THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

Dominion, Volume 18, Issue 59, 4 December 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

, GALLIPOLI—FROM THE INSIDE EVACUATION ’ A THUNDERBOLT FOR KITCHENER Mr. Winston Churchill, in the twenty-fourth article of his series of war memoirs, details the chain of events which led up to the decision to abandon the Peninsula—a decision, hfe tells us, that fell like a thunderbolt on Kitchener,

(Exclusive to “The Dominion.”)

(In intervening chapters Mr. Churchill tells the glorious story of the exploits of the British submarines in the Sea of Marmora in 1915, and gives the history, of “the ruin of the Balkans during this period, when the Dardanelles army was left to languish in order that troops might be found for a new and disastrous offensive in the West and for the Salonika project.) THE ABANDONMENT OF THE DARDANELLES The events described in the last chapter led directly to the abandonment of the enterprise against the Dardanelles. In the first place, the impending opening of through communications between Germany and Turkey offered to the Turks the pros’ pect of large supplies of all kinds, and particularly of heavy guns ana ammunition. Our troops on the Peninsula, whose positions did not allow of any local withdrawal, were threatened, with, a very great increase in the hostile bombardment. Secondly, the Salonika expedition must become a serious rival to th© Dardanelles, drawing upon the existing strength of a harassed army, and intercepting and diverting reinforcements and supplies. Apprehensions of approaching failure, if not indeed of final disaster, were did what I could to stem the adverse movement in the. Cabinet and correct extravagant pessimism. None of< my recommendations produced any effective results. Our policy diverged increasingly from the conceptions I had formed of the conduct of the war. Only the fear >if a massacre on the beaches and of the loss of a large proportion of the army delayed for a time the evacuation of Gallipoli and the abandonment of the enterprise. HAMILTON RECALLED On October 14 it was decided to recall Sir lan Hamilton and to send out in his place General Munro, who had already commanded an army in France, and was deeply imbued with Western ideas. . General Monro was an officer of settled ideas and swift decision. He came, he saw, he capitulated. Indeed, to be severely accurate, he decided' before he saw. He reached the Dardanelles on October 28; and already on the 29th he and his staff were discussing nothing but evacuation. On the 30th ho landed on the Peninsula, without going beyond the beaches he familiarised himself in the epace of six hours with the conditions prevailing on the. fifteen-mile front of Anzac, Suvla, and Helles, and spoke a few discouraging words io the principal officers at each point. To the divisional commanders summoned to meet him at their headquarters, he said: “Supposing that you are going to get no more drafts, can you maintain your-position in spite of the arrival of strong reinforcements with heavy guns and limitless German ammunition?” He thus collected a number of dubious answers, armed with which he returned to Imbros. < MONRO’S FLYING VISIT He never again set foot on the . Peninsula during the tenure of hiy command. His Chief-of-Staff, also an enthusiast for evacuation, never visited it nt all. On October 31 General Monro dispatch ed his telegram recommending the total evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the final abandonment of the campaign. According to his own statemente, he contemplated, in addition to the ruin of the whole en- ' terprise, a loss of from 30 to 40 per cent, of the army —i.e., about forty thousand officers and men. This hp was prepared to accept. Two days later he left for Egypt, leaving the command of the Dardanelles Army temporarily in the hands of General Birdwood. General Monro’s telegram of “Evacution” fell like a thunderbolt upon Lord /Kitchener, and for the moment under the shock he had risen in all the strength which he commanded when he was attuned to the respective corps headquarters, he put separately and in turn a question in heroic inspirations of Britain. “I ABSOLUTELY REFUSE” Lord Kitchener to General Birdwood. November 3, 1915. Verv secret. You know the report sent in by Monro. T shall come out to you; am leaving to-morrow night. I have seen Captain Keyes, and I believe the Admiralty will agree to making naval attempt to force the passage of the Straits. . . . I. absolutely refuse to sign orders for evacuation, which I think would be the gravest disaster and would condemn a large percentage of our men to death or imprisonment. Monro will b'e appointed to the nommaßd of the Salonika Force. Here was the true Kitchener. Here was the man the British Empire believed him to be. in whom millions set their faith —resolute, self-reliant, creative. lion-hearted. Unhanpilv the next day— Lord Kitchener to General Birdwood. November 4, 1915. T am arranged. . . The more I look at the problem the less I !tee mv wav through, so you had better work out very quietly and secretlv and scheme for getting the troons off the peninsula. On the same October 31 that General Monro dispatched his telegram of evacuation to Lord Kitchener, Admiral von Usedom, who. it will be remembered. commanded the fortress of the Dandanelles and all the marine dtefences of the Straits, completed a dispatch to the Emperor dealing with

the events of the past month. He wrote: — The great attack which we have been expecting on the land front has not taken place since the advance inaugurated by the new landing on August 7 north of the Ariburnu front was brought to a standstill. At the end of September reports of moves of troops and vehicles increased. Information from Salonika confirms that troops are being drawn thither from the Dandanelles front. I do not, howeVer. consider it probable that the enemy will evacuate his position without hard fighting. In order to drive him out a very thorough artillery preparation is necessary, and for this the munitions on the spot or which can be brought up are insufficient. He proceeded to dwell upon the dangerous manner in which the fortress defences of the Straits had been weakened through the repeated withdrawals of the mobile artillery, particularly the howitzers, on which his whole system depended. In addition to the fort-nine howitzers and mobile guns, with their supplies of ammunition, withdrawn in Mav and June, he had during August and September been forced l to cede another twentv-onle of his most valuable howitzers and mobile guns. The whole of the vital intermediate _ defences of the forts contained at this time only twenty mobile howitzers and mortars. KEYES SAYS FLEET COULD DO IT Meanwhile Commodore Keyes, Chief of the Staff to Admiral de Robeck, ,could endure the position at the Dardanelles no longer. He had been throughout convinced that the Fleet could at any time with proper preparation, force the Dardanelles and enter the Marmora in sufficient strength. During the summer he had caused detailed plans for tills operation to be prepared under his direction by the Naval Staff. These plans were now completed, and Commodore Keyes declared himself confident of their success. In this opinion, he was most strongly supported by Rear-Admiral Wemyss. The joint representations of the Chief of Staff and of his Second-in-Command was not, however, acceptable to Admiral de Robeck. Commodore Keyes thereupon asked to be relieved of his functions in order that he might return home and lay his plans before the Board of Admiralty. Admiral de Robeck, not without personal magnanimity, asked him to retain his position, and accorded him leave of absence, full liberty, gmd “a fair field” to state his case, malting it clear, however, that he could not himself in any circumstances become responsible for a further naval attempt. Commodore Keyes therefore repaired to London forthwith, where he arrived on October 28. On November 2 the Prime Minister reconstituted the War Council, or Dardanelles Committee, as it had hitherto been styled. In its new form it was called the “War Committee” and was limited to the Prime Minister. Mr. Balfour, Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, and Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Bonar Law was addled ten days later under Conservative pressure. 1 was excluded. It was announced that this Committee would be responsible to the Cabinet for the whole direction of the war. On November 3 the new Committee met to consider the question of evacuating .the Dardanelles. The military opinions were divided. The Committee had also before them the plans of Commodore Keyes, endorsed by Admiral Wemyss, in regard to which the Admiralty War Staff had pronounced no decided opinion.

TO-MORROW. The end of Gallipoli; dawn breaks on empty trenches.