ITALY’S INTENTIONS IN EUROPE

Dominion, Volume 30, Issue 261, 31 July 1937, Page 6 (Supplement)

ITALY’S INTENTIONS IN EUROPE

Signor Mussolini’s Difficulties

My most vivid recollection of a recent stay in Rome is of a. little boy playing soldiers on the ruins of the Colosseum, says Robert Bernays, M.P., in “The Spectator.” He had a rifle and a bayonet, and he was advancing by what I believe is known in military language as “short rushes,” pausing from time to time to lunge with his bayonet through the stomach of an invisible foe, and then going forward again. These evolutions were repeated until he had reached the summit of a tier of the Colosseum. It was my firit morning in Rome, and I witnessed similar incidents at every street corner. It seemed as if the whole youth of the country were re-living with all the absorption and intensity of which a child is capable, their country’s triumph in Abyssinia. That afternoon I came across in my tour of ancient Rome those colossal maps that Mussolini has caused to be carved in stone, illustrating the conquests of Italy down the ages. There is plenty of space for other maps. What will they contain? From all I heard and saw in a brief stay in Italy I am firmly of the belief that there will be no further imperialist adventures for at least fifteen years. For the time being, at any rate, Mussolini regards Italy as a satisfied Power. He has no illusions about the difficulties of consolidating his conquests in Abyssinia. Nor has he any hope of immediate economic return.

In the meantime he earnestly wants peace in Europe and for that purpose friendship with England is essential. Me is convinced that the British people at any rate would not tolerate for many years to come a second act of unprovoked aggression. Mussolini certainly is not making Ihe mistake of underrating Great Britain. When lie said, as he did recently, that “the corner-stone of Italy’s foreign policy is friendship with England.” he meant, it. He wants no clash in the Mediterranean. That is why he categorically resigned, in the Anglo-Italian agreement, all dreams of annexations in Spain. The recent contretemps with regard to the invitation of Abyssinia to the Coronation was none of Mussolini s making. It was one of the rare cases under a dictatorship of a really spontaneous uprising of indignation. Hie Italian people really felt that it was an intolerable insult to the Italian Crown Prince that he should be expected to be in the same room with the official independent representative of a country •if which his father had been declared Emperor. Mussolini himself shared none of these feelings. Like the astute and experienced politician that he is. he realised that the invitation to the Em peror had probably never come before

the British Cabinet, and that there was no question of an insult to Italians as such. But even he, for all his power, dared not ignore the resentment of the Italian people on the subject. «= It is singular, but true, that the only serious factor that he has to take into consideration is the popularity of the Italian Royal Family. He has never forgotten that even in his original inarch on Rome he had to recant his Republicanism and give a definite assurance that he would preserve . and respect the monarchy before his movement could be assured of success. It is fear of the consequences of coining between the King and people rather than any question pf pride and punctilio that induced him to make his protest about the Ethiopian invitation. The Italo-German agreement rests on wholly unstable foundations. The two dictators watch one another piciously as a cat and dog. Mussolini is still fearful for the safety of his Brenner frontier. He fully understands Hie extent and danger of the German minority in those regions and in what perilous proximity they are to the industrial districts of Northern Italy which are the life-blood of the Fascist State, He is well aware and deeply sensitive, of the contempt which the Germans have for the fighting qualities of the Italians—-a contempt which will no doubt be increased by the ease wit!) which the Government troops have put the Italian volunteers to flight in Spain. Mussolini wants peace in Europe at almost any cost. That is why he lias abandoned his attitude of friendliness toward the idea of a Ilapsburg restoration. He is convinced that the return of the Archduke would entail such antagonism from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as would very likely lead to war, and he is not prepared to take the risk.

Due to a variety of causes, Mussolini cannot relax for an instant his feverish propagation of the gospel that Italy is .surrounded by enemies and must prepare, tit whatever sacrifice, for war. That is the explanation of his recent announcement of increases in the length of army service: military experts assert that they mean in fact very little. Mussolini cannot afford the consequences of a return to tranquility, which would be bound to bring in their train dismissals from armament factories and wholesale releases from army service. He wants, in short, to prepare for war, but not to go to war. The situation is fraught witli danger, but such is his astonishing prestige and influence that I have no fear for the moment of the little boy practising bayonet fighting on the walls of Hie Colosseum. All it means is that Italy is playing at soldiers and Mussolini is determined to keei> her playing.