A JUTLAND MEMORY

Dominion, Volume 21, Issue 291, 8 September 1928, Page 20

A JUTLAND MEMORY

FAMOUS ADMIRAL DEAD COMMANDED STH BATTLE SQUADRON HIS PART IN HISTORIC ACTION Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, G. K.C.M.G., M.V.0., whose death at tha age of 66 years was recorded in a brief cable message this week, commanded the Fifth Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet in the Battle of Jutland, on May 31, 1916. The prominent and important part played by him in that muchdiscussed action has been the subject of much criticism, but there can be little doubt, in the light of all the available evidence, both British and German, that much of that criticism was unfair, and did the gallant Evan-Thomas a great injustice. His conduct in that historic sea tight has been warmly championed by Lord Jellicoe, and upheld by a majority of his brother officers. Sir Hugh EvanThomas is the third Jutland flag-officer who has passed away since the war, the others being Admiral of the Fleet Sir Doveton Sturdee, who commanded the Eourth Battle Squadron, and Vice-Ad-miral Trevylan, D. W. Napier, who commanded the Third Light Cruiser Squadron. Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas was born in Wales in October, 1562. and entered the Royal Navy in 1875. He was promoted Rear-Admiral in 1912, Vice-Ad-miral in 1917, and Admiral in 1920. He was Commander-in-Chief at the Nore from 1921 till 1924. when he retired. An Important Command. When the war started he had for nearly a year been second-in-command of the First Battle Squadron, flying his flag in H. Vincent. Later he was appointed to command the- Fifth Battle Squadron. comprising the fast battleships Queen Elizabeth, Barham, Valiant. Warspite Malaya, then the most powerful fighting ships in the world. In Lord Jellicoe’s battle plans the "Queen Elizabeth’s” had been given the function of a "free wing’’ squadron, which, not forming part.of the main line of battle, could be used at any opportune moment in an action for bringing a concentration to bear on part of the enemy’s fleet, or otherwise by independent attack, to modi fy the rigidity of the old single line ahead formation on which the battle orders were based.” A few weeks before the battle of Jutland was fought, however, and in the face of strong objection from Lord Jellicoe. the Fifth Battle Squadron was moved from Scapa Flow to Rosyth and attached to the Battle Cruiser Fleet commanded by Admiral Beatty, to reinforce him in the event of further raids on the English coast by the enemy. Oh the night of May 30, 1916, in consequence of information of unusual activity on the part of the German High Seas Fleet, the Grand Fleet put to sea, Lord Jellicoe ordering Beatty to meet him at a pre-arranged rendezvous the following afternoon. The German fleet left port between 2 a.m. and 2.30 a.m. on -May 31, for the Norwegian coast, and twelve hours later had passed Horns Reef, the five battle-cruisers with five cruisers and 22 destroyers being then some 50 miles ahead of the battleship squadrons, all completely unaware that the Grand Fleet was at sea and steaming to meet them. A Fatal Error. Describing the preliminary movements of the fleets, Rear-Admiral J. E. T. Harper in his “Truth About Jutland" says:— “Beatty now made a decision which was to cost us dearly a few hours later. At 1 10.10 a.m. on May 31, the Fifth Battle i Squadron was ordered to take station on ■ a compass bearing north-west and disi tant five miles from his flagship, the Lion. It is incomprehensible why such a position was selected for this powerful force. . . . Beatty expected and had prepared his outposts for a meeting with the i enemy to the south-eastward, yet he had stationed the heaviest and slowest ships of his force, five miles to the north-west-ward, where they would almost certainly be delayed in coming into action. In other words he made the fatal and elementary mistake of dividing his forces, so that he could only engage with part of them. This produced results which can only be termed disastrous. At 1.30 p.m. the line of direction of the cruiser screen was altered to E.N.E., and the Fifth Battle Squadron was stationed N.N.W. five miles from the Lion.” The Enemy Sighted. Shortly after 2 o’clock the stopping by the Germans of a steamer met by chance brought the extreme wings of the two battle-eruiser fleets into contact. At 2.20 p.m. the cruiser Galatea, 17 miles , E. by 8. from the Lion, signalled that I two enemy cruisers were in sight. With- | out ordering the Fifth Battle Squadron J to close up on him which could very easi ily have been done in the twelve minutes, I Beatty at 2.32 p.m. signalled the whole ' fleet to alter course to S.S.E. and in- , creased his speed to 22 knots. The signal was made by flags only, which were not immediately distinguishable on board the Barham- five miles away, and it was not til] 2.40 p.m. that it was made out and the course of the sth Battle Squadron alI tered accordingly. No steps were taken by the Lion to make certain that the signal had been received and in the eight minutes that had elapsed the distance between the Lion and the Barham had increased to 10 miles, and the battlecruisers were rapidly working up to full speed. Nevertheless by “cutting corners” when Beatty altered course during the next hour, Evan-Thomas’s squadron reduced the distance to six miles. A Disastrous Opening. At 3.20 the two battle-cruiser fleets sighted each other, and at 3.45 they opened tire at about 16,000 yards. The Fifth Battle Squadron was not able to open fire till 30 minutes later, and then only at extreme range. Had Beatty closed i up all his big ships he would have • opened the action with ten against five and with an overwhelming weight of heavy guns—32 15in„ 32 13.5 in., and 16 12in.—to the 16 12in. and 28 Ilin, of the German ships, which made off at full speed to the southward to join their > battle fleet. The faulty signal organisa- | tion of Beatty’s squadron again became apparent when the Lion ordered, again I by flags, both our leading ships to fire on the leading German ship and for each of the others to fire at her opposite number counting from the rear of the German line. The third and fourth ships • in our line misread the signal and counted from the bow. hence the Derfflinger, the second German ship, was not fired at at all—a very fatal blunder. At 4 p.m. the Lion was very badly hit and would undoubtedly have blown up had not an oflicer at the cost of his. life flooded the magazines. Two minutes later the Indefatigable was hit by three ■shells and sank with the loss of 1026 lives. Six minutes later the Fifth Battle ~Squadron was able to open tire at 20,000 yards (over 10 miles) and the effect: was felt at once, as the enemy's fire began to slacken. Nevertheless at 4.26 p.m. the Queen Mary wa hit by a salvo and blew up with the loss of 1266 lives. Beatty had lost two great ships while the Germans had received very little damage. The shooting of Beatty’s battle-cruisers was very poor and inaccurate. Official returns show that his foul- surviving ships expended 1-131 rounds of 12in. and 13}in. ammunition during the whole action, mostly in the first two hours, yet very little damage was done to the enemy, whose shins suffered most under the fire of the Fifth Rattle Sonndron and Jellicoe’s battle fleet! The gunnery officer of the LotZow reported that neither the Lion nor the Princess Royal hit that shin once between 4.2 and 5.23 n.m.. and their total hits were three in 05 minutes! How differently things might have gone had

Beatty ensured himself from the start I of flic support of Evan-Thomas's ships, which were one ol the best shooting . squadrons in the Grand I'leet! High Seas Fleet Joins In. At 4.33 p.m. the German battle fleet was sighted, and seven minutes later Beatty promptly and quite properly altered course right round and. headed northward to close with Jellicoe s e licet, which was coining down al lull speed. Again the signalling appears to have been at fault. The signal to turn having been made by flags only wa> not clear in the mist and smoki of battle to the Fifth Battle Squadron some miles astern. This squadron being therefore, still on a southerly course, rapidly approached our battle-cruisers as they steered to the northward. Ibe sig nal to turn was then seen, and iinmcdiatelv the Lion had passed on her norther Iv course, Evan-I homes turned his ships astern of the battle-cruisers. Dining this turn the Fifth Battle hquadroi. came under fire from the leading ships of the German Battle l icet, and the Barham was severely hit. more than once a few minutes after turning. Ou the run north Beatty lost touch with the enemy altogether and ceased firing from 5.12 p.m. till 5.-10 P ; m., when a few intermittent rounds were tired, tin Fifth Battle Squadron, two miles astern of the Lion, however, continued to be hotlv engaged with both enemy battle cruisers and battleships, on which eon sideraMe damage was inflicted, until well after 6 p.m.. and action had been joined by Jellicoe’s battle fleet.