THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

Dominion, Volume 18, Issue 57, 1 December 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

-5 GALLIPOLI—FROM THE INSIDE “,THE ONLY PRIZE WHICH LIES WITHIN REACH” NEEDLESS DELAY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES In the twenty-third article of his series of war memoirs Mr. Winston Churchill continues his story of the preparations made for the big August push on the Peninsula. He refers also to a “very hot” discussion at a meeting of the Dardanelles Committee on a proposal to “cut the loss and come away. (Exclusive to “The Dominion.”)

The naval measures decided on by the'new Board of Admiralty and the new War Council were in principle the game, slightly extended, as those which had been previously pressed by me upon Lord Fisher on the eve of his resignation. The military decisions were, however, on a far larger scale than any which Lord Kitchener had countenanced hitherto. Besides the two divisions which ib was in 'onteniplation to send on May 17 and May 30 respectively (one of which had already gone), two others were added ; and of the four divisions so assigned to Sir lan Hamilton three Were to be divisions of the New Army, which was considered perhaps unjustly, superior to the Territorial divisions at this period. “CUTTING THE LOSS”: A i HOT DISCUSSION The conclusions of the Dardanelles Committee of. June 7 were brought before the Cabinet on the 9th; and a very hot discussion arose on the general principle of whether the Dardanelles enterprise should be perserved in, or whether we should “cut our loss” and come away. This was, in fact, going over the whole process by which the Dardanelles Committee had arrived at their conclusions. The sense of the Cabinet on the whole was, however, clearly with the Committee, and in the end it was agreed that the three divisions should go as reinforcments to Sir lan 'Hamilton. There was, however, from the outset to the end a duality of opinion in the Cabinet, which, although it did not follow party lines, resembled a .party cleavage, and at every stage in the. rest of the Dardanelles operations crauscd serious embarrassment. Had the Prime Minister possessed or been able to acquire plenary authority, and had he been permitted to exercise it during May and June without distraction or interruption, it is my belief, based upon daily acquaintance with these transactions, that he would have taken the measures which even at this stage would have resulted in securing a decisive victory. But from the moment of the formation of the Coalition power was disbursed and counsels were divided, and every military decision had to be carried by the same sort of process of tact, temporising. and exhaustion which occurs over a clause in a keenly contested bill in tho House of Commons in time of peace. These facts are stated not with a view of making reproaches where all were equally sincere and equally well-meaning, but to explain the melancholy turn of events. We had now at length got on June 9 the kind of decisions which were necessary to carry the enterprise through to success. There was no military reason of any kind why the decisions which were reached on June 7 and June 9 should not have been taken within forty-eight hours of Sir lan Hamilton’s telegram of Maj' 17. But from causes in which the enemy had no part, which arose solely from the confusion into which the governing instrument in this country had been thrown, from a fortnight to three weeks were lost for over. The consequences wero momentous. Time was tho dominating factor. The extraordinary mobility and unexpectedness of amphibious power can only be exerted in strict relation to limited periods of time. The surprise, the rapidity, and the intensity of the attack are all dependent on the state of the enemy’s preparations at a given moment. Every movement undertaken oh one ' side can be matched by a counter-movement on the other. Force and time in this kind of' operation 'imount to almost the same thing, and each can to a very large extent be expressed in terms of the other. A week lost was about the same ns a division. Three divisions in February could have occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula with little fighting. Five could have captured it after March 18. Seven were insufficient at the end of April, but nine might just have done it. Eleven might have sufficed at the beginning of July. Fourteen were to prove insufficient on August 7. Moreover, one delay breeds another. MONTH’S NEEDLESS DELAY The date of the next great attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula was governed by two factors —the arrival of the new army, and to a lesser extent by the state of the moon. It was considered that a surprise landing at a fresh point could best lie effected on a moonless night. If, therefore, the dark period of July was missed, the operation in the particular form adopted must stand over till the similar period in August. It will be seen by reference to the decision of the Dardanelles Committee of June 7 that they contemplated an attack in the second week of July, and believed that the three new divisions would all have arrived by then. This would have been the most favourable moment. It could certainly have been achieved if the decision had been taken promptly on the receipt of Sir lan Hamilton’s telegram, or if, pending a general decision on policy the dispatch of reinforcements by divisions could have proceeded while the Government were considering the matter. But as it was, the troops that it was now decided to send did not or could not arrive in time for a July attack. The three New Army divisions did not, in fact, finish arriving until July had ended. Thus the great batt.'e of Anzac and Suvla Bay was fought in the second week of August, instead of, as would have been perfectly practicable, in the early part of duly. , ~ , n During tho month that was .thus lost, i.e., from the begin; ning of July to the beginning ot August, ten new Turkish divisions or their equivalents, besides important drafts, according to our row certain knowledge, reached fte defenders of the Peninsula.

And thus our new divisions, which had at last decided 1 to send, and which if sent in time would have given us a good superiority, wens equated and cancelled out before they got to the spot. Moreover, in tho interval our land forces were greatly waited and rediiccd by sickness and casualties, and the fleet was.exposed to continuous danger from submarines. The Germans acquired an ever-increasing control of the Turkish Army, and the whole methods of defence were in consequence far better organised. The defeats of the Russians in Galicia, during June and July produced a marked change in the fighting spirit of tho Turks on the Peninsula. The removal from Batoum of General Istomina.’ a urmy. which was thrown into the main Russian battlefields, liberated the considerable forces which the Turks had been forced to keep concentrated at or near Midia to guard against a landing there. Before June was half over it became clear that the reinforcements could not reach the Dardanelles in time for a July battle. The second week, in August was the earliest date when the troops woul'l be there, and the nights would be moonless. PRIZE WITHIN REACH

Mr. Balfour by most strenuous exertions was able to undertake the transport of additional troops. For this purpose he had recourse once again to the great liners Aquitania, Mauretania, and Olympic. For several weeks everyone had shrunk from using these giants on account of the awful consequences if they were sunk with seven or eight thousand men on board. The new First Lord, as he gradually began to measure and appraise the values and hazards in this terrible sphere, resolved to repeat the action which I had taken, providentially, without misadventure, six weeks before. In the end. therefpre, the two extra divisions were ordered to sail, andl it was certain they would arrive in time for the August battle. Meanwhile the Turks also on their side must be moving. On June 18 I completed the following further general memorandum for the Cabinet. I endeavoured in this to show the relation which the attack on the Dardanelles took to the whole field of the war. and concluded the memorandum thus:—

10. However, these vast problems are approached, the dominant needs emerge in clear sequence. First, to re-equip for 1916. Secondly,, to rally the Balkan States against Austria and Turkey, thus forcing the Central Powers to bleed along a new front, and at the same time protecting Italy. Thirdly, to nurse France through the winter. But in order that a voice may be heard amid the indistinct murmurings or unconvincjing assertions of tho various Governments, it is necessary that one of the Powers should speak, not only with the consciousness of a clear policy, but with the indispensable prestige of victory. It is open to Great Britain now to take tho

necessary lead in the Allied Councils. She commands the sea. In that respect her primary weapon has vindicated itself even more

decisively than the German army She wields the power of the purse. She is becoming an important arsenal of munitions. Her military strength, which has for some months been respectable, is growing substantially. She only requires victory to give her the ascendancy without which no good common action is to be expected. 11. There can be no doubt that we now possess tho means and the power to take Constantinople before the end of the summer if we act with decision and with a due sense of proportion. The striking down of one. of the three hostile Empires against which we are contending, and the fall to our arms of one of the most famous capitals in the world, with the results which must flow therefrom, will, conjoined with our other advantages. confer upon us a far-reach-ing influence among the Allies, and enable us to ensurq their indispensable co-operation.' Most of all, it will react on Russia. It will give the encouragement so sorely needed. It will give the reward so Ion" desired. It will render a service to an Ally unparalleled in tho history of nations. It will multiply tho resources and open the channel for tho re-equipment of the Russian armies. It will dominate the Balkan situation and cover Italy. It will resound through Asia. Here is the urizo, and the only prize, which lies within reach this year. It can certainly be won without unreasonable expense. and within a comparatively short time. But we must act now, and on a scale which makes speedy success certain. W.S.C. June 18, 1915. —Sydney “Sun” Copyright. MONDAY, General Monro visits Gallipoli; evacuation recommended : Kitchener “absolutely refuses to sign.”