Problems of the Near East

Dominion, Volume 29, Issue 256, 25 July 1936, Page 18

Problems of the Near East

THE average Englishman rapidly forgets the more resounding failures of British foreign policy and remembers only the successes. The average inhabitant of the Near East takes the successes for granted as the natural outcome of an honourable tradition in international affairs, but remembers the failures and files them carefully, writes a British traveller in the “Manchester Guardian.” In the last few weeks I have had the opportunity of discussing international affairs with ordinary citizens, of the Near East, mainly Greeks and Turks, the former simple peasants of the islands or unassuming business men, the latter ordinary villagers or professional men of Anatolia. All alike agree, with surprising unanimity, that the prestige and name of Great Britain are no longer of the smallest value. For these two countries, Greece and Turkey are face to face with a potential challenge to their existence. Italy has shown no love for either. “The trouble with Great Britain,” said a particularly intelligent Turk to me, “is not that she does not keep her word, but that she never makes a decision until the crisis is so far advanced that her decision one way or the other does not alter the course of events.” He remembered 1914, when British policy, if absolutely decided and unequivocal, might at least have countered German influence sufficiently to split Turkish policy into two and delay or conceivably prevent her entry into the war. The only decision made then by Great Britain, which was to retain the Turkish warships being built in British shipyards, merely gave the Germans and Enver Bey, the trump card they needed. He also reminded me of Chanak in 1922, when the British inability to make a decision one way or the other finally gave triumph to Kemal. He was a broadminded man. for the cases he quoted were mostly failures of British policy which had resulted in Turkish advancement. But now it was Italy that was in his mind —and not only in his mind but actually in his sight. For only an hour or two away on the near horizon is the outline of the island of Leros, now an immensely strong fortress, naval base, and aeroplane base crammed with Italian forces, the northern-most of the Dodecanese islands. It is within immediate striking distance of the Smyrna-Aidin railway, in view of the wide landing beaches of the Maeander plain, aimed at those very regions of Anatolia which Italy has coveted, ever since the nefarious Treaty of London in 1915, as part of her spoils. “Now,” says the Turks, "your Baldwin Government has hesitated,

bullied, and hurled threats at Italy iii a vain attempt to defend Abyssinia from destruction; all your mighty fleet has assembled and done nothing to carry out your policy. Abyssinia is as good as finished ; what will happen now if the greater part of an experienced and triumphant Italian army, instead of returning home to poverty and unemployment, is diverted to the Dodecanese and begins operations on our shores? It will be easy enough to pick some quarrel which will give Mussolini the excuse to enlarge on his theme of an Italian Jake. Turkish support of sanctions might well be excuse enough. And can we imagine that Great Britain would, under its present Government, make the smallest effort to stop such an Italian move?” My Turkish friend gave a sour smile, and I had no answer.

“And so,” he continued, “we are forced to raise the question of the defence of the Dardanelles. When the Straits were demilitarised the Allied Powers undertook to defend them against attack. But the League Powers have equally undertaken to defend a small State against aggression and failed utterly. In consequence, we are forced to defend the Straits ourselves and have given due and proper notice that the question is now to be raised. For at the moment nothing can prevent an Italian fleet sailing into Constantinople. We have virtually no navy and no air force and can defend ourselves only with our very efficient army. But that is not enough.” As a contrast with our vacillating policy, he pointed out how, last year, when Bulgaria showed signs of moving into the orbit of Italy and Hungary, the Turks quietly concentrated a large army in Thrace, on the Bulgarian border. Bulgaria promptly shifted her ground and her allegiance. “That,” said my friend, “was the result of a resolute action and a determined policy.” The coast of Asia Minor opposite the Italian Dodecanese is now an armed camp. Troops, defences and artillery are at their stations. Betweer. Italy and the Dodecanese lies Greece, weaker than she has ever been, as the Greeks discovered during the recent revolution, an easy prey to international banditry, depending on a League whose very foundations have been removed by French support of Italy the aggressor. Such are the nightmares that beset the Near East —at the moment merely nightmares. But in these days one may easily’wake up to find the nightmare a reality. Britain no longer counts in the estimation of the Balkan lands. Our probity and our defence of treaties now belong to the past as a pleasant memory. Even to Anatolian peasants Mr. Baldwin is a comic figure, not a statesman.