.I.G.S. who did not see eye to eye with him is a different matter.

Our experience during the war, when Robertson came into collision with his political masters, indicates the possibility of a clash. A complacent C.T.G.S. is certainly not the solution. Constitutionally, of course, a Secretary of State with a strong personality is in a

position to override the council. This system of control of the Army is certainly not ideal. But it follows the lines to which the country is accustomed. Boards of directors do their work well, but if they have a capable nfanaging director they give him great powers. Like all governing bodies, the Army Council is influenced by public opinion —in its case by military public opinion. which is undoubtedly conservative, especially among regimental officers. If it has seemed over-conservative in its outlook, it may be attributed to some extent to the effect of this public opinion and also to the brake of “financial control” over any new proposals. I am convinced that it is the military members of the council who advocate changes, and' that it is public opinion and the matter of financial control which tend to make their efforts at reform appear somewhat modest. ..