THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

Dominion, Volume 18, Issue 56, 30 November 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

GALLIPOLI—FROM THE INSIDE ■ REINFORCEMENTS for the big push - IN AUGUST DAZZLING VISIONS OF VICTORY ■ The twenty-second article of Mr. Winston Churchill’s i series of war memoirs, after a reference to the navy’s readiness and efficiency, tells the story of the ‘‘visions of victory” seen through the preparations for the big August battles on the Peninsula. (Exclusive to “The Dominion.”)

Meanwhile, the British Navy was Erowins continually and rapidly in strength.. The fruits of the exertions ■ which had been made before and since the ’ outbreak of the war were being .reaped with each successive month. Battleships, battle cruisers. light cruisers in dozens, submarines m scores, destroyers in hundreds, small craft in thousands, were being armed and built, and were coming into commission in an unceasing and broadening tide. . > Tho manning arrangements to meet this enormous new construction were . ■) perfected for a year in advance. Everyrequirement known to the naval science of the day in guns, in torpedoes, in shells, in explosives, m propellant, in coal, in oil. and in auxiliary services had been .foreseen and provided for in harmonious relation to the expansion of our naval power. At the Admiralty we were in hot pursuit of most of the great key inventions and ideas of the war; and .. this long in advance of every other nation, friend or foe. Tanks, smoke, torpedo-seaplanes, directional wireless, cryptography, mine fenders, monitors, torpedo-proof ships, paravanes —all were being actively driven forward or developed. Poison gas alone we put aside —but not from want of comprehension. Even for the new submarine campaign, not to burst upon us for nearly eighteen months, the principal safeguarding measures had already been devised; the multitudes of vessels were building; the decoy ships were already at work. LEADERS OF THE NAVY ' Moreover, the true war leaders of ■: the navy had already, emerged from the ranks of peace-time merit, and in Beattv. Keyes, Tyrwhitt, Pakenham. and I must add Lewis Bayly—- ' ■ 'though under a temporary cloud—we had masters of the storm capable of rivalling upon the seas and against the enemy’s coasts the exploits of the famous sailor figures of the past. There remained only to devise and perfect those schemes of naval offensive which in spite, . and indeed by means of modern science and invention would have liberated the pentup skill and daring of our officers and men. There was also at hand that .. - -prolonged interlude, of ease and trainA , quillity upon salt water in which every -.'--■plan could be worked out with sure and deliberate study. From all this reward and opportunity Fisher, bv his own impulsive, fatal act. and I. through causes which these pages expose, were for ever disinherited. We lingered on, helpless spectators, until the period of halcyon ”* I 'weather came fearfully to an end and the very life of the State was plunged again into supreme hazard on the seas. .“HOPEFUL & DANGEROUS” Although without executive power, I was treated with much consideration bv the new Cabinet. I continued to ■ sit in my old place on Lord Kitchen-«>;-’er’s left hand. I was nominated) to " serve on the committee of nine Ministers which, under the title of the Dardanelles Committee, was virtually the old War Council. I was invited to prepare statements on the., situation, , both naval and general, and every . facility was placed at my disposal by the Admiralty for marshalling and checking the facts. On June 1 I circularised bv two documents. The concluding part of the second was as follows :— ’ ■ ~L~ The position at the Dardanelles is at once hopeful and dangerous. The longer/it lasts the more dangerous it will become. The sooner it is settled the sooner everything ' can again, if desired, he concentrated on the French and Flemish front. The unexpected delays in beginning the military operations and the gradual manner in which the troops have been dispatched , have already given time for the . ...Turks to make elaborate defen.L'.pj Rive preparations, to bring up re- ' inforcements from Syria and elsee- -'where, and for the Germans to send submarines: If we delay longer in sending the necessary '• reinforcements, or send them -f.: . piecemeal, we shall have in the end to send all, and more than all, that are now asked for, and we shall run the double risk of fighting the whole Turkish army in relays around the Kilid Bahr plateau, and of being seriously harassed by number of German submarines, which will certainly be attracted to the spot by the success which has attended the first one. It seems most urgent to try to obtain a decision here, and wind up the enterprise in a satisfactory manner as soon as possible. Neuve Chapelle and other battles in Flanders have shown that our troops and the French, with adequate numbers and artillery, can storm the enemy’s entrenchments. But no strategic results are obtained in Franco and Flanders, as Lord Kitchener points out, from making, at an inordinate cost, an advance of three or four miles. Beyond tho ground captured so dearly lies all the breadth of Flanders before even the Rhine is reached, and before the artillery of the attack can move forward and reregister a new line of entrenchments not less strong than the old has been prepared by the enemy. But an advance of three or four miles in the Gallipoli Peninsula would produce strategic results of a decisive character. We have not at present enough high explosive shell for a sustained and continuous offensive in France, but the comparatively small quantities which are required at the Dardanelles are available. Here there is no room for new lines to be formed in rear, and no retreat for either side but into tho sea. Every 500 yards gained here is an important step towards an imminent a.nd vital result. And what a result!

VISIONS OF VICTORY As soon as our troops can obtain positions from which the Kilid Bahr plateau can Si rendered unteuable tho whole Turk ish army concentrated there is lost. As soon as the plateau of Kilid Bahr is in our hands the forts on the European side must be evacuated by the enemy. Those on the Asiatic are commanded ■from the European, side. The door is thus opespd to the Fleet, which at some moment in these operations will advance through the Narrows, sweeping the mine field methodically. Once the forts and minefields ol the Narrows are passed there is nothing to stop the fleet entering the Marmora and, once in tho Marmora, it is a few hours’ steam to Constantinople. Thia TurcoGerman fleet ran then certainly be destroyed. Its destruction removes the menace which has hitherto prevented a Russian army from crossing the Black Sea and attacking Constantinople from the north. Although the Russian army which had been held ready to profit by our success has now been drawn away by more urgent interim needs, tho Russians certainly will not kt Constantinople fall without their participation. Bulgaria cannot remain indifferent to the movement and approach of these events. She will be inevitably forced to march on Adrianople, and with Bulgaria the whole of the Balkans must come out on our side. Any Turkish troops in other parts of the Gallipoli Peninsula will be incidentally cut off as soon as the fleet severs the water communication with Clianak and closes the Bulair isthmus from both sides. But the position of all the burkish forces in Europe, whatever their numbers, is by the same series of events decisively affected. Their homes are in Asia, their food comes from Asia, their Government will have fled to Asia. Thby must fall into our hands with all their stores and artillery, as a mere by-product cf the main operation. And all this depends on the conquest c-f three or four miles of ground Where else in all thle ' theatres of the war can we look during the next three months for a- decisive victory, or for results of this extraordinary character? The consequences of failure, on the either hand, are set out by Lord Kitchener in paragraph 32 of the War Office Note in .a manner which leaves nothing to be said. W. S. C! DARDANELLES COMMITTEE Opinion declared itself increasingly favourable to the prosecution of the enterprise at the Dardanelles and generally in the sense of the views which I had set forth on the military problem. It was not, however, until the afternoon of Juno 7 that the first meeting of the Dardanlles Committee was convened. It was composed of: Tlie Prime Minister, Lord Kitchener, Lord Landsdowne, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Balfour, Lord Curzon, Lord Seibourne, Lord Crewe, and myself. Mr. Lloyd Georoge, though a member, was not present on this ooccasion. The committee addressed itself to the requests for reinforcements contained in Sir lan Hamilton’s telegram of May 17. Lord Kitchener pronounced with the utmost decision in favour of prosecuting the campaign at tho Dardanelles with the greatest vigour. He declared that he would reinforce Sir lan Hamilton with three divisions of the New Army in addition to the Lowland Territorial Division, which had already been dispatched under orders issued before the interregnum. He stated that he could not consent to remain responsible for the conduct of the war if it were decided to abandon the attack upon the Gallipoli Peninsula. The council accepted this clear guidance not merely with relief but with satisfaction. Opinion was unanimous. The following conclusions were recorded: — 1. To reinforce Sir lan Hamilton with the three remaining divisions of the First New Army with a view to an assault in the second week of July- . , 2. To send out certain naval units —Sydney “Sun” Copyright.

TO-MORROW. Waiting for the noon; the prize within reach.