GOAD TO CHINA

Dominion, Volume 30, Issue 46, 18 November 1936, Page 5

GOAD TO CHINA

Importunate Japanese DANGER OF CONFLICT To the Western mind there must always be something abstruse about the methods of Oriental diplomacy; and the testiness of manner which has lately been Japan’s own particular contribution to those methods enhances rather than modifies their intricacy, says “The Times,” London. In externals, it is true, the crises which recur with the tedious frequency of routine in Sino-Japanese relations have hitherto conformed to a simple pattern. An incident occurs; Japan protests; China replies. Japan, dissatisfied, trumps China’s reply with an ultimatum or a landing party; and China gives way. A new foundation for neighbourly accord is hailed, rather perfunctorily, in Tokio and Nanking; and a few weeks later some gunboat is clearing her decks to underline a further accusation of “insincerity” on the part of China. The latest of these crises owes its inception to a series of sporadic and irresponsible acts of violence. Two. outrages in the Yangtze Valley, one in South China, and a fourth in Hongkew—the Japanese quarter of Shanghai—have in the past two months resulted in the deaths of half a dozen Japanese. In two of these cases the assassins have been apprehended and executed without delay; and in all of them the Chinese authorities, both on the spot and in Nanking, have done aU in their power to express regret and to bring the malefactors to book. But the murders, aroused the keenest indignation in Japan, and were loudly ascribed to anti-Japanese sentiment deliberately fomented by the Nanking Government through the organs of the Kuomintang. Although each case was made the subject of an official Japanese inquiry—for which the Chinese officials granted full facilities—not one particle of evidence has been adduced to show that these Isolated occurrences had any political significance whatever; and Tokio would be well advised to drop this particular line of attack, which, based as it is on nothing more than a highly improbable supposition, carries little weight with the audience for which it is intended. Absurd Attitude. The Japanese have not a ready sense of humour, but there must have been moments in the last two months when even they saw, if only for a moment, the absurdity of their attitude. The murder of half a dozen Japanese subjects on Chinese territory is indeed regrettable; but, for an impartial observer at any rate, it is impossible to forget that, five years ago the forces of the Imperial Japanese Army were engaged in killing Chinese subjects on Chinese territory as fast as they conveniently could. War was’ never declared in Manchuria; but the process of pacification was none the less bloody for that, and the casualty lists are not yet closed, though most of the indigenous dead may be classed as bandits. The majority of the Chinese race have not, as yet, any acute political consciousness; but even the remotest peasant cannot, for dimly-felt reasons of prestige, be wholly indifferent to the annexation of what he still calls “The Three Eastern Provinces.” To those unfamiliar with China’s peculiar brand of fatalism it is indeed remarkable how temperate has been the expression of anti-Japanese sentiment; and it would be reasonable in Japan to remember that, though a Government may be forced to forgive, a nation cannot be made to forget.

Perhaps she does remember this. The 1 murders, at any rate, have dropped un- ■ obtrusively out of the picture. They ■ served their turn as a pretext, and the ; negotiations now proceeding in Nanking are cynically irrelevant to the i original agenda. Japan is making fresh demands on China. They are : understood to comprise various stipu- 1 lations for rail, air and harbour facilities in North China; the further appointment of Japanese advisers; the ' establishment of Japanese military ' posts in Inner Mongolia (these are virtually in existence already) ; a reduction of the Chinese tariffs; and “co- ’ operation” in the development of na- ■ tural resources. In return Japan will 1 probably offer assurances with regard j to the cessation of smuggling, and the ■ Tangku Truce —at present a nebulous anomaly—may be crystalised and expanded in a treaty. Behind these proposals—none of them particularly important in itself —-lie considerations which, if only from the’ Army’s persistent championship of them, would appear to be as much strategic as political. Seat of Intrigue. Our Tokio correspondent has reported allegations that North China has been a seat of intrigue directed against Manchukuo, carried on by diehards like General Feng Yu-bsiang and General Chang Hsueb-liang, and supported by the Soviet Government. Jam of this quality is not calculated to sweeten the pill very noticeably, but the Japanese are not alone in believing that the best excuse for attack is defence. Besides, the Army never bothers much about jam. What they want—they have said it before and they will doubtless say it again—is “recognition of Japan’s special position in North China.” That would be the more readily accorded if Japan showed herself disposed to take into account the special position of China in North China. The situation has become unreal. Japan’s record south of the Great Wall —even if we omit the bloody fiasco of 1932 in Shanghai—is not a creditable one. Ethics apart, it is not even creditable from her own point of view, from the point of view of expediency. She has found the diplomatic wicket sticky and the Chinese adroit stonewallers. Again and again she has forced China’s hand (each time damaging her own credit with the world at large), but she has got surprisingly little to show for her trouble. Why? The Chinese are admittedly difficult people to deal with, and they are impossible to deal with at all —except by force—unless you have their confidence. This Japan, both by her actions and her attitude, has forfeited; what she has done she has done by the implied threat of force. Though she has not got far, she has got somewhere near the end of China’s tether. If she persists in being overbearing rind exorbitant there will come a time when China, or more accurately China’s leaders, will revolt at being frogmarched any farther. Once passive resistance turns into an armed forlorn hope (a contingency not inordinately remote) Japan must accept the consequences. Chief among them will be the collapse of her most important market and the absorption of her energies in an attempt to conquer the uncon- ’ querable. War between China and Japan would r be tragic folly. Japan’s present policy ' I is leading her toward it (though not.

at present, rapidly toward it) ; and Japan’s present policy is bringing her few rewards of any sort. The West will judge her by her ability to modify that policy—to correlate the spirit of her deeds witli the letter of her protestations, to give China a chance. This country in particular is not unmindful of or indifferent to Japan’s peculiar needs and difficulties; but Japan can expect little sympathy, and nothing more concrete titan sympathy, until her much-vaunted altruism toward Asia is shown to be something better than a perfunctory disguise.