DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

Dominion, Volume 21, Issue 15, 12 October 1927, Page 11

DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

THAT WAR OFFICE HISTORY. Referring to the cabled references to the War Office History of the Dardanelles Campaign, a correspondent, "No Hero, But an Anzac,” refers at length to wnat happened in his own vicinity at that historic landing and incidentally comments that the Aussies took the brunt of the actual lauding on the beach. Continuing, he says:— “I understand it was never intended that we should land at Anzac Cove but a couple of miles further up the coast. I doubt if our officers had any definite objective outside of Constantinople. Looking back, one realises that had the whole of the colonial forces been concentrated on Hill 971 (i.e., apex in Suvla Bay stunt) it could have been taken and held, but the fault was with the staff and not the ordinary officers and men, “To criticise the Aussies’ courage is absurd. I fought with him in the Boer War as well as on Gallipoli, and to my mind, outside the little Ghurka of India, there is nothing on the face of the earth that will equal him for sheer devil. The Aussies, as I have known them, officers and men in the mass, would not show fear in the face of anything on earth, and that corers a good deal. “To criticise his discipline would be more reasonable. From an Imperial officer’s point of view the Australian is devoid of discipline, and all the training in the world would have very little effect on him in this sense. He first started to consider the necessity of discipline after being cut to . pieces through over-running his objective in France. , "Comparisons are odious, but General Monash’s criticism of . English troops on Gallipoli is hardly fair to. the lads concerned and recalls an incident that occurred in my own vicinity. Some of the first of Kitchener’s Army were filing through to take over a line of trenches. A Turk’s shell came over and killed or wounded fourteen of the leading men. Those at the rear hesifated to go forward, and I saw an Australian major draw his revolver and with forcible language threaten to shoot anyone that hesitated to .go forwani. A number of our boys witnessed the same thing and were a bit disparagamg in their remarks, but I asked them if they had noticed the faces of the troops. They were mere lads, Sir, and.l doubt if even our own territorials coming from the same environment would have acted differently. "General Monash's reference to the *>9th Division is as it should be, and it was only the real British Tommy that could ‘have effected a landing at Cape Helles or successfully carried, out such as the retreat from Mons. I will never forget the cheers they, or some of them, gave us when we advanced over the last of our own frenches on to the 'Daisy Patch’ at Capo Helles in May, 1915. , It was. sheer spontaneous good-will from British regular soldiers to colonial volunteer comIn conclusion General Monash mentions Suvla Bay. The troops were raw. Sir but they would have done better had their officers been different I remember on August 7 pointing to an Imperial officer hundreds of troops grouped about within a thousand yards of the main objective. I told the officer candidly that he should get into communication with the heads and urge an advance, even if it was done after dark. He reckoned he could do no"I%el'ieve the inquiry into the failure of the Suvla Bar stunt proved that it was more the officers’ fault than the men’s.”